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Research Abstract 
 
Since the early 1980’s there has been a heightened academic interest in the field of 
commitment, particularly as it relates to business relationships.  Knowledge of 
commitment continues to advance and has begun splintering and applied into specific 
and narrow fields.  The particular field of interest in this study surrounds commitment 
levels in business relationships within property and casualty insurance distribution 
networks.      
 
The intent of understanding and enhancing commitment levels is to allow stakeholders 
to explore new ways to improve profitability.  This can be achieved by deepening the 
level of understanding and knowledge of relationship partners with a view to 
anticipating and fulfilling their needs better than the competition.  However, 
commitment is intangible and involves many factors including human emotion.  This 
increases the difficulty in comprehending the whole phenomenon of commitment.      
 
To assist in furthering the knowledge in this area, transaction cost theory is examined 
and applied to insurance company and broker relationships.  In seeking a greater 
understanding of the underlying drivers of commitment, this thesis investigates the 
theoretical contribution of transaction cost economics theory in assessing commitment 
levels.  The purpose is to utilize the elements of transaction costs as a means to extend 
the awareness of how commitment is constructed, and to search for ways to improve 
and strengthen these relationships.   
 
The primary research method consists of three major case studies within the Canadian 
property and casualty insurance distribution sector.  The first case study explores the 
perspectives of insurance brokers in Ontario.  The second study reveals the perceptions 
of relationship managers employed with ING Canada, the country’s largest property and 
casualty insurance company.  Lastly, the research incorporates a series of interviews 
with ING Canada senior executives to capture their perspectives and validate the 
research findings from the first two case studies.  These investigations into the Canadian 
insurance industry have provided several outputs, chief among them is the development 
of a conceptual model referred to as the “Commitment Wheel.”  This model has the 
advantages of seating affective and calculative commitment at the centre of a moving 
environment of commitment enablers. 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  Commitment, Transaction Costs, Property and Casualty Insurance, 
Exploratory Case Study  
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 1  Introduction 
 
When contemplating the notion of commitment, people’s definitions and visions are 
varied.  Commitment does not appear to be a finite point on a widely-accepted scale.  In 
fact it is an evolving and dynamic range on a moving continuum.  It is influenced by 
many factors including human emotion.  Its intangibility makes it difficult to define and 
measure.  On the surface it seems simple enough, but this simplicity masks the 
complexity of its underlying issues in most modern-day commercial relationships.   
 
The Canadian financial services sector is in a period of unprecedented change and 
industry members have developed a heightened need to align themselves with potent 
and committed allies.  A keen awareness and understanding of these allies is paramount, 
thus precipitating the need to examine and characterize the varying forms of business 
arrangements.  This need is clear and is exemplified within the property and casualty 
insurance distribution sector, specifically within the insurer-broker channel.   
 
As the literature suggests (Phillips and Pugh 2000) the topic of study should be a subject 
of personal interest to the researcher which it is in this case by virtue of life-long 
industry involvement, study, and employment.  Initially, the research goal was to 
identify and understand what academia could contribute to understanding and 
improving the knowledge of commitment, and conversely how industry could inform 
academia. 
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 The author’s professional employment-experience assisted immensely in identifying the 
preliminary research questions.  These were subsequently refined by the literature 
review and key informant interviews, and evolved into the research question which will 
be discussed in the following section.  During the interviews, the author’s industry 
experience significantly assisted in gaining access to busy executives, managers, and 
brokerage owners while providing credibility to interviewees regarding the research 
agenda.   
 
The foregoing acknowledges that the author brings a practitioner’s perspective to this 
research project.  However, strict attention was paid to ground the dissertation in 
academic and not practitioner literature and research practices. 
 
1.1  Introducing the Research Question 
 
1.1.1  Brief Statement of the Research Topic 
 
The early 1980’s witnessed an increasing academic interest in the area of commitment 
theory.  Knowledge continued to be advanced through the 1990’s and again into the 
new millennium.  Diverse examinations of commitment were conducted including 
relationships of principals and agents, suppliers and customers, business-to-business 
arrangements, etc.  The purpose of advancing this knowledge is to gain a better 
understanding of the various aspects of commitment, its constructs and integral 
components.   
 
The volume of increasing interest in commitment theory has moved in tandem with 
further research into the area of transaction cost economics.  It is rather common to 
discover inter-organizational research within various fields that contain elements of 
5 
 
 transaction cost economics (Leiblein and Miller 2003).  Acceptance as a scholarly 
endeavour was secured in 1991 when the eminent academic Ronald Coase received the 
Nobel Prize for his ground-breaking research into this field.  Moreover, Oliver 
Williamson also recently received the prestigious Nobel Prize in 2009 for his work in 
this area.  Transaction cost theory has parallels with commitment theory, particularly 
with their exposures of the various bonds and linkages between organizations.  Thus the 
intent of this study is direct application of the factors and concepts of both theories to 
further the academic understanding of commitment.   
 
The creation and development of theoretical frameworks incorporating theories and 
models from the literature can assist in focusing and binding the research (Huberman 
and Miles 2002).  In the context of exploratory case studies, conceptual or theoretical 
frameworks may be less important (Hussey and Hussey 1997) or less clear in structure, 
however they can aid in arranging data collection while enabling exploration of a wide 
range of topics (Barnes 2001).  This dissertation will investigate the utility of theoretical 
contributions from transaction cost theory in an effort to further understand the field of 
commitment.  To accomplish this, an exploratory case study has been conducted.  In 
addition, this particular investigation into the Canadian insurance industry has provided 
several outputs, chief among them is the development of a conceptual model referred to 
as the “Commitment Wheel.”  This model has the advantages of seating affective and 
calculative commitment at the centre of a moving environment of commitment enablers. 
 
1.1.2  The Research Question 
 
The overall research objective is to increase the body of knowledge of commitment 
through exploratory case study research.  As indicated, the primary research question 
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 will explore the utility of transaction cost economics theory in an effort to increase 
understanding of commitment and is lead by the following question: 
Does Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explain the varying degrees of 
calculative commitment levels in relationships between insurers and brokers 
in the Canadian property and casualty insurance sector? 
The research design specifically selected three important stakeholder groups as the 
primary data source.  These included insurance company executives and relationship 
managers from ING Canada along with property and casualty insurance brokerage 
owners and senior managers.  It is recognized and acknowledged that other perspectives 
may be equally valid.  For example, regulators, suppliers, and customers can and likely 
do have divergent opinions or perspectives on commitment.  However, the limitations of 
a PhD dissertation precluded interviewing all stakeholders.  Furthermore, it is argued 
that the opinions of the selected groups are essential in advancing the knowledge further 
in this field of study.  These selected groups provide different perspectives of their joint 
relationships which has been afforded them due to their different vantage points.  This 
will add depth and richness to the quality of the data being gathered for the study.    
 
1.2  Why this Topic is Worthy of Study 
 
Further research in the area of commitment is necessary in order to understand and 
identify the underlying issues that can either enhance or destroy relationships between 
organizations.  The notion of closeness in this context has been the subject of 
considerable interest in a number of diverse fields (Daft 2001).  Committed 
relationships have the ability to add value in both upstream and downstream value-
adding chains, and thus it has the capability to enhance distribution channels as well 
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 (Heide 1994).  More research is necessary in the principal and agent distribution 
channel due to the variety of forms that can exist.   
 
As the literature review will demonstrate, there were several high-quality academic 
studies conducted which examined principal-agent distribution and/or sales 
arrangements in the commitment area (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005; Daft 2001).  
But there is not an abundance of research in this field whereby the distributor is an 
organization itself as opposed to a single individual, and where this organization 
operates within a highly-regulated industry.  In addition, this thesis also examines the 
topic from several points of view, including an internal stratified approach from the 
principal and also from the owner’s point of view at the distributor level.  As indicated, 
this stratified approach will illustrate the differences in perspectives of the same 
relationship from different vantage points, thus adding a wealth of new insights into the 
construction of commitment and how the parties view the strength of the relationship. 
   
1.3  Introduction to the Key Informants 
 
A qualitative, exploratory case study approach was chosen as the optimum method for 
examining the underlying issues in the research topic area.  Open-ended questioning of 
key informants would be undertaken in order to solicit perspectives and opinions of 
recognized experts in the relevant stakeholder groups.  As mentioned, these groups 
include insurance company executives and relationship managers from ING Canada 
along with property and casualty insurance brokerage owners and senior managers 
       
ING Canada is the largest property and casualty insurance company in Canada, and is a 
member of the Amsterdam-based ING Group family.  ING Canada recently became a 
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 publicly-traded company, launching an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of its shares in 
December 2004.  As a market leader, the company strives to be innovative and on the 
cutting-edge.  In 2006, ING Canada housed approximately 6,700 employees in about 50 
offices across Canada and maintained a national network of 2,700 independent broker 
relationships.  Although not as relevant to this study, ING Canada also owns Belair 
Direct, a direct-to-consumer property and casualty insurer.   
 
As a publicly-traded company, ING Canada is under the direction of a formal, corporate 
Board of Directors.  Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.) Claude Dussault reports to this 
Board and there are several Executive Vice Presidents and Senior Vice-Presidents 
reporting to him.  Eight of these individuals, including the C.E.O. have contributed to 
this study by virtue of their participation in the case study interviews.   
 
Within the branch operations are key relationship individuals (managers and regional 
vice presidents), eleven of which have contributed to this study.  These key informants 
regularly interact internally with other functional areas of the organization and also 
externally with the independent brokerage owners, managers and staff members.  They 
play an important role in maintaining effective lines of communication between ING 
Canada and the broker community. 
 
Within the brokerage community the level of owner and senior manager were selected 
as most appropriate for key informants.  These individuals are the decision-makers for 
their firms.  Moreover, they are the main point of contact at their company and they 
manage the relationships with the insurance companies.  In the Canadian insurance 
brokerage community, many of these individuals are second and third generation 
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 (family) owners and their decisions have a direct impact on their profitability and long-
term survival. 
 
1.4 Background 
 
ING Canada is the first publicly-traded property and casualty (P&C) insurance company 
to operate in Canada.  Until early in 2004, ING Canada was wholly-owned by ING 
Groep based in the Netherlands.  Although they retained a large ownership stake in ING 
Canada, ING Groep launched one of Canada’s most successful Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) in 2004, thus raising substantial capital and positioned the company to pursue its 
acquisition strategy.   
 
The current company consists of an amalgam of several former industry players, each 
acquired and now operating under the ING Canada banner.  Of note, some of the more 
recognizable names include:  Halifax Insurance, Western Union, Group Commerce, 
Wellington Insurance, Zurich Insurance, Guardian Insurance, Allianz Insurance, Nordic 
Insurance, among others.  This is part of an ongoing consolidation within the Canadian 
insurance marketplace and other significant players are displaying a hungry appetite for 
merger and acquisition opportunities.  It is important to understand this phenomenon at 
the outset, as it helps to define the Canadian insurance marketplace and has an influence 
and impact upon the shaping of the beliefs of market participants. 
 
ING Canada advocates a concentration strategy whereby it encourages its brokerage 
partners to narrow their product shelf and reduce the number of insurance companies 
they represent.  Preference is given to brokers complying with this notion, and in 
particular to those that allocate a greater percentage of their premium revenue in favour 
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 of ING.  The intent is not necessarily to abdicate the broker’s independent status, but 
more as a means of becoming more efficient and knowledgeable about the companies 
they do represent.  This is a philosophical debate that continues because of its many 
implications and complexity.  This aspect of the current state of the marketplace is also 
important to be aware because of how it will shape and form opinions on the part of the 
respondents. 
 
The focus of this case study was the brokerage community (and ING Canada’s 
involvement) in the Province of Ontario for several reasons.  Ontario is the economic, 
social, and technological hub of Canada, containing the nation’s capital city (Ottawa), 
the country’s largest city (Toronto), plus the largest mix of both urban and rural 
brokerage operations in Canada.  ING Canada maintains contractual relationships with 
the majority of Ontario’s insurance brokers (roughly 1200 out of 2000).   
 
As the market is relatively stable, and is driven by the number of automobile and 
homeowners (plus commercial) requirements, market-share growth is vital to the 
success of the company.  Beyond organic growth and efficiency opportunities, 
acquisitions form a key ingredient of ING Canada’s success formula.  Consolidation is 
also occurring in the brokerage community as brokers seek efficiencies and improved 
growth rates.  Differentiation is often unclear between brokers as many of them 
represent similar insurers within the same marketplace.  Thus mergers and acquisitions 
serve as the quickest route to growth and efficiency and also provide an alternative 
succession plan for owners. 
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 Rationalization is taking place on the part of both brokers and insurers for other reasons 
as well, beyond growth and succession planning.  The independent broker channel is 
under a constant threat from direct insurance writers, i.e. those that bypass the brokers 
and deal direct with clients.  Although this is a separate philosophical debate as to the 
value that brokers bring to clients, technology has been a catalyst in the proliferation of 
direct-writers.  Telephony improvements, lower long distance telephone costs and call 
centre advancements have each contributed to the constant threat to the broker 
community.  But ultimately it is the consumer that determines the value of the service 
and advice brought forth by brokers, and although the broker channel is evolving it is 
thriving. 
 
1.5  Organization of the Thesis 
 
This chapter sets the context and describes the rationale and purpose for the research 
study.  The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter Two undertakes a 
scan of the environment in which the participants operate within; Chapter Three 
assembles and discusses relevant and competing theories; Chapter Four reviews and 
assesses commitment literature from academic sources; Chapter Five reviews and 
assesses transaction cost economics literature from academic sources; Chapter Six 
assembles the emergent sub-topics and provides a link to the following study: Chapter 
Seven provides an overview of the methodology and methods used in conducting this 
research; Chapter Eight compiles and presents the analysis and findings from the three 
aforementioned case studies; Chapter Nine discusses the results of these studies, 
examining the contribution from transaction cost economics theory, as well as 
considering other emergent findings; Chapter Ten concludes this thesis by responding 
to the primary research question and presenting the overall research conclusions.  In 
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 addition, it discusses research limitations and suggests future potential research.  The 
following Table 1 summarizes the thesis chapters. 
 
Table 1:  Thesis Outline         
 
Chapter Purpose Approach 
1 Introduction Set the stage, introduce 
research topic and questions. 
Topic introduction and initial 
research definitions. 
2 Environmental 
Scan 
Examine the current inner-
workings of the industry. 
Present topical aspects of the 
insurance industry in Canada. 
3 Theoretical 
Perspectives 
Assemble relevant theoretical 
perspectives for review. 
Compare and contrast relevant 
theoretical considerations. 
4 
& 
5 
Literature 
Review 
Literature review of academic 
literature (Chapter 2 includes 
commitment literature and 
chapter 3 includes transaction 
cost literature). 
Review of relevant academic 
literature. 
6 Advancing the 
Body of 
Knowledge 
Assemble the emergent sub-
topics in the commitment & 
transaction cost theories.  Link 
these items to the research 
methods and purposes. 
Compile the key topics developed 
during the literature review. 
7 Methodology Presentation and discussion of 
Research Methodology and 
Methods 
Research gap, methodological - 
exploratory case study method, 
contribution of key informant 
interviews, field procedures, 
interview questionnaire, etc. 
8 Case Studies Present the three case studies. Presentation of the findings & 
responses from the 3 case studies. 
9 Discussion Determination of findings, 
presentation of research 
questions and research 
objectives and introduction of 
conceptual model. 
Analysis and triangulation of 
findings, cross-case comparisons, 
etc. 
10 Conclusion Conclusions and implications 
of the research. 
Responding to the research 
question, implications of research, 
limitations, and final conclusions. 
11 Bibliography   
12 Appendix   
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 1.6  Summary 
 
In summary, the proposed research will explore, through the application of sound 
research methodologies, organizational and executive perceptions on the construct of 
commitment.  This research will apply transaction cost economics theory to this topic 
and consider whether the theory enhances the overall comprehension and suggests 
practical applications, addressing the Academic-Practitioner gap (Swamidass 1991).   
 
The development of the academic literature will be explored with a view to 
understanding how it arrived at its current state along with any gaps that are evident.  
The current literature will form the foundation for this study and will be advanced 
further with the analysis of the data garnered during the process.  The contemporary 
issues confronting the Canadian insurance industry provides an intellectually thought-
provoking environment for this research due to the rapid consolidation and evolution 
that it is undergoing.  Commitment levels in this industry are under unprecedented strain 
and pressure because of these changes thus matters involving transaction costs are 
increasingly under scrutiny. 
 
From the perspective of executives, senior managers, and owners themselves, this study 
will explore and analyze the various perspectives and responses to changes in 
commitment levels.  It will examine the influences and impacts of the factors of 
transaction costs upon each other and upon commitment itself.  These investigations 
into the Canadian insurance industry will provide several outputs, chief among them 
will be the development and introduction of a conceptual model referred to as the 
“Commitment Wheel.”  This model will have the advantage of seating affective and 
calculative commitment at the centre of a moving environment of commitment enablers. 
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 2 Environmental Scan 
In order to correctly situate the ING Canada distribution system in the proper context, 
this section will describe and examine the roles and duties performed by the various 
relevant industry stakeholders.  Whereas some groups have a direct impact on business 
relationships, such as the insurance companies and the brokers themselves, others have 
a vicarious influence (e.g. regulators and associations) yet provide the backdrop and 
landscape for the distribution systems to exist.  Each of these groups will be analyzed, 
along with an inspection of how the industry is evolving. 
 
2.1 Industry Overview 
Since the start of the new millennium, the Canadian property and casualty (P&C) 
insurance industry has consistently generated in excess of $20 billion in net premiums 
annually.  As a percentage of Canadian GDP, the industry’s recently consistent 
contribution has remained within the range of 4 to 4.5%, similar to the United States 
and most Western countries (SwissRe 2009).  The most recent figure available from 
Statistics Canada (January 2009) suggests the range of $27 billion in 2002.  Automobile 
insurance remains to be the largest class of insurance in Canada in the P&C area, 
regularly contributing over 50% of those net premiums.  Between the insurers and the 
related industries such as brokers, actuaries, etc. roughly 100,000 people are employed 
within this industry.  In addition, the industry holds $66 billion in assets, thus making it 
a significant contributor to the economy in Canada.  Seven of the ten largest insurers in 
Canada are foreign-owned and overall foreign insurers represent 64% of net premiums 
earned (Statistics Canada 2009). 
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 The property and casualty insurance industry in Canada is in a state of transition based 
upon shifting power and control over distribution and relationships.  Matters of 
regulation and legacy cultures continue to provide resistance and roadblocks to 
meaningful changes that have the potential to move the industry in a positive direction.  
Some of these roadblocks and resistance stems from distribution partners (i.e. brokers) 
that are small and undercapitalized, thus are incapable of updating their ICT inter-
connections.  This has the result of retarding growth and progress.  Moreover, an 
increasing trend in regulatory requirements is diverting time, effort and capital away 
from other initiatives and projects that could otherwise enhance productivity.  A 
minority of players on all sides have been pivotal in endeavoring to make, at a 
minimum, incremental improvements in processes, technologies and regulatory matters.  
Unfortunately, this does little to address the necessary and substantive changes in 
matters of business strategy whereby competitive threats are beginning to manifest.  The 
threats include those from banks, branding and competitive pricing and direct writers. 
 
Recognizing this resistance to change, certain groups are emerging with new approaches 
and consumer-friendly alternatives that are beginning to take root.  In particular are the 
Canadian banks and multi-national corporations, both of which can bring economies of 
scale and specific expertise that can provide efficiencies and economic leverage 
uncommon in smaller Canadian P&C companies.  In addition, they bring more stringent 
underwriting protocols, heightened risk management capabilities along with advantages 
in expense management and savings.  The previous decade has witnessed the following 
changes in the competitive arena: 
• Insurers are getting involved with direct writers in various ways, i.e. strategic 
alliances, mergers and acquisitions, contractual arrangements, etc.  For example, 
16 
 
 ING Canada purchased and partially distributes through Belair Direct and Grey 
Power Insurance; Aviva distributes through President’s Choice Financial. 
• Some insurers are developing a multi-channel approach to distribution, including 
ING Canada, Aviva, Royal & SunAlliance. 
• Larger insurers are purchasing brokerage operations at prices and multiples that 
are higher than conventional.  Subsequently the brokerage is consolidated into 
the insurer’s call-centre operation. 
• Direct writers are moving beyond urban centers and targeting clients in out-lying 
regions, offering premium rates around 15 to 30 percent below intermediary 
channel rates.  This is achieved in part through their in-house branding and 
marketing expertise. 
• In an effort to establish and increase control in the broker channel, insurance 
companies are providing interest-free and low-interest loans to brokers that are 
keen to expand their operations via acquisitions and mergers.  In most cases, 
conditions accompany these loans and often will include a requirement to direct 
a minimum of 25% of the brokerage book of business to that particular insurer 
along with a right of first refusal on renewal contracts. 
• Since the Canadian Federal Bank Act precludes insurance companies from 
distributing individual insurance contracts through their branch network, banks 
have been taking direct action because of what they deem to be unfair restraint 
of trade.  For example, the Royal Bank of Canada commenced opening 
insurance branches adjacent to their bank branches, albeit with separate 
entrances and facilities yet taking advantage of branding and consumer 
awareness.  This is recognized as a harbinger of the banking industry’s 
intentions and objectives. 
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 While the industry witnesses a reduction in the number of independent brokerage 
operations, it is expected that insurance companies that supply this network will also 
shrink.  In spite of these changes, however, the industry is performing well and capital is 
available which will help facilitate the consolidation and brokerage acquisitions.  
Eighty-one percent of insurance carriers with greater than $500 million dollars in annual 
premium are actively seeking to acquire a competitor or a distributor (Carlson 2008).  
But this appetite for acquisitions has caused a rise in price multiples, particularly in the 
case of larger brokerages.  For example, in February of 2007, the brokerage network 
HUB International was acquired by a private equity firm for 3.5 times commission 
which is roughly double of the conventional multiple (Carlson 2008).  Although the 
pace has been slowing into 2009, this acquisition trend (including the use of private 
equity) is expected to continue into the foreseeable future.  The size of the price 
multiples will likely also receive some downward pressure but should remain strong.   
 
In the wake of these changes, brokerages on average are getting larger and stronger, 
leveraging economies of scale and many will surpass the $100 million level in the next 
few years (French 2007).  Adding to the number of available brokerages for acquisition, 
four percent of Canadian broker owners have suggested they would like to retire in the 
next five years (Aarsteinsen 2008).  This represents $2.5 billion in annual premium 
(IBAC 2008).  In addition, other potential players have expressed interest into gaining 
membership in the industry.  Toyota, for example, has indicated that it intends to 
distribute automobile insurance within the next year and it will be underwritten by a 
carrier it controls in Japan.  It will be administered through a local partner in Canada.  
To comprehend the impact of this decision, Toyota annually sells 200,000 cars in 
Canada and this number is expected to rise to 250,000 by the year 2010 (Carlson 2008).  
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 However, given the current economic situation and the state of the auto sector this 
number will likely be reduced.  In any event, Toyota is a significant force within 
Canada’s economy. 
 
2.2 Direct Writers 
Recognizing that size and control bear a strong relationship, both brokers and insurers 
acknowledge the benefits of consolidation.  This is causing a noticeable change to the 
insurance industry landscape.  In addition to this, direct companies (i.e. those that deal 
with the customers directly and not through an intermediary) have been well-received 
by consumers and a proliferation of them is evident which continues to modify the 
marketplace.  Direct writers typically have lower operating and transaction costs and 
have the ability to readily adapt to the vagaries of the market (Aarsteinsen 2008).  Their 
structure provides them with control over both distribution and manufacturing in a fully 
integrated fashion.  However, opponents of this system have indicated that direct writers 
need to improve their claims management capabilities (RIBO 2008).  Their belief is that 
without the involvement and intervention of an intermediary on their behalf, consumers 
do not receive fair treatment and payouts during the claims process and thus may be 
taken advantage of.  Further discussion and elaboration of these two distribution 
systems will be presented in the following sections. 
 
2.3 Contrasting Direct Versus Intermediary Systems        
In the recent environment, broker companies controlled 62 percent (approximately $13 
billion) of the marketplace while the direct writers maintain 31 percent (approximately 
$6 billion) (Canadian Insurance Statistical Issue 2006).  This compares to five years 
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 earlier in which broker companies enjoyed in excess of 75 percent of the marketplace, 
thus they are in a downward trajectory and have lost 13 percent.  Moreover, broker 
companies only control approximately half of the personal lines market (French 2007).   
 
Table 2 
BUSINESS RESULTS:  SIX YEAR HISTORY 
DIRECT WRITERS TRADITIONAL INDUSTRY 
  Broker Companies Brokers 
In 
2000 
• Control 25% 
of the business 
• Average loss 
ratio 85% 
• Control 75%* of the 
P&C market 
• Traditional markets 
are moving into 
multiple distribution 
channels 
 
• Wrote 78% of 
the business 
• Competition is 
neighboring 
brokers 
In 
2006 
• Control 32% 
of the business 
• Expense ratios 
average 20% -
23% 
• Average loss 
ratio is 65% 
• More 
competitors:  
Greypower, 
RBC, 
President’s 
Choice, TD 
Meloche 
Monnex, 
groups & 
programs, etc. 
• Toyota and 
others are on 
their way 
• Control 62% of the 
market 
• Expense ratios 
average 28%-33% 
• Average loss ratio 
58% 
• Traditional partners 
are purchasing 
brokerages at 
multiples not 
affordable by brokers 
and moving the 
business to call 
centers 
• Fewer carriers 
• Write 62% of 
the business but 
only 50% of 
personal lines 
• 90% of brokers 
are losing client 
count every 
year 
• Lost business is 
going to the 
new directs 
• Almost 40% of 
brokers plan to 
retire in the 
next 5 years 
and most have 
no perpetuation 
plan 
• Fewer brokers 
*Percentages do not add up to 100 (reinsurers, mortgage insurers, etc.) 
*All statistics are as at December 2006, CI Statistical Issue 
Adapted from Canadian Insurance, December 2007 
 
 
The aggregate and cumulative result of these trends is that direct writers, mostly owned 
by multi-nationals and banks, are increasingly gaining control and market-share.  This is 
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 accomplished through distribution systems, largely at the expense of independent 
brokers.  In 2008 it is estimated that ING Insurance hovers around 15 percent market-
share (IBAC 2008). 
 
The competitive playing field for the direct versus broker channels is not equitable in 
terms of expense ratios.  This is due in large part to economies of scale whereby direct 
writers have the resources to invest in technology and other efficiency tools whereas 
traditional carriers and typical independent brokerages cannot.  Direct writers generally 
function in a range of expense ratios surrounding 20 percent to 23 percent (RIBO 2008).  
On the other hand, traditional domestic insurance carriers supporting independent 
brokerages function in the area of 28 percent to 33 percent.  This affords the direct 
writers a significant advantage in operations and sustainability.  In order for the 
intermediary channel to survive and thrive, they must accept that improvements are 
needed with structural issues, duplication and redundancies.  This study will be 
exploring this matter in-depth in subsequent sections, particularly as it relates to 
transaction costs.  
 
There are many areas of duplication in the intermediary channel that have been 
considered and discussed by industry participants with a view to remedying the 
situation.  For example, underwriting expertise and resources exist at both the carrier 
and broker level, thus causing an unnecessary cost to the channel (Carlson 2008).  This 
can be restructured to position the underwriting decision-making responsibility at the 
broker level and recast the carrier’s responsibility to that of an audit function.   The 
elimination of this responsibility (and associated salaries) would effectively reduce 
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 channel and transaction costs and improve efficiency.  There are many other such 
opportunities that exist in this channel which require creativity and trust to implement. 
 
2.4 A View to the Horizon 
The pressure posed by this evolving landscape has been a cause for concern for the 
participants in the intermediary channel.  Commitment between the parties in the chain 
is being tested in an unprecedented fashion while the evolution progresses (Carlson 
2008).  In summary, three significant facts are clear: 
1. Domestic property and casualty insurance carriers have a costly business 
structure that is uncompetitive due in large part to the direct writers’ ability to be 
more effective and cost-efficient. 
2. Independent brokerage firms are being purchased by non-domestic insurance 
carriers at higher pricing multiple levels that are unaffordable by other brokers.  
Thus, distribution control is moving up the supply chain. 
3. Independent brokers and domestic carriers are losing market share. 
 
As indicated, the uncertainty of the marketplace has caused participants to examine their 
transaction costs, commitment levels and those of their counterparts.  Although these 
terms will be discussed in detail in the following chapters, it is important to understand 
the definitions of commitment and transaction costs at this stage.  Transaction cost 
economics (TCE) has been described as a significant theoretical approach in the 
analysis of inter-organizational governance, including the safeguarding of specific 
investments (Jap and Anderson 2003).  Morgan and Hunt (1994) define commitment as 
a relationship in which an exchange partner believes that an ongoing affiliation with 
another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it.  With these 
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 definitions in mind, traditional brokerages and domestic carriers will be forced to 
consider new business models and structures in order to thrive in the evolving 
environment and commitment between these parties will continue to be tested. 
 
2.5 Examining the Roles of Independent Brokers 
Historically, the term “insurance broker” would conjure images of a truly independent 
firm with linkages to most (if not all) insurance carriers.  More recently, due to 
pressures for cost effectiveness and efficiency, Canadian brokers began reducing their 
product shelves and provided access to fewer carriers.  This change has been bilateral, 
i.e. product concentration has been driven by brokers and insurers alike, albeit for 
different reasons.  Brokers chose to specialize with a limited number of carriers in order 
to reduce their transaction costs in the areas of training, technology, product knowledge, 
volume and frequency, and as a sign of commitment to those remaining carriers.  
Insurance companies, on the other hand, chose to restrict access to their products to 
brokers that committed and/or demonstrated an inclination to sell their product with 
meaningful levels of success and quality.  The movement in this direction has caused a 
measure of uncertainty within this channel. 
 
To assist in the comprehension of brokerage operations, this study will examine recent 
data compiled for the industry in this subject area.  In 2007, an industry study was 
conducted by the Canadian accounting firm of Berris Mangan with the intent of 
shedding light into the composition of brokerage firm profitability (Carlson 2008).  A 
random sampling of 206 brokerages was selected from across Canada and they were 
requested to respond to a questionnaire.  Of those that were invited, 164 did provide 
responses.  The first priority was to gain insight into the makeup of their product shelf 
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 then to further understand the contributions toward profitability made by each line of 
business. 
 
Initially, the Berris Mangan study tabulated the data received and compared by 
profitability level.  The dividing line chosen was profits above and below 18.5% 
followed by an examination of brokerage firms based upon size (see Tables 3 and 4).  
An average amount provided by the respondents in each of the categories was used to 
demonstrate typical operations.  Additional findings from the questionnaires are evident 
and will be discussed in this section.      
 
 Table 3 
AVERAGE RESULTS COMPARISON BY PROFITABILITY LEVEL 
Total Sample Size                                       75                                               89 
 Profits <18.5% 
Average of Sample 
Profits >18.5% 
Average of Sample 
 $                           % $                         % 
Income   
Public Auto 
Private Auto 
Travel 
Personal Lines 
Commercial Lines 
Contingent Profit 
Other 
152,564                31.5% 
  20,841                  4.3% 
    1,762                  0.4% 
144,288                29.8% 
124,813                25.8% 
  27,892                  5.8% 
  12,332                  2.5% 
202,552               29.6% 
  21.743                 3.2% 
    1,897                 0.3% 
212,734               31.1% 
166,161               24.3% 
  45,369                 6.6% 
  34,190                 5.0% 
Total Income 484,491              100.0% 684,647             100.0% 
Total Personnel 
Total Administration 
Total Premise 
Total Data Processing 
Total Marketing 
313,639                64.7% 
  67,265                13.9% 
  47,062                  9.7% 
  10,108                  2.1% 
  16,749                  3.5% 
317,585               46.4% 
  78,984               11.5% 
  39,169                 5.7% 
    9,017                 1.3% 
  20,893                 3.1% 
Total Expenses 454,822                93.9% 465,649               68.0% 
Total Operating Income   29,669                  6.1% 218,998               32.0% 
Adapted from Canadian Insurance, April 2008 
 
 
As noted in the above table, income derived from each of the product lines in both 
groups is reasonably close and within a close range.  Yet a more noticeable difference 
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 appears in the expense area, with diverse percentages in Total Personnel and Total 
Premise.  Clearly, cost containment is an issue for those that are less profitable.  
 
Table 4 
AVERAGE RESULTS COMPARISON BY BRANCH SIZE 
Total Sample 
Size 
94 51 19 
 $0-500k 
Average of Sample 
$500k-1M 
Average of Sample 
>$1M 
Average of 
Sample 
        $               %       $                 %       $                % 
Income    
Public Auto 
Private Auto 
Travel 
Personal Lines 
Commercial 
Lines 
Contingent Profit 
Other 
  103,586       36.5% 
      8,362         2.9% 
      1,066         0.4% 
  102,382       36.0% 
    46,551       16.4% 
    13,912         4.9% 
      8,196         2.9% 
254,203         36.4% 
  31,732           4.5% 
    2,912           0.4% 
208,267         29.9% 
130,758         18.7% 
  40,355           5.8% 
  29,203           4.2% 
  356,210      19.3% 
    57,570        3.1% 
      2,749        0.1%   
500,493        27.2% 
  689,729      37.4% 
  145,468        7.9% 
    89,900        4.9% 
Total Income    284,056   100.0% 697,430      100.0% 1,842.120  100.0% 
Total Personnel 
Total Admin 
Total Premise 
Total I.T. 
Total Marketing 
   157,241      55.4% 
     42,427      14.9%  
     31,114      11.0% 
       8,067        2.8% 
       7,597        2.7% 
339,861         48.7% 
  94,065         13.5% 
  51,999           7.5% 
  13,772           2.0% 
  18,051           2.6% 
   986,095     53.5% 
   238,290     12.9% 
   112,586       6.1% 
     26,077       1.4% 
     62,164       3.4% 
Total Expenses    246,446      86.8% 517,747        74.2% 1,425,212    77.4% 
Net Operating 
Income 
37,609.91       13.2% 179,683        25.8%    416,908    22.6% 
Adapted from Canadian Insurance, April 2008 
       
 
When considered in light of their size, larger operations have an opportunity to leverage 
economies of scale, thus giving them an advantage over their smaller competitors.  With 
savings in most areas, the greatest savings for mid to large size operations stems from 
Total Premise expenses.  Savings in other areas, although not as significant, do 
collectively contribute to the mid to large brokerage operation economies of scale.  
Contingent Profits, i.e. those that are awarded to brokers for delivering a profitable book 
of business to an insurance carrier, play a significant role in impacting profitability.  The 
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 concept of contingent profits is discussed in another section, but their relevance is 
noteworthy at this time. 
 
2.6 Additional Findings of the Broker Study 
Within the Berris Mangan study, additional qualitative responses were garnered.  
Interestingly, sales mix appeared to be quite similar in smaller brokerages.  Location 
and local competition significantly affected volumes of automobile and personal lines 
sales, whereas commercial lines production tended to drive growth in larger brokerages.  
Conversely, smaller operations indicated a greater degree of success through 
improvement of systems and focusing upon personal lines marketing.   
 
Although small brokerage operations have the ability to be nimble and react quickly 
without the constraints of bureaucracy, they tend to be impeded by a diminishing cash 
flow and shrinking market-share.  Smaller brokerages do not have the resources 
necessary to develop and retain commercial accounts, a highly lucrative area.  The small 
brokerages’ sales growth is also not keeping pace with cost increases and contingent 
profit levels are declining in their sector due to their inability to deliver adequate 
volume or underwriting results to their insurance carriers.  Plainly stated, whereas the 
intermediary channel is feeling the pressure from the direct channel, the smaller 
brokerage operations have and will continue to experience the most significant impact. 
 
2.7 Recent Regulatory Intervention 
Since 2004, United States regulators as well as state governments have paid close 
attention to activities within their insurance systems.  Investigations, many of which 
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 resulted in legal actions against insurers, brokerages and individuals have ensued.  
Much of this activity gained attention in the media due to the active involvement of 
Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General responsible for this area in that 
jurisdiction.  In the various states and the federal government itself examined 
allegations of fraud, plus concerns over coercive and dishonest practices in the sale of 
insurance products.  The rigging of bids, particularly in the area of commercial 
insurance was a significant cause for concern as well as the payment of contingent 
commissions and certain other sales incentives (Cooper 2007). 
 
Due to media attention that spilled over the border into Canada, Canadian federal and 
provincial regulators elected to inspect the Canadian insurance distribution system to 
determine if similar practices existed in Canada (Harris 2004).  Moreover, it became an 
opportunity to enhance public confidence in the marketplace.  To accomplish this task, 
the Canadian Council of Insurance Regulators (CCIR) and the Canadian Insurance 
Services Regulatory Organizations (CISRO), which are responsible for regulatory 
matters and licensing, established the Industry Practices Review Committee (IPRC) 
assigned to examine the financial relationships between insurers and intermediaries (e.g. 
contingent commissions, ownership and financial linkages, and other sales incentives).  
These were thought to have the potential to create conflicts of interest.  Other industry-
related organizations developed similar committees and investigations with similar 
mandates such as the Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario (RIBO). 
 
2.7.1 CCIR-CISRO Study Findings 
Among the most relevant findings of the CCIR-CISRO study, the following facts were 
confirmed.  Specifically, the majority of insurance companies in Canada utilize brokers 
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 to sell and distribute their policies.  Within this framework, most of the Canadian 
insurers use a standardized form of contractual agreement with their brokers through 
which they are engaged (see Appendix “E”).  Moreover, greater than two-thirds of 
insurance companies make available contingent commissions to their brokers (based 
upon pre-determined criteria).  However, non-monetary sales incentives such as golf 
tournaments, learning retreats, and workshops are not as prevalent.  Fortunately, it was 
also discovered that the majority of Canadian insurers have policies and procedures in 
place aimed at mitigating the potential for conflicts of interest.  Finally, more than half 
of the insurers maintain loans, ownership and/or other similar financial arrangements 
with their sales intermediaries.   
 
The aforementioned study found no evidence of systemic bid-rigging or other 
complaints that plagued their American counterparts (Harris 2004).  The study did 
acknowledge however that there is room for improvement in areas of disclosure to 
clients regarding financial arrangements between insurers and brokers, as well as 
clarifying the definition of “independent” as it applies to brokers that are contracted 
with only a few (or one) insurer.  The regulators are seeking input from all stakeholders 
in terms of these areas for improvement.  The study also concluded that contingent 
commissions, in the Canadian context, was an acceptable business practice because it 
was paid through the determination of a broker’s overall book of business with a 
particular insurer as opposed to being paid on a single transaction (RIBO 2008).  A key 
element of the formula in determining the payment amount also depending upon the 
quality of the book of business, i.e. claims rate, etc. and not simply the volume of sales.  
This is a departure from the American style which was inclined more towards sales 
production or on a transaction basis. 
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 2.8 Typical Agency/Broker Agreement 
As indicated, Appendix “E” contains a typical agency agreement that ING Canada 
utilizes for its brokers.  The insurance companies that are specified in this agreement, 
including Wellington and Halifax are those which ING Canada owns and operates in the 
Province of Ontario.  The bulk of the conditions, duties and obligations have been 
standardized across insurance companies and during the standardization process broker 
committees and the Insurance Brokers Association of Ontario were consulted for input.  
Most of these standard clauses are included in the first section of the contract.   
 
This particular agreement includes a requirement for concentration of business which if 
fulfilled allows the broker to share in the profitability of the portfolio.  ING Canada 
utilizes the program name of Exclusive Alliance (EA) as a method of identifying those 
brokers that are eligible and have chosen to participate in this arrangement.  The terms 
and conditions applying to concentration levels are discussed in the second section of 
the contract.   
 
The term ‘concentration level’ refers to the percentage of premium volume that is 
directed in favor of the principal insurance company.  These amounts tend to vary and 
as such so too does some of the benefits bestowed upon the broker by the insurer.  As 
noted earlier, the profit-sharing arrangement, often referred to as contingent commission 
(CPC), is not based upon singular pieces of business but on the portfolio’s quality, 
claims history and growth rate. 
 
Eligibility for this profit-sharing is defined and negotiated on the first page in the final 
section of the contract.  Considerations for eligibility include variables such as volume 
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 of business, future projections and various commitments made on the part of the broker 
within a comprehensive package of other factors.  These include a right of first refusal 
upon the sale of the brokerage, broker loans, equity participation on the part of the 
insurer, etc.   
 
Page two of the Exclusive Alliance agreement defines the calculation of the profit-
sharing arrangement.  This is typically an award of 50% of the portfolio’s profit which 
is further defined for clarity in the following section on page two.  Moreover, the 
contract includes a special benefit entitled ‘Nine Month Option’ which allows the 
broker to make a one-time decision annually permitting the broker to receive an early 
profit-sharing payment, albeit with a pro-rata reduction.  The determination as to 
whether it is wise or not vests with the broker and some may accept it in order to 
improve their current cash flow or if they sense their brokerage may be subject to a 
spike in their claims rate, perhaps due to inclement weather.  Other conditions (such as 
termination, deductions, etc.) are subsequently specified.   
 
The agreement makes it clear as to why the payment of contingent commissions (CPC) 
is different in the Canadian market versus the American market.  As such, the concerns 
expressed by the Spitzer inquiry in the USA are not as relevant or as problematic in the 
insurance distribution system in Canada.      
 
2.9 ING Canada’s Operations 
ING Canada is the largest property and casualty insurance company in Canada offering 
a broad lineup of property, automobile, and liability insurance on both consumer and 
commercial levels.  (The following statistics were released on the ING Canada website 
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 in January 2009 at www.ingcanada.com)  Boasting an approximate 11% market share, it 
currently provides service domestically to more than four million individuals and small-
medium sized businesses.  In several provinces across Canada, the company is either the 
largest (Alberta, Quebec, Nova Scotia) or second largest (Ontario) insurance company.  
ING Canada has elected to serve customers in the manner in which they choose, i.e. 
through an intermediary (broker) or directly with the company.  The intermediary 
channel distributes insurance under two distinct brands (ING Insurance for standard 
requirements or via Grey Power for individuals that are over age fifty).  Belair Direct 
distributes insurance on a direct-to-consumer basis via the company’s own agents in its 
call-centres.  
 
The personal insurance market in Canada is quite fragmented, i.e. the five leading 
property and casualty insurers represent less than 40% of annualized premiums in 
Canada (IBAC 2008).  In the automobile sector, ING Canada is 30% bigger than its 
second place rival and 58% bigger than third place.  In the property sector the difference 
is more pronounced, specifically ING Canada is roughly 45% bigger than the second 
largest insurer and 80% bigger than the third.  Whereas the organization maintains the 
number one position in both segments of personal insurance, its approximate market 
share is only 15% in property and 14% in automobile coverage, thus there is still 
adequate room for potential growth.   
 
In the past decade, ING Canada has presented a superior claims ratio gap of 600 points 
below that of its competitors (industry average) in automobile coverage.  Due to 
unanticipated seasonal storm activities, the company underperformed the industry 
averages in terms of personal property.  Steps are underway to create sustainable 
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 improvements in this area with the goal being to retake a leadership position in the 
property arena as well. 
 
In the area of commercial insurance, ING Canada is positioned as one of the largest 
industry participants.  Approximately 90% of the company’s commercial premiums 
stems from the small-to-medium size corporate marketplace.  Over the past decade, the 
company has outperformed the industry average claims ratio by more than 500 basis 
points annually and the trend continues in a positive direction.   
 
2.9.1 Recent Corporate Performance 
Since the majority of the data in this study was gathered and analyzed during the period 
of 2006 and 2007, it is important to also understand the financial context within which 
ING Canada found itself.  ING Canada’s underwriting income was $47.5 million in the 
fourth quarter of 2007.  This is $14.8 million lower than the same period in 2006.  
Setting aside the impact of a $20.7 million market yield adjustment to claims liabilities, 
underwriting income grew on a year-over-year basis.  Strong operating performance 
resulted in higher commercial non-auto and personal property figures versus the 2006’s 
fourth quarter.  In addition, ING Canada’s return on invested assets exceeded Canadian 
P&C industry averages by 170 basis points over the preceding five years.  Given its 
scale, operations and performance, ING Canada is a strong choice as inclusion in a case 
study on commitment and transaction costs.   
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 2.10 Commitment and Transaction Cost Economics    
Earlier in this chapter, several of the structural changes in the Canadian insurance 
industry were discussed, along with the resultant impact upon the intermediary channel.  
In particular, two key measures provide revealing insights into the threat that confront 
insurance brokers.  Firstly, the intermediary channel’s loss of marketshare to the direct 
channel over a period of six years, i.e. from 78% down to 62% (Canadian Insurance 
2006) foretells of a challenging future.  In addition, the lack of economies of scale on 
the part of brokers versus that of direct writers is evidenced by a reduced expense ratio 
ranging between 8% and 10% on the part of the direct writer.  Among other variables, 
the impact of these two key statistics will result in reduced profitability, pricing 
disadvantages and competitive vulnerability for insurance brokers.             
 
Due to the aforementioned dynamics of the Canadian property and casualty insurance 
distribution arena, certain questions become apparent and require further study.  For 
example, due to the performance pressures, regulatory constraints, consolidation and 
concentration, what is it that enhances or diminishes commitment between brokers and 
insurers?  With a lower transaction cost environment existing in the direct-to-consumer 
distribution channel, how is the continuance of relationships justified in the 
intermediary channel?  The following chapters will examine these questions with a view 
to extending the results into similar arenas.   
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 3 Theoretical Perspectives 
There are several theories in scholarly literature that endeavor to explain causes and 
effects of performance and relationships involving firms.  In an effort to understand 
commitment levels in and between firms, the most notable theories that have been 
selected for consideration and examination for the reasons noted below include the 
following: 
• Commitment theory itself 
• Competitive advantage 
• Information and communication technology (ICT) 
• Resource based view (RBV) 
• Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
This chapter will discuss the implications of these theories along with their explanatory 
power and criticisms of each other.  In addition, advancements in other areas will be 
discussed in this and subsequent chapters including call centers, customer relationship 
management and vertical integration.  Ultimately, this section will conclude with a 
discussion surrounding the use of TCE to further understand commitment.  The 
following two chapters will provide an in-depth examination of commitment and TCE 
and will develop propositions for subsequent study within this thesis.   
 
3.1 Commitment Theory 
Commitment theory continues to be advanced academically and is being applied within 
various disciplines including marketing, law, and human resources (Kim and Mahoney 
2006; Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005; Van de Vrande et al 2006). 
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 Among the earliest definitions with a focus upon distribution systems, Anderson and 
Weitz (1992) suggest that commitment is essentially a willingness to create and refine a 
stable relationship, including a desire to endure short-term sacrifices in order to 
maintain this relationship while having confidence in its sustainability.  Morgan and 
Hunt (1994) define commitment as a relationship in which an exchange partner believes 
that an ongoing affiliation with another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at 
maintaining it.  Scholars continue to examine matters of trust as it pertains to 
commitment in relationships (Welty and Becerra-Fernandez 2001), particularly within 
supply chains.  Recent research (Kwon and Suh 2004, 2005) has considered the 
influence of various factors that can cause variability in commitment with trust being 
the key factor under examination in this context. 
 
Specific industries have been the focal point of contemporary research activity.  
Developments within the technological arena have heightened academia’s interest in 
how it can strengthen or diminish commitment levels (Kim and Mahoney 2006).  
Technology can be a double-edged sword as it has the ability to improve connectivity 
between people and firms, yet it comes with the risk of bringing people together 
electronically but not socially (Van de Vrande et al 2006).  As these advances in 
information and communication technology (ICT) persist, so too will the research 
continue.  
 
Inter-firm structural arrangements have also attracted considerable research attention.  
For example, Bengtsson et al (2006) compared and classified the effectiveness of 
different distribution arrangements, including hierarchical.  They determined that the 
optimum arrangement was situational and dependent upon a complex set of variables, 
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 including proximity and sophistication of partners, type of industry, etc. Blumberg 
(2001) approached the topic by examining embedded firms and the effectiveness of 
contracts that are designed with the intent of promoting and stimulating cooperation 
between parties.  Srinivasan and Brush (2006) studied supplier performance within 
vertical alliances and examined the effects of self-enforcing agreements and enforceable 
contracts.  Similarities exist in this regard between these relationships and typical 
employment relationships (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005), as flexibility is important 
in building commitment. 
 
Commitment theory is being extended into many narrow and specific areas, the 
knowledge of which can be applied into other fields.  For example, Skarmeas et al 
(2002) explored various drivers of commitment and their impact on performance levels 
in cross-cultural buyer-seller relationships.  In addition, Ng (2007) examined 
commitment levels between parties in a service channel and the optimum methods of 
constructing an agreement between a cruise line and a tour operator.  The risks and 
rewards of focused or concentrated commitment to particular suppliers gained the 
attention of Swink and Zsidisin (2006) whereby the study considered the concept of 
locking-in to particular relationships, often at the exclusion of other potential firms and 
opportunities.   
 
The theory of commitment involves attitudes and preferences, choices and decisions.  
The human element is a key component of commitment in relationships.  As firms are 
made up of people and since commitment is largely a human emotion, a firm’s social 
capital plays an important role in organizational commitment (Watson and Papamarcos 
2002).  The human side of this concept will also be explored in the upcoming section 
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 relating to transaction costs.  Moreover, the other aforementioned theories will be 
discussed in order to explore which among them makes the strongest contribution to 
commitment.  Although there are elements of overlap, certain theories provide greater 
contributions to commitment theory than others. 
 
3.2 Competitive Advantage 
Conceptually, competitive advantage is broadly defined in terms of flexibility, cost, 
quality and delivery (Kathuria 2000).  It is based on either being able to reduce costs 
below the industry average or upon differentiating services or products (Porter 1985).  
Sum et al (2004) discuss competitive advantage in terms of cost advantage, service 
variety advantage and service quality advantage.  This can be achieved by a firm 
choosing to re-design and re-engineer its internal business processes and activities, 
deliver superior service and product quality with the goal of improving business and 
financial performance (Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien 2005).     
 
The ways of achieving competitive advantage are complex and varied.  In this regard, 
other theories provide support and guidance.  For example, information and 
communication technology (ICT) theory suggests that state of the art technology can 
assist a firm in distinguishing itself as being leading-edge as opposed to merely average 
(Bowersox et al 2002).  Moreover, it can strengthen collaboration internally and with 
external supply chain partners (Sanders and Premus 2005) while simultaneously 
reducing transaction costs.        
 
Because competitive advantage is obtained through the proper mix and exploitation of 
resources in conjunction with effective external and internal transactions, this theory is 
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 supported by the primary conditions of transaction cost economics (Childers and 
Offstein 2007).  The view is also supported in the resource based view literature (Lai et 
al 2008), but does not appear to go far enough to support or explain commitment theory 
in itself. 
 
3.3 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
The information and communication technology (ICT) sector contributed $60.6 billion 
towards the Canadian gross domestic product by 2006 (Khan and Raahemi 2008).  The 
insurance distribution system remains a recipient of the advancements in the ICT area.  
As indicated in the previous chapter, recent trends have shown a marked increase in 
consumer preferences in favor of insurance purchases through ICT-mediated 
distribution arrangements, such as call centers and via the internet.  The intermediary 
channel has benefited from advancements in ICT however these have not been 
sufficient to reduce transaction costs that can be translated into lower premiums for 
consumers versus the savings found within the direct channel. 
 
Recent studies have attempted to examine the benefits of ICT implementation in B2B 
contexts.  Much of this research has focused upon EDI systems (Mukhopadhyay and 
Kekre 2002; Naude et al 2000).  Research has suggested that EDI implementation has 
the potential to provide a variety of economic benefits (Sanders 2005) including: 
• Reduced inventory carrying costs; 
• Improvements in cycle time; 
• Mitigated obsolescence and transportation costs due to timeliness of 
information; 
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 • Strategic and operational benefits. 
Whereas a considerable amount of research exists which indicates the value of ICT and 
in particular EDI on value creation, scholars are looking further into the subject to 
ascertain the conditions under which this value is delivered (Jean 2007).  Some 
contradictory evidence suggests that investments in this regard may not fully provide 
the intended benefits and that more empirical evidence is necessary (Zhu et al 2006).  
This ambiguity in the literature pertaining to the value of ICT in inter-organizational 
arrangements persists, thus requiring additional work in this research stream.  
Understanding how ICT can enhance a firm’s competitiveness is of particular 
importance to smaller players in an asymmetric business relationship (Jean 2007).  This 
is relevant for Canadian insurance brokerage operations and their corporate 
counterparts.         
 
Resource based view (RBV) and transaction cost economics (TCE) theories have each 
made contributions to ICT-mediated firm relationships and performance (Wu et al 
2006).  But each of these theories on its own does not fully explain the complexities of 
ICT (Kim et al 2005).  But in a circular fashion, ICT theory contributes (although not 
fully) to TCE and RBV theories as well as provides some compelling arguments 
surrounding commitment (Keysuk andHsieh 2006). 
   . 
3.4 Resource Based View (RBV) 
The resource based view (RBV) has been gaining in utility and notoriety in the past 
decade.  Before getting to this point, the theory was rooted in the early works of Coase 
(1937) and later with Penrose (1959) and Williamson (1975), among others.  The term 
(Resource Based View) was first coined by Wernerfelt (1984) and was subsequently 
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 developed into a framework by Barney (1991).  Considerable research is emerging in 
this area while other theories such as supply chain management borrow from RBV 
(Straub et al 2002) to shed additional light into their respective topics.  By definition, 
RBV explains how a firm’s assets (both tangible and intangible) and capabilities 
controlled by that firm are engaged to improve the firm’s efficiency and effectiveness 
(Liu and Chen 2008).  Generally, RBV has stressed that a company’s success cannot be 
explained by market factors alone, rather that deployment and development of scarce 
resource capabilities in that firm must also happen (Wernerfelt 1984).  Moreover, 
Carnali (2003) suggests that in organizations that have a higher degree of connectivity 
between processes and resources and also between capabilities and resources, there 
exists a greater probability of success.   
 
Innovation is commonly discussed in RBV literature.  This can be defined as the 
process of discovery and development on the path to new products, technologies, 
organizations, production processes, and systematic and institutional arrangements (Van 
Kleef and Roome 2007).  A firm’s internal flexibility and its preparedness to adjust to 
unanticipated environmental changes are often visible capabilities within successful 
companies (Daft 2001).  Recently, some scholars have focused their attention within the 
service sector and studied service innovation in new service development and delivery 
channels.  In so doing, they have made progress in gauging performance levels leading 
to factors of success and failure in innovations within the financial services sector (Jong 
& Vermeulen 2003).  This is of particular relevance and importance for understanding 
the distribution of insurance within this study.   
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 Amid the changes in the corporate landscape, including a growing popularity of 
alliances and vertically integrated firms, a significant amount of research continues to 
be presented with varying theoretical approaches (Wang 2007).  Whereas the earlier 
research was mainly derived from transaction cost economics, recent literature has also 
considered the application of RBV (Contractor and Ra 2002).  RBV and TCE do not 
have to be viewed as mutually exclusive but more of being complementary (Tsang 
2000).  By comparison, the resource based view focuses upon the actual value or 
benefits of a transaction as opposed to the costs.  RBV suggests that a company should 
attempt to maximize transaction value by the development and exploitation of its 
capabilities, resources and processes (Nelson and Winter 1982).  They will entertain this 
in order to gain competitive advantage through access to non-imitable, valuable and 
complementary resources of their alliance partners (Jolly 2005).   
 
RBV has credibility due to its rationale for the formation of alliances, yet it is argued 
that it is not as potent as transaction cost economics in explaining the reasons for 
choosing between equity and non-equity alliances (Reddy et al 2002) due to its lack of 
ability in discerning between these two forms of cooperative strategies.  RBV focuses 
upon benefits whereas TCE focuses on costs, thus making these theories both 
competing and complementary (Wang 2007).  Also, due to its internal focus on benefits, 
RBV falls short of assisting in the explanation of inter-firm commitment-related 
matters. 
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 3.5 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)     
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been the recipient of a rapidly growing and 
eclectic collection of researchers and scholars for no less than the past three decades.  Its 
origins are recognized by the early works of Ronald Coase (1937) and he was later 
awarded the Nobel Prize in 1991 for his ground-breaking work in this field.  More 
recently, Oliver Williamson was awarded the Nobel Prize in October 2009 for his 
ongoing research into this area.  With continued support from eminent academics in 
addition to Oliver Williamson (1975) such as Paul Joskow (1987), the theory continues 
to gain awareness and value.  Other disciplines have been active in expanding the 
knowledge of transaction cost economics including; Jap and Anderson (2003) in 
marketing; Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy (2005) in contract discussions; Leiblein and 
Miller (2003) in business strategy; Moe (1991) in political science; Smith and 
Schnucker (1994) in corporate finance; Barney and Hesterly (1996) in organizational 
theory; and Granovetter (1985) in the field of sociology.     
 
TCE transactions typically have three considerations; these include ‘frequency’, 
‘uncertainty’ (both environmental and behavioural), and ‘asset specificity’ (Williamson 
1985).  Of these three considerations, the one that is often referred to as being the most 
significant is asset specificity, commonly described as idiosyncratic investments.  This 
is defined as the scale to which robust transaction-specific investments are incurred 
(Joskow 1988).   
 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) has been described as a significant theoretical 
approach in the analysis of inter-organizational governance, including the safeguarding 
of specific investments (Jap and Anderson 2003).  Several studies have discussed the 
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 relationships between governance mechanisms and transaction attributes (Subramani 
and Venkatraman 2003) and a number of mechanisms have been identified.  Among 
them are bilateral governance, asset safeguarding, incentives, and strategic alliances 
(Stump and Heide 1996).   
 
A total focus on costs and cost minimization alone cannot define the value of inter-
organizational governance.  Because of this, TCE tends to be used in conjunction with 
other approaches such as RBV in order to jointly provide explanations in a more robust 
fashion (Wang and Wei 2007).  But in order to position these two particular theories and 
the contributions they make, it is important to understand where TCE diverges from 
RBV.  TCE concentrates on the efficiency of the management and control of 
opportunistic behavior in the context of economizing on transaction costs.  
Alternatively, RBV focuses upon the effectiveness of collaboration for the purposes of 
creating value from resources and capabilities (Wang and Wei 2007).  This distinction is 
important because the notion of TCE being a complementary approach also applies to 
other theories as well, including commitment. 
 
Transaction costs economics supplies a framework which can be utilized to gauge the 
efficacy of alternatives for economic organization and can demonstrate which 
governance structure has the lowest cost under a specified set of conditions (Wang 
2007).  Within this framework, inter-firm relationships and alliances can be categorized 
into non-equity versus equity forms, the former of which could include contractual 
arrangements such as licensing and the latter could include equity joint-ventures or the 
creation of a corporation separate from the parent.  Ultimately, the decision to utilize 
equity versus non-equity arrangements in TCE theory is basically an examination of 
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 market (merchant distributors) versus hierarchy (sales subsidiary) or hierarchy versus a 
hybrid (blending of the two) governance mode (depending upon the actual form of non-
equity arrangement) (Wang 2007).  Williamson (1985) determined that firms will 
internalize those assets requiring safeguarding and if there is an opportunity to 
economize while they will tend to outsource in cases where the alternative is true 
regarding economizing and if it can be done with relative ease.  This and the entire 
realm of transaction cost economics will be discussed in greater detail in the TCE 
Literature Review chapter. 
 
3.6 Why Use TCE to Explain Commitment in Insurer-Broker 
Relationships 
Whereas the current literature on the topic sub-divides commitment into two distinct 
forms as being either affective or calculative, so too will this study examine the 
phenomenon of these sub-sets from the perspectives of both insurers and brokers.  To 
clarify and distinguish the two forms, the affective form is evident in cases where an 
individual wishes to forge a linkage with another because of common values or some 
likeness or affinity.  Intangible matters such as trust and friendship would be classified 
as variables constructing affective commitment.  The issue of identifying with the other 
party is regarded as an emotional attachment to the relationship.  Conversely, 
calculative commitment results from the deliberate evaluation and assessment of the 
value and the need for the relationship.  More tangible and measurable by nature, this 
process of deliberation typically involves a weighing of the pros and cons, investments, 
costs, inputs and outputs (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Calculative commitment takes into 
account transaction costs involved in the dyad (Williamson 1985) and considers 
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 whether alternatives should be sought.  This is particularly relevant to matters involving 
idiosyncratic investments.   
 
This thesis will explore the insurer-broker relationship in terms of both affective and 
calculative commitment however it will narrow the focus in order to incorporate various 
aspects of transaction costs economics in order to aid in explaining calculative 
commitment specifically.  Although the following two chapters will provide an in-depth 
discussion surrounding developments in the theories of TCE and commitment, this 
section will discuss the reasons and methods for drawing upon TCE to further 
understand calculative commitment.   
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, a shift is apparent in Canada with the distribution 
of property and casualty insurance products.  This shift surrounds the proliferation of 
direct-to-consumer insurance sales wherein insurers are bypassing the use of 
intermediaries (brokers) and transacting directly with clients.  However this is not 
anticipated to be a complete shift since a significant portion of the Canadian population 
would still prefer to deal with an intermediary that they perceive as an advocate working 
on their behalf.  Moreover, the direct writers seek to reduce transaction costs with their 
utilization of ICT-mediated sales methods through call centers.  One of the ways and 
means of achieving this has been with the distribution of less complex product offerings 
which can easily be handled with lower-paid and less-trained call centre staff.   
 
Currently and for the foreseeable future, direct writers have restricted themselves to 
personal automobile and house-hold insurance due to its simplicity and standardization.  
For the most part, regulators have mandated standard wording and coverage within 
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 these insurance policies, thus comparisons across competitive products becomes a 
simple matter of price and service.  Moreover, this standardization has allowed them to 
staff their call centers with entry-level, newly-licensed agents with minimal training and 
experience.  Commercial insurance has remained the domain of insurance brokers due 
to the product complexity and the necessity for greater expertise.  Therefore, because of 
the continuous encroachment by direct writers into the personal insurance arena along 
with a pre-existing competitive environment in the intermediary channel, insurers and 
brokers alike are seeking answers as to how to measure the commitment of their 
counter-parties.  By being aligned with a solid partner, their opportunities to retain their 
position with commercial insurance products while simultaneously mitigating losses in 
market share in personal insurance can be enhanced.  Thorough analysis of transaction 
costs in this channel will aid in exposing potential opportunities for fortifying this 
distribution network. 
 
The preceding discussion surrounding theories of RBV, ICT, and competitive advantage 
demonstrate that although they each can make a contribution in understanding 
commitment, none of these theories is as robust as TCE in explaining the calculative 
form of commitment.  This is evidenced by several of the closely-related aspects of 
TCE and commitment which expand on the understanding of the components of these 
theories.  Specifically, there are four key aspects of TCE, commonly referred to as 
frequency, behavioral and environmental uncertainty, and idiosyncratic investments.  
Whereas behavioral and environmental uncertainty provide a measure of contribution 
and explanation regarding the affective form of commitment due to their emotional 
natures, matters of frequency and idiosyncratic investments are closely linked to the 
calculative form of commitment.   
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Within the sphere of calculative commitment, decisions are made on the feasibility of 
relationships on a basis of efficiency and costs.  Matters of vertical integration, resource 
allocation, outsourcing, etc. are determined with the aid of transaction cost analysis.  
These matters are of critical importance to insurance companies and brokers due to the 
nature of their relationships, i.e. determinations on where to invest within the channel, 
to whom should they partner, etc.  To further understand this concept, this thesis will 
undertake an in-depth examination of the development of the academic literatures of 
both commitment and transaction cost economics.  The outgrowth of this literature 
review will be a series of propositions that are addressed in the subsequent discussion 
chapter which will demonstrate the explanatory potency of calculative commitment on 
the part of TCE.  An expansion of this discussion and in-depth literature reviews on the 
theories of commitment and transaction cost economics follows in the next two 
chapters. 
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 4  Literature Review - Commitment 
4.1  Introduction 
 
As this thesis is explanatory in nature, this chapter will examine the relevant history and 
literature surrounding the area of commitment.  The key aspects under consideration 
involve those that bear some relationship with financial services distribution which 
incorporate a principal (insurance company) and agent (insurance broker) arrangement 
and in particular those whereby each of the dyad members is a firm as opposed to being 
an individual.  Although there does exist both older and newer literature, only the most 
relevant will be discussed in this section.   
 
The literature search has uncovered several key themes that are important to this study.  
Each of these topics will be addressed in detail in an effort to categorize and further 
understand commitment, and will aid in organizing this section.  These themes include: 
1) Insurance distribution and the Canadian marketplace 
2) Affective and calculative forms of commitment 
3) Structural and financial bonds 
4) Processes and procedures and its affect on performance 
5) Key aspects of relationships 
6) Satisfaction and quality 
7) Conflict history and a reputation for fairness 
8) Opportunism, trust, and dependence 
9) Stakeholder perceptions 
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 4.2 Commitment Defined 
 
It would be appropriate at this stage to assemble the most recognized conceptual 
definitions of commitment in order to build the foundation for this study.  Following the 
early works of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975), a focused study in the area of 
distribution conducted by Anderson and Weitz (1992) suggested that commitment is 
essentially a willingness to create and refine a stable relationship, including a desire to 
endure short-term sacrifices in order to maintain this relationship while having 
confidence in its sustainability.  Morgan and Hunt (1994) define commitment as a 
relationship in which an exchange partner believes that an ongoing affiliation with 
another is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it.  In a similar 
fashion, Wang and Wei (2007) indicate that it is an enduring intent to develop and 
maintain a stable long-term association.  Each of these studies endeavoured to measure 
various aspects of relationships in order to gauge the strength and potential for its 
endurability. 
 
Each of the aforementioned studies demonstrates an academic consensus of precisely 
what commitment represents.  Subsequent research (explored throughout this literature 
review) continues and expands on the preliminary works, as well as considers the topic 
in specific environments.  Whether it involves matters ranging from value creation in 
inter-organizational governance (Wang and Wei 2007), the effects of self-enforcing 
agreements (Srinivasan and Brush 2006), or the impact of organizational change (Liu 
and Chen 2008), interest continues in this highly active research area. 
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 4.3  Background 
 
Research into the area of commitment has accelerated since the 1980s while academics 
and practitioners alike seek to better understand this phenomenon.  Regardless of 
whether the inter-relationship under examination is principal-to-principal (Wang 2007), 
principal-to-employee (Ng 2007), principal-to-agent (Subramani and Venkatraman 
2003) or some other variant, the issues are similar if not identical.  In the context of this 
study, an example of a principal would include insurance companies, whereas 
employees would include their staff members.  Agents would include insurance brokers 
(distributors) that are contractually bound and engaged with insurance companies in the 
distribution of the insurer’s product.  Ultimately, the research is undertaken in pursuit of 
understanding commitment and searching for techniques and models to enhance its 
sustainability.   
 
Burgess and Turner (2000) have determined that commitment can be a catalyst for 
change.  Commitment can motivate individuals to sacrifice other priorities in favour of 
pursuing a seemingly impossible goal.  Conversely, a lack of commitment will serve as 
a significant constraint upon the relationships and the achievement of objectives.  
Internally, organizations are recognizing this, and remain vigilant and cognizant of their 
culture.  But defining such a phenomenon can be subjective.  However most studies 
tend to include conceptual, research-based terms such as loyalty, attachment and/or 
bonding (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005; Mullins 1996) when attempting to measure 
commitment levels and its attributes.  These dimensions are used as tools in order to 
assess how commitment is constructed in different circumstances and its potency. 
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 The concept of closeness within business relationships has been the subject of 
considerable interest in several diverse fields (Daft 2001; Powell 1992).  The 
information technology and automotive industries, for example, have sought solutions 
to bring components suppliers closer together with manufacturers and assemblers of 
end-products in an effort to drive efficiencies (Sanders 2005; Bensaou and Venkatraman 
1995).  Whereas committed relationships add value in an upstream value-added chain, 
so too will it add value in downstream distribution channels (Sanders 2005; Heide 
1994).  There is a wealth of knowledge that can be borrowed from research into 
relationships between distributors and producers of industrial items (Anderson and 
Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1992) and subsequently applied to intangible goods 
such as financial services (La Londe 2002; Keysuk and Hsieh 2006; Liu and Chen 
2008).  In particular, common in both channels is a need to understand and measure the 
makeup of commitment levels in both the affective and calculative form in order to 
gauge the durability of the relationship. 
 
Ultimately, the objective in understanding commitment is to be enabled to identify the 
requisite elements that can either build or destroy relationships between organizations.  
Terminology used to label the relevant types of business arrangements are varied, and 
some of the more common names visible in the literature include: ‘committed 
relationships;’ ‘hybrid governance;’ ‘relational governance;’ ‘vertical quasi-
integration;’ ‘strategic alliance;’ and ‘partnership’ (Jap and Anderson 2003; Heide 
1994).  Commitment in these contexts refers to the desire to maintain a relationship 
indefinitely, in conjunction with a willingness to make sacrifices in favour of the 
relationship versus itself alone in order to assure a stable and sustainable future together 
(Keysuk and Hsieh 2006; Anderson and Weitz 1992).            
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 Commitment theory has continued to develop and advance unabated, particularly in 
terms of inter-organizational relationships (Wang and Wei 2007; Frazier and Kim 
1997).  In fact, the shift has moved from simplistic, discrete exchanges to relationships 
replete with intrinsic value (Anderson and Narus 1990; Webster 1992).  In this context, 
commitment describes the lengths to which an organization will go to bind itself to an 
intimate and sustainable co-existence with another company.  The firms have common 
goals that are integral to the ongoing relationship and they jointly strive to fulfill 
customer needs while hopefully improving their own performance levels (Morgan and 
Hunt 1994).  Because of these differing and various perspectives on the definition of 
commitment, the following is proposed for this study: 
Proposition 1:  An individual’s personal definition of commitment and the 
importance they place upon it will influence their degrees of calculative and/or 
affective commitment.   
 
While the foregoing sections have provided a general background on the theory, 
definitions, genesis and evolution of research on commitment and inter-organizational 
relationships, the following section will build on this foundation and narrow the 
discussion and focus upon financial services distribution.  Specifically, the examination 
will uncover literature relative to insurance distribution in the intermediary channel and 
in particular within Canada. 
 
4.4  Insurance Distribution & the Canadian Market 
 
4.4.1 Relationships & Commitment in Insurance Channels   
 
The behaviour exhibited by distributors (agents) participating in insurance distribution 
will trigger strong signals to the manufacturers (insurers), and vice versa.  In most cases, 
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 this results from the perception of one party as to the content of the information that the 
other side has regarding the customer or the level of risk posed by them.  This 
perception is supported by the roles played by each party, specifically that the agent 
typically maintains the relationship with the client, and may hold (or with-hold) 
pertinent information suitable for assessing the risk.  On the other hand, at the time of 
application the insurer becomes entitled and obliged to obtain relevant information 
about the client in order to underwrite the risk.  The agent may be internally conflicted 
with mixed motivations, i.e. present the client in the best light possible in order to 
ensure successful acceptance of the case in order to maximize commissions, versus 
being open and honest with the insurer in order to maintain a solid relationship 
(Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  The insurer, on the other hand, recognizes this, 
and acknowledges that agent commissions constitute a significant proportion of the 
manufacturing and distribution costs, and also that due to the agents’ role, they are in a 
better position to ascertain true risks presented by clients as well as aiding in judgement 
of the legitimacy of claims (Wang and Wei 2007; Cummins and Weisbart 1977).   
 
Both insurers and agents alike have to balance at least two relationships, as well as their 
self-interest.  For example, insurers have to demonstrate their commitment to their 
agents, their joint customers, plus the company’s stakeholders (shareholders, other 
policyholders, etc.).  The agents are sandwiched between the insurer and the customer 
relationships and are compelled to show their commitment to each, as well as their own 
internal motivation to be profitable.  These two balancing acts become apparent at the 
point of purchase of an insurance policy.  Notably, the hallmark of a successful agent is 
the continuously positive results obtained during the negotiation process whereby an 
insurer becomes convinced to underwrite a risk, albeit within a price range that is 
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 agreeable to the customer (the adverse selection challenge).  The parties are 
simultaneously confronted with the task of clarifying the customer’s claims history 
without challenging their veracity in order to retain the client (the moral hazard 
challenge).  Having an appreciation and understanding of the dilemmas facing the 
counterpart will aid in sustaining commitment in the relationship, particularly if one 
side bends to make allowances in support of the other party (Kulkarni and 
Ramamoorthy 2005).  But this flexibility must be tempered with notions that unsatisfied 
customers will defect, and yet poor risks are insidious and can collectively manifest into 
a high loss ratio for the insurer (claims/premiums).  This is negative for all stakeholders 
(Joskow 1973; Grossman and Hart 1986) including the insurer (profitability), the 
shareholders (return on investment), the distributors (hardening of the market), and 
potentially the industry overall (the dynamics of the marketplace).   
 
It is a commonly held belief that independent distributors of insurance, particularly 
those selling several types and brands, will demonstrate little if any commitment to a 
particular manufacturer and may feel the temptation to engage in opportunism (both 
challenges of moral hazard and adverse selection).  They feel justified in their actions 
due to the belief that insurers bear the ultimate responsibility to validate information 
garnered during the underwriting and claims processes (Aarsteinsen 2008; Dimond 
1988).  In these cases, the agent is clearly misunderstanding their individual role in the 
distribution channel since by their very involvement in the chain they are supposed to 
demonstrate the fact that they contain better local knowledge of the market than would 
an insurer, as well they should have a closer, more intimate relationship with the 
customer than would an insurer (Jap and Anderson 2003).  It would be cost prohibitive 
54 
 
 for an insurer to attempt to replicate the agent’s position in the channel (Arrow 1985), 
thus the agent should be open and frank with the insurer in this role. 
 
To proactively mitigate episodes of opportunism on the part of the agent it becomes 
incumbent upon the insurer to take the lead in establishing and assuring the maintenance 
of a two-way committed relationship between the agent and themselves.  Encouraging 
healthy communication and shared goals may be effective in contributing to their 
sustainability and profitability.  Currently, this belief is apparent in the insurance 
industry and is evidenced by the use of “select” or “preferred” agent systems (Mulcahy 
1988; Dimond 1988).  Systems of this type provide benefits and efficiencies to both 
sides of the dyads.  Insurers can take comfort in the knowledge that their preferred 
agents have a stake in the insurer’s success, and will act in accordance with policies that 
will enhance the principal’s position (Welty and Becerra-Fernandez 2001).  Agents, on 
the other hand, may become the recipient of preferential service and benefits such as 
training, lead referral, pricing, underwriting dispensation, etc.  It is presumed that this 
level of treatment will be extended to customers of the preferred agent at times of post-
purchase service and claims, thus becoming a competitive advantage for the agent 
(Kwon and Suh 2004, 2005). 
 
4.4.2 Canadian Agency System of Distributing Insurance   
 
The Canadian system of distributing insurance tends to mirror that of their American 
counterparts but have attracted far less academic attention.  In the independent 
distribution channels, agents represent several insurers and are granted certain rights 
with respect to policy expirations and client relationships.  On the other hand, insurers 
have engaged agents to distribute products due to the agent’s specific knowledge of 
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 local markets and also their relationships with clients due in large part to their 
proximity.  Insurers have increasingly endeavoured to build commitment with agents in 
order to bind them more closely, particularly in the eyes of the client such that they 
cannot distinguish between agent and principal.  The intent is to have the distribution 
channel resemble one single seamless system or firm (Wang and Wei 2007).  But this 
notion has come under scrutiny and is being challenged by other distribution models 
such as captive agents, customer-direct (call-centers), etc.  In the case of captive agents, 
internal salespeople are truly employees working exclusively for the insurance 
company.  They hold themselves out to the public with business cards and stationery 
which demonstrates that they are employees of the insurance company.  There is no 
confusion on the part of the customer as to whom they are dealing with, unlike in the 
case of brokers whereby the salesperson represents multiple insurers.  Customer-direct 
call-centers are similar to captive agencies with the exception of dealing over the 
telephone as opposed to face-to-face.  In terms of commitment, does the pursuit of a 
closer relationship actually generate positive economic benefits for either side or is it 
purely psychological?  If it does create benefits, how can commitment become 
strengthened in a relationship?  
 
Indirectly, by virtue of being modelled on the American agency system, the Canadian 
agency system of insurance distribution has been the target of academic criticism in the 
literature for over thirty years (Aarsteinsen 2008; Carlson 2008; Cummins and Weiss 
1991; Blair and Herndon 1994; Barrese and Nelson 1992; Heide and John 1988).  Some 
have concluded that independent agents are the recipient of higher commissions, with 
the result being that insurance companies utilizing independent agents are forced to 
incur higher expense ratios (Leiblein and Miller 2003; Regan 1997; Joskow 1973; 
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 Cummins and VanDerhei 1979).  Some have deduced from these empirical studies that 
independent agents are less efficient than captive agents, or that the independent agent 
structure is not viable.  The question arises as to why the independent distributor system 
still exists, particularly given the strength of the evidence surrounding expense-ratios.  
Some of the more recent additions to academic literature suggest that the coexistence of 
both independent agents and direct writers is dictated by the circumstances surrounding 
their individual strengths and weaknesses (Keysuk and Hsieh 2006).  For example, 
higher costs incurred in the independent channel are offset by superior service and 
presence in local markets.  Although different reasons are presented in the various 
literatures for the pros and cons of each distribution channel, they concur that specified 
superiority is possible in each type.   
 
The subject of service level comparisons between agents and direct writers has been the 
topic of considerable debate.  Earlier literature suggests that the notion of agents 
providing better service to either existing policyholders or prospects is in no way 
conclusive (Cummins and Weisbart 1977; Doerpinghaus 1991; Barrese et al. 1995).  
More recent research suggests that it is difficult to make clear comparisons between the 
two channels in terms of their service levels (Contractor and Ra 2002).  However, 
through examination undertaken from a different perspective, Berger et al. (1995) posit 
that independent agents have the ability to provide better service to both existing and 
potential policyholders because of their unique local knowledge, ability to carve niches 
for themselves, and their specialized skills.  In those niches the independent agents can 
command higher premiums and develop more sales production than would otherwise 
have been possible without their involvement.  Therefore, it is suggested that although 
the independent agent channel may contain a higher cost structure, it is no less 
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 profitable than the direct writers.  They are simply structured differently and policy size, 
premium amounts and costs are different. 
 
Further research has supported the preceding argument and suggests that independent 
agents are in a strategic position that affords them the opportunity to engage their 
unique skills and add value to the distribution channel (Wang 2007; Regan 1997).  
Regan and Tennyson (1996) have indicated that agents have the motivation and ability 
to assess the nature of the risk to be underwritten.  Combining this ability to conduct a 
proper risk assessment along with the desire to place the case with an appropriate 
insurer will certainly add value to the distribution chain by pre-qualifying policies for 
insurers and enhancing the service level to customers through advice and rapid 
placement.  This becomes quite evident at times when markets are uncertain and also 
when the risks, requirements and products are rather complex.  When all revenues and 
costs are incorporated (including opportunity and transaction costs), Regan (1997) and 
Regan and Tennyson (1996) support the notion that commitment is enhanced between 
the agent and the insurer, and that the independent agent will thrive and perhaps even 
dominate the market.  But it is not to suggest that agents will replace other distribution 
methods but are likely to co-exist with the other market participants (Zhu et al 2006; 
Berger et al. 1995), each of which will be providing service where it is most 
appropriate. 
   
4.5  Insurance Agents (Brokers) and Performance Outcomes 
 
Through the coordinated efforts of both sides in a dyad it is presumed that each will 
receive benefits that were likely not possible without the establishment of this closer 
relationship.  The insurance company receives a more intensive presence in a market 
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 that may have been under-represented otherwise (Wu et at 2006).  Moreover, cost 
containment may manifest through agent willingness to link up to the insurer via 
electronic data interchange, the result of which will reduce paperwork, errors, and 
demonstrate agent commitment (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1994).  If the insurer is 
fortunate in demonstrating its own high level of commitment to the agent, a by-product 
may result in which the agent reduces the number of alternative insurers in its portfolio 
and will concentrate more volume in favour of the committed insurer (Anderson et al. 
1987).  In addition, agents may become inclined to present superior risks to their 
preferred insurer in order to strengthen the relationship with the company.  To 
compensate the agent for this preferred business placement the insurer typically will 
allocate a portion of their profit on the agent’s portfolio (occasionally referred to as 
“contingent profit bonus”).  The percentage of the profit-share is normally determined 
by a scale which provides payouts based upon different levels of volume concentration 
(Aarsteinsen 2008; CCIR-CISRO 2005; IBAC 2008; RIBO 2008).   
 
If the agent strategically commences to concentrate its premium volume towards one 
supplier, a shift in the relationship’s balance will occur with some additional power 
drifting toward the insurer.  Depending upon the level of trust between partners, this 
could have both positive and negative consequences for the agent.  As outlined 
previously, operational efficiencies will become apparent due to familiarity with an 
insurer and its product line-up, plus technological linkages become warranted, more of 
the insurer’s resources will be allocated towards a concentrated partner, etc. But 
inherent in the power shift there is asymmetry, and sensitivities become heightened thus 
placing the insurer’s actions under a microscope.  Also, if market conditions tighten it 
may become difficult if not impossible to place risks with an insurer because the agent 
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 has reduced its portfolio of alternatives, and probably has demonstrated very little 
loyalty to its remaining marginal suppliers.     
 
It is debated in the literature as to whom the agent is more committed to, i.e. the insurer 
or the policyholder?  Independent agents add value to prospects and policyholders by 
offering one-stop shopping as well as providing objective advice to clients by virtue of 
the agent’s independence (Blair and Herndon 1994).  This suggests that the agent is 
primarily committed to the buyer (Mayers and Smith 1981; Kim et al. 1996).  But due to 
the short-term nature of the transaction, is that a demonstration of commitment or 
simply risk assessment and part of the agent’s role?  Posey and Yava (1995) submit that 
this may simply be a matter of reducing the client’s search costs when cases are more 
complex, thus demonstrating the fulfillment of the agent’s role in handling complex 
risks and the placement of insurance solutions (Leiblein and Miller 2003).  Thus the 
truly committed and enduring business relationship primarily exists between the insurer 
and the independent agent. 
 
The focus of a typical independent agent is to develop new business, but a key 
ingredient of those sales is repeat business (persistency) (Grossman and Hart 1986).  If a 
substantial portion (if not all) of an insurer’s premium income is driven by the actions of 
agents, insurers can justify higher commission payouts (Marvel 1982).  Alternatively, if 
sales are driven by the insurer’s own marketing efforts, including advertising and direct 
sales, the insurer would be inclined to utilize an exclusive dealing arrangement and not 
relinquish the ability to control renewals to agents.  But for new market entrants, agents 
provide an important function to insurers by providing expertise and presence in new 
regions (Contractor and Ra 2002; Blair and Herndon 1994).  Ultimately, both agents 
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 and direct writers can co-exist in the same market as they would have different 
requirements depending upon their own product lines, cost structures, proximity to the 
marketplace, etc. (Wu et al 2006; Posey and Yava 1995).                            
 
Now that the backdrop of the Canadian insurance marketplace has been established, this 
chapter will continue with an examination of key aspects and forms of commitment 
theory.  Where appropriate these concepts will be discussed in the context of the 
Canadian insurance marketplace. 
 
4.6  Affective and Calculative Commitment   
 
In the current literature, commitment has been sub-divided into two distinct categories.  
One view suggests that commitment is an affective state of mind which an individual or 
partner has regarding a counterpart.  This is referred to as “affective commitment” and it 
is evident whereby an individual desires to forge a linkage with another because of 
shared values, a likeness or commonality, or they identify closely with them (Morgan 
and Hunt 1994).  In this sense, affective commitment is regarded as an emotional 
attachment to the relationship.  Alternatively, the other category of commitment tends to 
be more behavioural than the affective form.  This second category is classified as 
“calculative commitment” and results from deliberate evaluation on a cognitive level of 
the need for the relationship.  It takes into account whether or not there is value in 
maintaining the relationship with the counterpart.  This is conducted through the 
assessment of the pros and cons, costs, investments, inputs and outputs (Morgan and 
Hunt 1994).  Calculative commitment considers transaction costs related to the dyad 
(Williamson 1985) and aids in the decision process as to whether alternatives should be 
sought or if the dyad should be maintained or perhaps even enhanced (Srinivasan and 
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 Brush 2006).  Ultimately, calculative commitment is strongest when external costs 
outweigh internal costs (Zhu et al 2006).  More discussion and examination regarding 
calculative commitment will be explored within the chapter describing the literature on 
transaction costs.   
 
The affective form of commitment lends itself to deepening and strengthening the 
relationship thus encouraging reciprocity and mutual benefits to accrue to the partners 
(Kumar et al. 1994).  Affective commitment appears to promote willingness on the part 
of channel members to allocate resources to the relationship.  It also positively 
influences both the desire and intention to remain within the partnership and manifests 
itself vis-à-vis enhanced performance levels.  Conversely, affective commitment 
appears to mitigate opportunistic behaviour and tends to set aside the need to develop 
alternatives for the current relationship (Jap and Anderson 2003).  Calculative 
commitment, on the other hand, supports the development of alternatives and 
opportunism.  It becomes apparent that calculative commitment has a negative influence 
and ultimate impact on relationships (Wetzels et al. 1998). 
 
Further early research helped extend and develop the components that are most relevant 
in dyads in distribution channels, i.e. an affective component (Kumar et al. 1995), a 
continuance component (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Gunlach et al. 1995; Morgan and 
Hunt 1994; Scheer and Stern 1992), and a behavioural component (Anderson and Weitz 
1992; Gundlach et al. 1995).  Affective commitment, as indicated earlier, refers to a 
sense of belonging and an attachment that one side feels towards the relationship (Kwon 
and Suh 2004, 2005).  Highly affective commitment would result from strong feelings 
of a harmonious and effective relationship (Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer et al. 
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 1987).  On the other hand, continuance commitment is a description of the desire of a 
partner to remain in the relationship and becomes a measure of its stability (Anderson 
and Weitz 1992).  Lastly, behavioural commitment describes the actions of one party 
towards the other, particularly their helpfulness in times of need and their level of caring 
(Frazier and Kim 1997).    
 
As the study has described both forms (affective and calculative) of commitment and 
how these are constructed, it will now move on to add more depth to the discussion by 
examining the different ways and means of how dyad members can become bonded 
together.  It will also consider the strength of the various bonds and also puts forth the 
following proposition for further study: 
Proposition 2:  Since calculative commitment results from deliberate evaluation 
on a cognitive level of the need for the relationship, it can be explained and 
measured through the use of transaction cost economics.  
 
4.7  Structural and Financial Bonds 
 
4.7.1 The Value of Pledges 
 
The exchange of pledges to create and enhance commitment has attracted considerable 
attention in the past two decades (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  These pledges are often 
utilized within distribution channels containing independent (yet inter-dependent) 
suppliers of products or services and their distributors.  But they are not always 
effectively coordinated (Stern and El-Ansary 1990).  Whereas better control and 
coordination is possible through the vertical integration within a corporation’s internal 
structure (Anderson and Weitz 1986), this will invariably be ineffective from a cost 
perspective due to high governance burdens.  Moreover, that structure is likely to prove 
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 inflexible because the supplier’s core competency is not typically distribution but is in 
the creation and supply of the product or service itself (Sanders 2005).  Thus we are 
witnessing a proliferation of contractually bound yet otherwise unrelated organizations 
becoming somewhat vertically integrated for competitive, cost, and flexibility purposes 
(Naude et al 2000; Powell 1987).   
 
It is largely due to the mutual commitment of both parties in the relationship that 
profitability is enhanced.  The suppliers/manufacturers can enjoy improved access to 
existing and new markets alike through their distributors.  Conversely, distributors can 
improve performance through greater access to new products and training.  Through this 
relationship, they each have the opportunity to succeed and attain greater results than by 
operating independently (Stern and El-Ansary 1990).  But stability in the relationship is 
essential, allowing for minor disputes to be resolved through the acceptance of a long-
term view of the arrangement (Becker 1960 and Kelly 1983).  Also, the parties must be 
open to a level of sacrifice, particularly in the area of control and short-term adjustments 
(Dwyer et al. 1987).  Presumably the relationship will be of a tenure which has lasted 
suitably long enough for benefits to be manifested for both parties.  As suggested by 
Anderson and Weitz (1992, p.19): 
“Commitment to a relationship entails a desire to develop a stable relationship, 
a willingness to make short-term sacrifices to maintain the relationship, and a 
confidence in the stability of the relationship.”      
 
4.7.2 Clauses, Terms, and Conditions of Contracts 
                     
Imposing a written contract upon a relationship would be classified as a form of a 
pledge (Wang 2002).  A voluntary constraint of activities such as limiting or granting an 
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 exclusive territory or agreeing to exclusive dealing with a manufacturer would be 
examples of pledges exchanged through contractual terms (Williamson 1983, 1985).  
The contractual clauses may contemplate minimum quotas for performance and 
preferential pricing as part of a pledge exchange.  A distributor might limit its training 
and alternative product knowledge as a trade-off for inducements and benefits in 
territorial protection (Sum et al 2004).  As such, these clauses and terms of the 
agreement become self-enforcing as neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would 
desire the agreement to cease due to the negative implications that could occur for each 
of them (Kathuria 2000; Klein and Leffler 1981; Telser 1980).  Thus, the written terms 
in the agreement can commit the parties to their joint relationship by encouraging (or 
forcing) performance on each part and also through perception of the other party’s 
strengthened involvement (Sanders and Premus 2005).   
 
On the negative side, violations of contractual terms require penalties in order to 
preserve their authenticity.  The severity of the enforcement response should be in 
relation to the violation and also consider the frequency of historical violations (Antia 
and Frazier 2001).  In order to effectively manage channel relationships it becomes 
apparent that explicit contracts are important and instrumental (Frazier 1983).   
Academicians have examined the issue of contractual agreements (Blumberg 2001; 
Srinivasan and Brush 2006) and discovered that regardless of the spirit and intent of the 
documents they still observe occurrences of violations (Hennart 1993; Williamson 
2000; Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005).  Despite the fact that written, explicit 
contracts are integral to an effective inter-organizational governance structure, 
circumstances can evolve and objectives may change for either (or both) channel 
members (Jap and Anderson 2003).  Although the intent of a contract is to foster 
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 cooperation and agreement, it can frequently become the central focus of disagreement 
and dispute (Rousseau and Parks 1993).   
 
There is limited literature published on the benefits of potent enforcement practices of 
explicit contracts.  Yet the ultimate value that accrues to channel members is derived 
from their coordinated efforts and the observance and enforcement practices (Stern et al. 
1996).  Research has indicated that enforcement of agreements tends to be most 
apparent when the following three conditions are evident, i.e. the commitment of the 
principal to the channel is high, agents are offered higher margins or commissions, and 
lastly that the importance of agent services is high (Dutta et al. 1994).  Subsequently, 
more weight was allocated to these findings through the addition of the empirical 
research of Bergen et al. (1998).  To expand upon these discoveries, this study proposes 
the following: 
Proposition 3:  The use of contracts has the potential to deliver clarity and 
certainty in a relationship thus increasing calculative commitment (supported by 
transaction cost theory). 
 
Prior research on the implications of contracts and the enforcement of terms does have 
relevance to the topic of commitment in inter-channel relationships.  However, it has 
greater relevance to the issue of transaction cost economics and transaction specific 
investments and will be covered in greater detail within that context.    
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 4.7.3 Asset Specificity and/or Idiosyncratic Investments 
 
An important concept in the understanding of commitment involves asset specificity or 
the utility of idiosyncratic investments.  Although this topic will be examined in depth 
in the following chapter, it is important to provide a definition at this stage.  Thus, 
idiosyncratic investments are certain inputs (money, other assets, time, etc.) that are 
allocated and dedicated for a unique and specific purpose, and for which it is difficult or 
impossible to re-deploy elsewhere (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  Typical 
examples of idiosyncratic investments in channel-type relationships may include 
training, i.e. specific to a unique purpose.  Others may involve the dedicating of staff to 
servicing the counter-party’s products or services, incorporating a common computer 
processing system, building or retro-fitting special physical plant and equipment in 
order to handle the requirements of the relationship, etc. (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  
To illustrate the concept further, consider a distributor of insurance products that fully 
trains its staff on all aspects of this field, including product knowledge for each 
insurance manufacturer.  The level of idiosyncratic investments would apply to the 
specific training required to learn about the unique elements of the particular offerings 
of one insurance manufacturer.  Although each manufacturer relationship brings with it 
a level of required idiosyncratic investment, the distributor must gauge and balance the 
extent to which they intend to invest further with each one.  
 
When one party in a dyad moves to demonstrate good faith to the other party by making 
a pledge, it is effectively weakening its own position for the greater benefit of the 
relationship (Leiblein and Miller 2003).  The result may be that they have reduced or 
eliminated the use of alternative sources of channel functions in favour of the counter-
party.  Although this concept will be discussed in greater detail when investigating 
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 transaction cost economics, it is worthy of note in this context also.  Arguments have 
been presented in which a relationship can be strengthened by first weakening it through 
the use of pledges and idiosyncratic investments (Schelling 1960).   
 
In place of the term ‘pledges’, Williamson (1985) refers to this binding exchange of 
promises as ‘credible commitments’.  Williamson (1985) also describes the nature of 
the relationship as becoming stabilized due to the realignment of the parties’ self-
interest.  The investments made into the relationship by a channel member will heighten 
the desire to maintain the relationship.  It may become difficult to switch partners if 
there does exist a shared identification in the marketplace of the use of the other’s 
brand, particularly if the party was leveraging the other’s brand while investing heavily 
in it through training and marketing (Zhu et al 2006).  The risk to the idiosyncratic 
investments may lie in the potential of the counter-party engaging in opportunistic 
behaviour through the knowledge that the first party would be forced into making 
considerable re-training investments with another supplier if this relationship was to 
end.  If they exploit this knowledge to their own benefit, they are acting 
opportunistically.  Ultimately, mutual idiosyncratic investments have the ability to 
modify a competitive (‘win-lose’) relationship into a cooperative (‘win-win’ or ‘lose-
lose’) arrangement (Anderson and Weitz 1992).   
 
4.7.4 Allocation of Resources  
 
Within distribution channels, members seek to secure advantages over competing 
members and competitors through the use of influencing techniques and other methods 
to gain attention (Anderson et al. 1987).   Manufacturers and other suppliers attempt to 
encourage distributors to expend more effort and attention on their products and 
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 services.  Conversely, distributors endeavour to persuade suppliers to allocate more time 
and attention towards them.  Influencing the allocation of the channel members’ 
resources becomes an ongoing goal of the parties (Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien 
2005).  
 
The allocation of resources within a channel can be impacted by many variables.  
Among others, these include the effectiveness of their communication, the party’s 
perception of the balance of power within the relationship, and the general state of the 
relationship (Swink and Zsidisin 2006).  This leads to this study’s proposition:  
Proposition 4:  The way in which resources are allocated within a relationship 
will provide an indication as to a party’s level of calculative commitment. 
 
This section has examined the financial and structural bonds that are deployed in order 
to commit parties to a relationship.  The following section will consider this further in 
action, specifically in the design of processes and through performance measures. 
 
4.8  Processes and Procedures and its Affect on Performance 
 
Within distribution channels, it is generally assumed that if the necessary steps 
associated with processes and procedures are fulfilled satisfactorily and trend toward 
improvement, this should invariably result in enhanced performance (Stern and El-
Ansary 1993; Mohr and Nevin 1990).  Quite often this is examined in the context of the 
pursuit of higher satisfaction levels while simultaneously mitigating conflict.  The 
objective of targeting these two ideals is to better the perception of the parties, with a 
somewhat intended by-product manifesting itself as a reduction in relationship tension.   
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Defining a better or improved perception level may mean different things to different 
parties, i.e. increased profits and/or profitability, greater revenue, more market share, 
etc. (Lewin and Minton 1986).  However, there is very little research that has been 
undertaken in which it has been demonstrated that a correlation or causal linkage can be 
drawn definitively between results obtained with the performance levels during the 
intermediate steps and the end results (Ng 2007; Gaski 1984; Hunt et al. 1985).   
Although in the realm of franchising, some work has been done indicating that an 
increase in satisfaction and a decrease in conflict can lead to a greater collaborative 
result (Carman and Klein 1986).  But as Dant and Schul (1992) stress, franchise 
relationships are typically symmetric, low-power relationships versus the common 
asymmetric dyads which are visible in non-franchise situations whereby power 
struggles can be amplified (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  Thus, comparisons 
may be misleading.   
 
Brown and Day (1981) have argued that conflict in these relationships engenders a 
separation and polarization between the two sides, the result of which is less 
constructive communication and collaboration, thus bringing suspicion into the mix.  
The nature, volume, intensity and frequency of the confrontations will also have a 
bearing on it.  The impact of negative conflict invariably results in suffering of their 
joint performance and goal attainment (Frazier 1983; Tjosvold 1985).  But not all 
conflict is negative, and a certain type and amount is healthy.  It can play a role in 
keeping the relationship refreshed and not stagnating, as well as identifying elements 
that need correction (Hunt et al. 1985).  In this context, healthy conflict can bolster the 
ongoing functionality of the dyad, thus improving its sustainability (Anderson and 
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 Narus 1990).  If the nature of the relationship is inherently adversarial, albeit healthy 
and sustainable, conflicts may play an integral role in the clarification of salient points 
and working together to seek resolutions to issues that may not have been envisioned at 
the start of the collaboration (Pinkley 1990).  To reiterate, unconstructive conflict 
typically results in damage and costs to both sides (Skarmeas et al 2002; Reve and Stern 
1989; Tjosvold 1985).      
 
A debate persists as to whether conflict arises as a result of performance levels versus 
the performance levels being a reflection of conflict (Ravichandran and Lertwongsatien 
2005).  Conventional wisdom has tended to accept that the results achieved at 
intermediate steps in processes contribute to performance success overall (Michie and 
Sibley 1985; Hunt et al. 1985; Stern and El-Ansary 1993; Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Kumar et al. 1992).  Once the success level is ascertained it serves as an indication of 
the potential for later conflict (Scheer and Stern 1992).  Since relationships are dynamic, 
this feedback and feed-forward mechanism is continuous, thus making it unclear in 
determining which comes first.  Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine the key 
aspects of relationships in order to aid in understanding this matter further.   
 
4.9  Key Aspects of Relationships 
 
4.9.1 The Value of Effective Communication 
 
Mohr and Nevin (1990) suggest that communication is essential in the pursuit of the 
common objectives of manufacturer/distributor channel members.  These dyads can 
attain a heightened level of understanding and coordination through regular and 
frequent dialogue.  This will also aid in the development and promotion of the mutual 
levels of comfort in their ongoing association and should mitigate unsuitable conflict 
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 (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer et al. 1987).  
Presumably, healthy dialogue and communication will encourage the parties to commit 
to the relationship, and they will have a greater opportunity to achieve their common 
goals (Sum et al 2004).  It is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 5:  The effectiveness of the communication between parties has an 
impact upon commitment levels.    
 
4.9.2 Commitment in Relationship Marketing 
 
The concept of commitment invariably appears in relationship marketing literature, 
among other areas, as it has become a central foundation (Scanzoni 1979).  Ongoing 
research continues to demonstrate that retaining clients and distributors through value-
added and enhanced service and perquisites actually costs less than acquiring new ones 
(Kim et al 2005; Anderson and Fornell 1994; Reichheld and Sasser 1990).  Moreover, 
loyalty on the part of customers and distributors tends to generate more revenues in the 
long run.  Wetzels et al. (1998) have posited that commitment is the most desirable 
stage in the development of an ongoing relationship of a dyad.  This is a component of 
Scanzoni’s (1979) categorization of five general phases of relationships between 
partners.  The five-phase process starts with ‘awareness,’ followed by ‘exploration,’ 
then ‘expansion,’ ‘commitment,’ and finally ‘dissolution.’  If the parties in the dyad are 
not committed to the relationship, it will move quickly to the fifth phase, i.e. 
dissolution.  Commitment in this context is created on the foundation of two key 
strengths.  Firstly, each of the channel members is compelled and must fulfill the 
provision of significant input into the dyad.  Second, they must each maintain a belief 
that the dyad will continue quite effectively into the future and it is their intention to see 
this happen (Fehr 1988).  They should recognize that this becomes closely linked to 
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 their success and they must strive to nurture these relationships (Morgan and Hunt 
1994). 
 
Upon establishing an understanding of these key apects of relationships, is necessary to 
recognize the effectiveness of the relationship.  An important measure of this is the 
value placed upon satisfaction levels and quality.  These will be discussed in the 
following section. 
 
4.10  Satisfaction and Quality 
 
The measurement of satisfaction levels and service quality has been a topic of research 
and considerable scrutiny for the past approximately twenty years.  These levels have an 
important role to play in commitment and should not be overlooked.  Oliver (1996) has 
suggested that satisfaction refers to a customer’s evaluation and subsequent judgement 
regarding a pleasurable quantity of consumption-related utility.  Along the same lines, 
the perception of a quality of service has been identified as a comparison between the 
anticipated or expected service versus the actual service performance (Ravichandran 
and Lertwongsatien 2005).  There does appear to be a correlation, if not an outright 
causal linkage between service quality and satisfaction levels (Liu and Chen 2008).  A 
common belief is that satisfaction is influenced by quality as evidenced by Iacobucci et 
al. (1996) stating “quality is the logical predecessor to satisfaction.”  Moreover, 
“service quality is an antecedent of consumer satisfaction” (Cronin and Taylor 1992, 
p.56).   
 
Quality can be separated into two distinct groupings (Gronroos 1990).  The first 
category is technical quality which can be defined and measured by the result of the 
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 service, specifically what the customer receives from the service.  The second category 
is functional quality which involves the methods, styles of delivery and/or processes by 
which a service is delivered.  In contrast to technical quality (‘the what’), functional 
quality can be considered to be ‘the how’.   
 
However, examining academic research in seeking a relationship between quality, 
satisfaction and commitment would be challenging since little, if any empirical evidence 
exists.  But there has been considerable work done in linking these concepts, albeit 
using loyalty as a proxy for commitment (Assael 1987).  In this context, Assael (1987) 
expresses loyalty as commitment in favour of a particular brand.  Using loyalty as a 
proxy for commitment, it is reasoned that positive relationships do exist between 
quality, satisfaction, and loyalty (Wetzels et al. 1998).  Moreover, this extends 
specifically into technical and functional quality, satisfaction, and affective and 
calculative commitment (Swink and Zsidisin 2006).     
 
Without doubt, an effective working relationship in the context of satisfaction and 
quality is important, particularly in terms of production output.  Moreover, an effective 
and sustainable working relationship is based upon the resolution of conflicts and the 
history of conflicts and fairness by either party.  This leads to the discussion in the next 
segment. 
 
4.11  Conflict History and a Reputation for Fairness 
 
If a channel member has a reputation or history of relationships containing conflicts, 
particularly within the dyad itself, this may indicate a low level of commitment on their 
part.  This might signal that the party does not believe the relationship has merit or has 
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 long-term potential (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  Given this history and display of 
conflict, it is unlikely that they would be willing to make individual sacrifices for the 
benefit of the relationship (Kim et al 2005).  The study of conflict itself is widespread 
because of the possibility of negative impact upon distribution channel members (Gaski 
1984).  This is in spite of the fact that conflict has the potential to force parties to 
challenge the status quo and seek alternatives.  But it must be confronted and 
approached in the proper spirit.  This can extend itself into distribution channel conflict, 
whereby the manufacturer distributes in both a direct fashion as well as through 
intermediaries.  Although the manufacturer may feel that they can service customers 
better than intermediaries in a particular territory, this can provoke distributors and 
cause a negative backlash (Stern and El-Ansary 1990).  The distributors may perceive 
this action to be an indication of the manufacturer’s lack of commitment to the 
relationship, thus reducing their belief that sustainability is possible. 
 
Parties in the dyad can provide an indication of their commitment to the relationship by 
both their historical and current dealings in other relationships (Jap and Anderson 
2003).  Do they have a reputation of self-sacrifice and sharing in other similar 
arrangements?  Have they operated in an opportunistic fashion elsewhere?  The answer 
to these questions can send a clear signal to the other party in existing relationships, and 
provide clues as to their expected conduct and how they might improve or destroy the 
value of the dyad (Kwon and Suh 2004, 2005; Macauley 1963; Telser 1980).  Therefore 
it is proposed: 
Proposition 6:  The level and history of conflict in the relationship, along with a 
party’s reputation for fairness will have an impact upon commitment levels.   
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 4.11.1 The Impact of Conflict and Asymmetry 
 
It is generally recognized that conflict is natural and normal within relationships, yet the 
outcome can be positive or negative depending upon how it is perceived by either side.  
A key determinant of the content of the perceived conflict involves the history of the 
parties (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  This history should provide insights into 
the relationship that can be effective in explaining the current situation and potentially 
making predictions about future dealings provided the behaviour of each side is 
consistent (Deutsche 1974; Pinkley and Northcraft 1994).  Therefore, how each 
historical level and nature of conflict was regarded can assist in explaining the evolution 
of the relationship (Zajac and Olsen 1993).  If past interactions involved excessive 
disputes with negative connotations, the relationship becomes vulnerable (Carnall 
2003).  Current disputes will likely trigger flashbacks to former disagreements and may 
cast a shadow on future events.   
 
In the event that personal relationships are interwoven within the distribution channel, 
conflict can be exacerbated by a high rate of employee turnover by one side or the other, 
particularly if the connections were of a positive nature (Bamberger and Meshoulam 
2000).  Positive employee relationships between organizations have the ability to 
mitigate stress and pressure on the dyad, and can aid in creating an atmosphere that is 
conducive to reaching mutual objectives (Granovetter 1985).  On the other hand, 
employee influence in the relationship can have its drawbacks as well.  Specifically, 
disputes occasionally stem from a single employee’s mistakes or outright incompetence.  
This is more noticeable in service industries since the performance of the service can be 
highly visible (Zeithaml et al. 1990; Schneider and Bowen 1995).  Therefore, if a party 
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 feels confident in the ability of the counterpart’s staff, the conflict level should be 
reduced.   
 
The pursuit of common goals is important in distribution channel dyads.  If the parties 
recognize that they are moving in different directions in terms of their goals, their 
commitment may become reduced along with their motivation to continue (Tjosvold 
1985).  Alternatively, if their goals and objectives are aligned, the parties’ perception of 
conflict should be reduced.  In addition, it should be anticipated that a party that is 
highly motivated and committed to the relationship would likely perceive less conflict 
(Sanders and Premus 2005).  This is due in part to their choice of dyadic partners, as 
organizations tend to involve themselves with others that they believe share their desire 
to be involved in sustainable relationships (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  To this end, 
firms with this belief are more inclined to make a deliberate investment in a committed 
relationship and will demonstrate their desire to seek a reduction in conflict levels 
(Sanders and Premus 2005; Williamson 2000).   
 
Organizations with a long-term view versus those that are short-sighted tend to concern 
themselves with bigger issues and do not become fixated on minor disagreements or 
disturbances (Kathuria 2000).  They display greater flexibility and tolerance with their 
counterpart and this translates into enhanced commitment (Heide and Miner 1992).  As 
well, how each party tends to approach difficulties within the relationship can be a 
measure of how conflict will impact their ongoing relationship.  Immediate conflict can 
be minimized if a party chooses to ignore it, and this may be satisfactory in the near 
term as the issue under dispute may not be worthy of escalation.  But this approach may 
not be healthy to the ongoing relationship overall, as a certain degree of conflict is 
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 functional and normal.  If dealt with in a mature and open manner, the disagreement can 
signal honesty and act as a catalyst for developing new ideas and solutions (Welty and 
Becerra-Fernandez 2001).   
 
Intuitively, a party would be motivated to link with a counterpart in a dyadic 
relationship with the intent of improving their individual and joint circumstances 
(financial, cost, operational, etc.).  This benefit should increase as the performance and 
outcome of the relationship increases (Wang 2007).  Furthermore, as benefits accrue, 
concomitant investments in the relationship should be visible along with increased 
commitment.  But the combination of the two parties, each leveraging the unique 
strengths of the other side should deliver an enhanced level of performance 
(Mukhopadhyay and Kekre 2002).  This is particularly evident when either party (or 
both) maintains a leadership position within their market.  Specifically, in the case of a 
distribution channel, the principal would maintain a powerful product shelf while the 
agent would be recognized for its strength and local market presence.  The symbiosis 
created by the interaction of the two parties leads to advantages over dyads that do not 
contain these correspondingly valuable capabilities.  Ultimately, when these advantages 
manifest themselves through the attainment of increased profits and efficiencies, parties 
become even more committed to the relationship and will strive to make it sustainable 
(Anderson and Weitz 1992).  But this approach requires the fortitude and long-term 
vision of channel members that have the ability to cooperate and harmoniously pursue 
objectives for the mutual advantage of the dyad (Heide and Miner 1992).    
 
As conflict may often involve a response to another party’s lack of fair play, it is 
important to recognize the common sources of unfairness.  The following sections will 
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 examine in detail these common sources.  These include opportunism, issues of trust, 
and dependence. 
 
4.12  Opportunism 
 
The direction may have psychological benefits as well in terms of perceived 
commitment of the other channel member.  Specifically, a party may feel advantaged by 
their belief that the other party is more committed to the arrangement than they are.  On 
the other hand, if the party feels that they are over-committed in relation to the 
counterpart, they may sense that they are vulnerable and open to opportunism if trust is 
an issue (Stump and Heide 1996).  In either case of perceived or actual over/under-
commitment, either party may be inclined to take advantage of the other, and demand a 
greater share of the outputs in exchange of reduced inputs (Kim and Mahoney 2006; 
Cook and Emerson 1978).  Opportunistic behaviour and unfair practices will develop as 
an outgrowth of unequal commitment (Heide and John 1990; Anderson and Weitz 
1989).  The relationship is destined to result in becoming dysfunctional (Van de Vrande 
et al 2006).  It is therefore proposed that: 
Proposition 7:  The presence of opportunism will have a negative impact upon 
commitment levels.   
 
4.13  Trust 
 
Considerable research has been undertaken on the topic of trust in relationships 
(Gambetta 1988).  In this context, trust plays an integral role in the viability and 
sustainability of the relationship if the levels of commitment are in fact (or perceived by 
either party) to be disproportionate or in an environment in which it is common to 
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 encounter extensive information asymmetry (Diacon and Ennew 1996).  To correctly 
frame the issue, ultimately the concern and the risk is whether an overcommitted party 
is willing to trust their under-committed counterpart not to take undue advantage of 
them during the course of their relationship (Sanders 2005).  It is realistic to assume that 
the under-committed party could potentially leverage its position in an opportunistic 
fashion in thinking that the counterpart will be willing to withstand and tolerate 
contractual breaches and reduced performance on the part of the under-committed side 
(Sanders and Premus 2005).  This assumption arises from the belief that the 
overcommitted party would be more tolerant of this behaviour in an effort to maintain 
the relationship (Williamson 1985).  This is also explored in the realm of transaction 
cost economics.   
 
However, not all scholars agree with the preceding notion (Granovetter 1985; Bradach 
and Eccles 1989), and counter with the belief that trust can be spawned simply as a 
result of a good business relationship, thus reducing the risk of opportunism.  In the end, 
it may depend upon the character of the channel members themselves, as trust is a 
tenuous ideal which takes time to construct and maintain, and can be broken quite easily 
and rapidly (Skarmeas et al 2002; Heide and John 1992; Young and Wilkenson 1988).   
 
Trust is an intangible item, and can be expressed as a belief that a party’s needs will be 
met by another party (Anderson and Weitz 1989).  This requires a level of certainty that 
the counterparty is reliable and has integrity (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Borrowing from 
the social psychologists, the necessary ingredients for trust to thrive is a belief in the 
counterpart’s honesty and also in their benevolence (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005).  
The ability to demonstrate honour and keeping promises is a measure of honesty.  
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 Having an appreciation for the other partner’s well-being and not undertaking negative 
actions against them would be a method to assess a party’s benevolence (Geyskens and 
Steenkamp 1995).  When commitment is separated into two distinct forms, i.e. affective 
and calculative (discussed later), it becomes apparent that trust (replete with 
benevolence and honesty) has a positive impact on affective commitment (Anderson 
and Narus 1990; Anderson and Weitz 1989; Morgan and Hunt 1994; Geyskens and 
Steenkamp 1995).  Conversely, trust can produce a negative impact upon calculative 
commitment (Geyskens and Steenkamp 1995).  Clearly, if dyad members trust one 
another they become more emotionally connected.  The result of this attachment is less 
measuring of the pros and cons of staying in the relationship and more acceptance of the 
partner.  In the end, both benevolence and honesty have a positive relationship with 
affective commitment, and a negative relationship with calculative commitment 
(Bengtsson et al 2006).  As such, it is therefore proposed: 
Proposition 8:  Trust has a negative relationship with calculative commitment 
and a positive relationship with affective commitment. 
 
4.14  Dependence   
 
In instances whereby a level of asymmetry exists between two partners in a relationship, 
it is understood that a level of dependence exists from one side to the other.  An 
organization’s dependence upon their dyad partner has been historically recognized and 
defined in distribution channels as their need to maintain the relationship with that 
partner in order to achieve its objectives (Kumar et al. 1995).  The need varies directly 
with the level of asymmetry, that is, the more significant the dependence is between the 
two parties, then the more that one of the parties needs the other in order to benefit from 
their joint involvement (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).   
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Dependence between channel members in partnerships tends to apply a negative 
influence upon affective commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1989; Kumar et al. 1995) 
and conversely has a positive influence upon calculative commitment (Ganasan 1994; 
Geyskens and Steenkamp 1995).  This is likely due to a response triggered from the 
realization that a party is more dependent upon the other side, thus they become less 
emotionally connected to the relationship and more concerned with the weighing of 
costs versus benefits (Wang 2007).  In addition, a party’s motivation to prolong the 
relationship may be lessened in terms of their affective commitment due to their own 
dependence and their fear of being exploited (Anderson and Weitz 1989).  Alternative 
replacement relationships will potentially be sought; particularly those that will pursue 
and can achieve the same objectives while providing parity, even-handedness and more 
positive terms.  On the other hand, while dependence levels expand, the dependent side 
will perceive its position to weaken and become susceptible to opportunism and 
exploitation (Childers and Offstein 2007).  Although the dependent party may continue 
the relationship because of exorbitant switching costs (or a lack of alternatives) they 
will likely devote energy to continuously balancing the benefits of maintaining the 
relationship (Zhu et al 2006).  Thus, increased dependence tends to lead to more 
calculative and less affective commitment (Wetzels et al. 1998).  In this study it is 
proposed that: 
Proposition 9:  Dependence has a positive relationship with calculative 
commitment and a negative relationship with affective commitment.     
 
Issues of dependence, as well as opportunism and trust can lead to conflict and perhaps 
a deterioration in a relationship.  But it is necessary to accept and understand that these 
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 issues may not be real in a particular situation, and may simply be the perception of one 
party about the status of a relationship.  This should not be dismissed, and is considered 
in depth in the next section.  
              
4.15  Stakeholder Perceptions 
 
4.15.1 The Importance of Perceptions 
 
The way in which one channel member perceives the other member’s level of 
commitment to the relationship may or may not be accurate.  There is an assumption 
and perhaps an expectation that channel members reveal their motivations, feelings, etc. 
to each other over time.  A strong relationship is characterized by a mutually reinforcing 
essence surrounding it (Sanders and Premus 2005).  This is aligned with developing a 
culture of reciprocity between the groups (Goulder 1960) contrasted with the 
cooperation necessary when conflicting motives may exist (Axelrod 1984; Eisenberger 
et al. 1986).  This is not unlike the dynamics which can be witnessed within the theories 
of bargaining (Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Pruitt 1981). 
 
4.15.2 Perceptions of Asymmetry (one-sided Commitment)   
 
Within a distribution channel, members will attempt to gauge the counter-party’s level 
of commitment to their joint relationship.  As it is difficult to measure, largely due to 
its’ intangibility and subjectivity, the result is based upon their perception only (Ross et 
al. 1997).  Studies have been presented that examined contributing factors to satisfaction 
levels within those relationships, as well as that which manifests conflict.  Power-shifts 
and struggles within the dyad have attracted attention (Reve and Stern 1989), 
particularly the use of coercive power which is usually exerted by the principal (Gaski 
and Nevin 1985).  Coercive power tends to promote conflict and reduce satisfaction 
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 levels (Gaski 1984).  Ultimately, it is argued and accepted that performance outcomes 
are improved by either party when one side perceives the other party’s commitment 
level to be higher than its own (Ross et al. 1997).   
 
The psychological proximity and distance between the principal and agent has been 
scrutinized in recent research (Oliver 1990; Powell 1992; Kollock 1994) as it has been 
considered to be a factor in perceived commitment.  Commitment is acknowledged to 
be enhanced when one party feels a sense of closeness to the other party.  Anderson and 
Weitz (1992, p.19) comment on commitment levels by stating that it: 
“goes beyond a simple, positive evaluation of the other party based on a 
consideration of the current costs and benefits associated with the relationship.  
It implies the adoption of a long-term orientation toward the relationship; a 
willingness to make short-term sacrifices to realize long-term benefits.”   
The implication here is that it must be understood that the relationship is two-sided, 
specifically that one party must also give to the relationship, and in so doing it would 
not be unreasonable to feel an entitlement to receiving a concomitant benefit from the 
other party.  This description becomes central to the notion of how commitment is 
constructed.   
 
There becomes a heightened level of sensitivity surrounding inter-party commitment 
when one party feels that they have historically or are currently contributing more to the 
relationship (or sacrificing more for the good of the relationship) than the counter-party 
(Kim et al 2005).  It is understandable that one side may consistently gauge the strength 
of the other party’s commitment to the relationship.  If a prolonged lack of contribution 
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 persists, the result will be a relationship that is not sustainable, not unlike other human 
relationships. 
 
4.15.3 Stakeholder Perception            
 
Depending upon the make-up of the organizations involved within the dyad, along with 
the specific roles of the individuals as they relate to the inter-relationship, there are 
observable parallels to other human (person to person) relationships (Rousseau 1985).  
These parallels are most significant in situations whereby only a small number of key 
individuals within each organization are at the forefront of the relationship and where 
these people have considerable input (Seabright et al. 1992).  The organization tends to 
take on the character of these key people.  Most notably, this is evidenced in small 
companies in which the key person is the organization, and also in service-type firms, 
such as insurance and finance companies whereby the product is intangible and is 
personified by those people (Shostack 1987).  Franchise arrangements experience this as 
well, since the franchisees tend to bring their own feelings, attitudes and experiences to 
bear on the business in concert with the local district franchisor’s representative’s 
feelings (Keysuk and Hsieh 2006).   
 
When specifically examining insurance company/distributor (agent) dyadic 
relationships, the notion of the involvement of only a small number of people is clearly 
present.  Although they are usually large corporations, insurance companies tend to rely 
upon a smaller number of territory representatives to manage relationships with 
distributors (Sanders 2005).  Conversely, insurance distributors, typically comprising 
agencies, tend to have a small ownership/management team which liaises with insurers 
and service providers.  The product is complex and intangible (Crosby and Stephens 
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 1987) and the ability to transact with this product and translate it to consumers is vital, 
thus the requirement to utilize experienced and trained agents (Ziethaml et al. 1990).  
Within this context, the specified relationship individuals become key representatives 
for the inter-organizational endeavours, and their own feelings become the feelings of 
the corporation (Jong and Vermeullen 2003).   
 
4.15.4 Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment               
 
If commitment is perceived to be one-sided and lacking the attention from the counter-
part, the perceiver tends to become dissatisfied with the relationship and may become 
inclined to allow performance levels tend to suffer (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  
If the perceiver feels the counterpart is not functioning within a prescribed or target 
range, the relationship becomes vulnerable (Swann 1984).  However, when operating 
within the target range, each side takes comfort in their ability to predict the other’s 
behaviour and can strive to match resources and performance levels.  If there is a 
perception of a misalignment or dissimilar goals between organizations, conflict can be 
manifested between the two parties (Eliashberg and Michie 1984).     
 
Generally, asymmetry in this context has detrimental implications.  But it is important 
to ascertain on which side the asymmetry resides.  Dwyer and Walker (1981) 
determined that weaker parties who recognize the fact that they are in a lesser position 
tend to have an expectation of reduced benefits from the relationship.  Conversely, the 
stronger parties armed with this same knowledge, expect and tend to enjoy the reverse 
(Wang and Wei 2007).  It is their view that the direction of the asymmetry (or balance 
of power) is more important than the fact that it actually exists.  This notion will be 
explored further in this study and thus it is proposed: 
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 Proposition 10:  The direction and perception of asymmetry in a relationship 
has an impact on commitment levels.   
 
4.15.5 Sources of Perceived Asymmetry  
 
Whether asymmetry in the relationship exists or not each party’s perception becomes 
their individual reality.  Under normal circumstances it is probable that some element of 
reality exists with their perception of an imbalance although measuring this would be 
difficult.  One party’s interpretation of commitment levels may deviate from another.  
This is due to the subjective nature of the components that build perception and are used 
to gauge commitment of other party.  One of the key elements is the psychological 
distance between the two sides and this is affected by conflict levels, tolerance, insight, 
etc. (Kenny and Albright 1987; Kruglanski 1989).  True measurements of the variables 
constituting asymmetry and commitment levels are difficult to gauge, therefore there is 
a tendency to rely upon each party’s assumption (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005).     
 
The importance and relevance of the trait being judged by a party (the perceiver) has an 
impact on the assumed commitment level (Swann 1984; Lord 1985).  This is true for 
either a principal or an agent.  Essentially, if greater levels of importance and relevance 
are placed upon a variable under consideration, then presumably there should be a 
greater degree of accuracy (Funder 1987).  This is also true if the property is more 
observable and evident, subject to the closeness of the relationship.  Psychologically 
close dyads have an improved capability of obtaining and valuing items and property 
than they would if the distance were to increase (Jap and Anderson 2003).  As well, they 
have a propensity to conduct these observations and measurements when the issue is 
important and relevant to them (Anderson and Weitz 1992).   
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 Unfortunately, the assessment of the counter-part’s commitment level is not a perfect 
science and tends to contain some predictable errors.  For example, the perceiver can be 
misled when the party they are observing is not behaving in a manner consistent with 
their circumstances.  This is applicable to occasions in which the perceiving party has 
considerable history with the counter-part thus providing ample occurrences in which to 
provide a basis of accurate comparison (Swann 1984).  Moreover, if the target party 
under observation intentionally misleads the perceiver, an incorrect assessment is likely.   
 
It would be an interesting exercise to determine the motivations for knowingly 
demonstrating a false commitment level to a counter-part, and the list of reasons would 
be long and varied.  A situation where this might occur could involve a principal with 
low commitment demonstrating high commitment to an agent in the hopes that the 
agent would increase and maintain strong commitment (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  
Alternatively, the principal might demonstrate a low level of commitment with the 
intent of displaying indifference to the relationship, as they do not wish to appear 
overly-exposed and susceptible to demands. 
 
In any event, these demonstrations of commitment levels, regardless of whether they are 
true or false, provide indications of a party’s intentions.  Perceptions, on the other hand, 
can be inaccurate readings of reality and formed through the immediate requirements of 
the perceiver (Kenny and Albright 1987).  An integral component of the perceiver’s 
belief surrounds the amount of reliance (or ultimate dependence) they have on the other 
party.  The notion of dependence levels, a sociological phenomenon (Emerson 1962), is 
ubiquitous in academic literature, particularly management and marketing disciplines, 
and is useful in examining inter-organizational relations (Frazier 1983).  Specifically, 
88 
 
 within distribution channels, the concept of dependence plays an important function in 
discussions surrounding power sources and also in the area of strategies to build 
influence that is utilized within a relationship (Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier et al. 
1989). 
 
Relationship dependency is variable, and is impacted by several actions.  Key among 
them includes the amount of value the other party provides and also the level of 
difficulty that would be involved in securing a replacement for them (Emerson 1962).  
The relationship is required more by a dependent party, i.e. the more dependent they 
are, the more they will need the relationship (Kathuria 2000).  This dependency at 
varying levels can cause a disturbance in a distribution channel, and one party may 
become vulnerable and exploited by the other party (Carman and Klein 1986), or at 
least threatened to be exploited (Blois 1972; Heide and John 1988).  If the dependent 
party is capable of not focusing upon the dependency, they may develop a greater 
ability to cope with the potentially negative consequences that could manifest (Fiske 
and Taylor 1984).  But if the party perceives that they are more committed to the 
relationship than the counter-party, they may narrow this view if they feel they also 
have a high level of dependency upon that counterpart.   
 
Another important item involves the quality and quantity of communication within the 
dyad (Mohr and Nevin 1990).  Regardless of its form, communication requires 
investments of varying types, including time, money and people.  Arguably, there does 
not exist a shortage of alternatives whereby these investments could be re-allocated, 
thus communication becomes a committed cost (Sum et al 2004).  As such, it could lead 
a party to analyse the investment in terms of opportunity costs and alternatives.  In 
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 addition, as organizations tend to involve themselves in several relationships 
simultaneously, they must make determinations as to which relationships they will 
allocate more investment and attention to, including by way of communication 
(Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005).  The inclination to wish for a return on their 
investment is natural, and an obviously clear method would involve the hope that the 
counterpart recognizes the value of the communication investment and increase their 
own commitment level to the dyad (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  Moreover, 
communication in this context has the potential to enhance trust levels (Anderson and 
Narus 1990), thus improving the essence and feelings within the distribution channel 
and adding a level of reassurance to the perceiver that the commitment levels are 
balanced by both parties.  Therefore, if the parties engage in bilateral, healthy dialogue 
and constructive communication, uneven commitment levels can become balanced. 
 
4.16  Summary 
 
The theory of commitment involves attitudes and preferences, choices and decisions.  
The human element is a key component of commitment in relationships.  As firms are 
made up of people and since commitment is largely a human emotion, a firm’s social 
capital plays an important role in organizational commitment (Watson and Papamarcos 
2002).  The human side of this concept will also be explored in the following section 
relating to transaction costs. 
 
This chapter has examined and categorized the relevant academic literature regarding 
commitment in order to inform the reader of its key aspects.  It has also provided 
important details on the specific Canadian marketplace and the insurance distribution 
90 
 
 channel that is central to this study.  This dove-tails into the following chapter which 
will provide a similar foundation for the topic of transaction cost economics. 
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 5 Literature Review - Transaction Cost Economics 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Recalling that this thesis is explanatory in nature, this section will delve into the realm 
of transaction cost economics with a view to applying the precepts to the construct of 
commitment within financial services distribution and specifically in insurer-broker 
dyads.  Not unlike the commitment literature, considerable work was advanced in this 
area during the 1980’s and 1990’s, and it continues to be advanced in the new 
millennium.  The most relevant of these works will be examined in this chapter, along 
with a review of the recent advancements in this area in order to apply the tool of 
transaction costs economics to aid in measuring commitment. 
 
Some important themes emerged during the course of this literature review, and these 
will be used to assist in organizing the topics in this section.  These items include:   
1) Issues confronting and confounding organizations 
2) Major influences on transaction cost economics 
3) Purposes and applications for analysing transaction costs  
4) Considerations for alternative governance structures (e.g. outsourcing) 
5) The influence of transaction costs on networks 
 
5.2 Background 
 
Inter-organizational research cannot be undertaken without considering the impact and 
influences of transaction costs upon firms.  Transaction cost economics has been the 
recipient of a rapidly growing and eclectic collection of researchers and scholars for no 
less than the past three decades.  Its acceptance as being worthy and valid as a scholarly 
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 discipline is exemplified by the 1991 Nobel Prize honour bestowed upon Ronald Coase 
for his ground-breaking work in this field.  Later supported by eminent academics such 
as Oliver Williamson (winner of the Nobel Prize in October 2009) and Paul Joskow, the 
topic continues to gain notoriety.  Other disciplines have been active in expanding the 
knowledge of transaction cost economics including; Jap and Anderson (2003) in 
marketing; Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy (2005) in contract discussions; Leiblein and 
Miller (2003) in business strategy; Moe (1991) in political science; Smith and 
Schnucker (1994) in corporate finance; Barney and Hesterly (1996) in organizational 
theory; and Granovetter (1985) in the field of sociology.  The consensus among the 
various groups is that the basic tenets of transaction cost theory are relevant for their 
different subject areas and do serve as a tool for the measurement of commitment, yet 
there is still value and ample room for development into the nuances of how it can be 
applied within the specific areas.  In particular, relationship and contract decisions can 
be guided by this theory (Kulkarni and Ramamoorthy 2005), along with choices of 
distribution systems (Jap and Anderson 2003; Leiblein and Miller 2003).  These are all 
of significant interest to the gauging of commitment.  However there is still a need to 
further develop the understanding and extend the knowledge of its application into 
international trade plus comparisons across different distribution channels and also 
across different products and services.  If made, these refinements will add potency to 
transaction cost economics theory.  
 
Transaction cost economic transactions typically have three considerations; these 
include ‘frequency’, ‘uncertainty’ (both environmental and behavioural), and ‘asset 
specificity’ (Williamson 1985).  Of these three considerations, the one that is often 
referred to as being the most significant is asset specificity, commonly described as 
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 idiosyncratic investments in the commitment literature also.  This is defined as the scale 
to which robust transaction-specific investments are incurred and is a measure of 
calculative commitment (Klaes 2000; Joskow 1988).  Asset specificity contemplates 
circumstances whereby channel participants such as an insurer and an agent are required 
to make specific investments in order to create the potential for ongoing exchanges 
(Childers and Offstein 2007).  The underlying implication is that switching costs will 
become prohibitive for either party thus resulting in a weakening of commitment and 
substantial losses.  If an arrangement was terminated, one of the parties would 
encounter challenges and costs if they attempted to engage the specific asset for an 
alternative purpose.  Much of the predictive nature and content of transaction cost 
economics is derived from asset specificity (Zhu et al 2006; Williamson 1985).  Earlier, 
Williamson (1975) also employed human elements relating to affective commitment 
such as opportunism and bounded rationality in his model.  These will be discussed later 
in greater detail. 
 
Traditional neoclassical economics has been slowly replaced by the “New Institutional 
Economics” theory, as least where it specifically involves transaction cost analysis.  The 
concept of the firm has been overlooked by neoclassical economics, largely dismissing 
it as simply a production function (Barney and Hesterly 1996).  On the other hand, 
transaction cost economics perceives the firm to exist as a governance structure.  In his 
seminal work, Coase (1937) indicated that both markets and firms operate with separate 
and distinct governance structures, each of which having different transaction costs.  
Coase suggested that when particular conditions exist, the cost of completing an 
exchange within the market may be higher than conducting the exchange within a firm.  
In this situation, the transaction costs would be classified as those which are incurred in 
94 
 
 the actual running of the network.  These costs might include, but would not be limited 
to such examples as the creation and implementation of contracts and the subsequent 
observation of how commited the parties are to the adherence to them (Madhok 2002).   
 
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996, 2000) has been supplementing and refining much of 
Coase’s earlier work by specifying particular exchanges that would be more effectively 
conducted within firms versus markets.  In addition, he has added to Coase’s early 
model by submitting that transaction costs should be considered with both the direct 
costs of relationship management along with the opportunity costs of incorrect 
governance selections.  Furthermore, Williamson added to the literature by combining 
the aspects of human behaviour in terms of opportunism and bounded rationality along 
with two important components of transactions, particularly uncertainty and asset 
specificity.  Each of these are key considerations when examining commitment levels. 
 
With the foregoing background and foundation in place, the thesis will now turn to the 
an examination of the application of transaction costs.  The following section will 
explore the issues facing contemporary organizations relative to inter-organizational 
relations and how transaction costs can influence commitment.  These issues have 
provided the impetus for research into transaction costs and are largely associated with 
safeguarding (to guard against opportunistic behaviour), adaptation (to adjust to 
external factors), and performance evaluation (measuring their partner’s performance in 
terms of their agreements). 
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 5.3 Issues Confronting and Confounding Organizations 
 
5.3.1 Issues Associated with Safeguarding        
 
Safeguarding challenges may emerge for an organization when it utilizes specific assets 
and recognizes that its cohort may opportunistically take advantage of these investments 
(Subramani and Venkatraman 2003).  Therefore, the events leading up to the 
safeguarding challenges are asset specificity and opportunistic behaviour.  These 
influence both the affective and calculative forms of commitment.  Safeguarding 
appears to be the most prevalent issue examined in the research that involves 
governance problems.  That research contributes considerable support for the suggested 
impact of specific assets yet somewhat inconclusive support for the influence and 
existence of opportunistic partners. 
 
An example of opportunism can be observed in a study by Dutta and John (1995) which 
suggests that a supplier that dominates and controls a market in a monopoly position has 
a greater propensity to raise prices than a supplier that is forced to share the market.  
Ultimately, that study concurs with Williamson’s (1985) suggestion that small-numbers 
negotiating can lead to opportunism.  Further agreement is also presented by Wang 
(2007) and Anderson (1988) by determining that a direct sales unit exhibits less 
opportunistic conduct than that of manufacturers’ representatives.   
 
An opposing view is presented by John (1984, p.287) in which this result is suggested;  
“It appears that opportunism can be viewed usefully as an endogenous variable 
that is evoked by certain antecedents within a long-run relationship.  In other 
words, individuals may not always behave opportunistically even if conditions 
permit such behaviour.  Refusals to honour agreements and misrepresentations 
96 
 
 of intentions cannot be taken for granted.  Rather, they are induced by certain 
other factors.”  
Palay (1984) advanced this conclusion by suggesting that idiosyncratic investments in 
rail freight relationships invariably assist in the creation and evolution of trust between 
exchange partners.  In addition, Wang and Wei (2007) and Parke (1993) concluded that 
opportunistic conduct between partners in strategic alliances is frequently eased when 
there has been a record of previous ongoing cooperation.   
 
Varying viewpoints have been put forward regarding the impact of opportunism upon 
relationships.  Notwithstanding the different perspectives, it does seem that if 
opportunism is present, then performance is impacted negatively.  Parke (1993) 
suggests that strategic alliance partnerships are hindered by opportunism, and so too 
does it also weaken commitment in relationships between suppliers and buyers (Claro et 
al 2006). 
 
One of the overarching tenets of transaction cost economics suggests that due to 
opportunistic behaviour amongst partners, high degrees of asset specificity will inflate 
the costs of safeguarding, monitoring and enforcing contracts and agreements.  Asset 
specificity can have a noticeably positive impact upon transaction costs and 
commitment both before and after the exchanges (Mukhopadhyay and Kekre 2002; 
Pilling et al. 1994).  In the context of integration, specific assets dedicated to intra-firm 
exchanges result in reduced transaction costs as opposed to specific assets reserved for 
external suppliers (Zhu et al 2006; Walker and Poppo 1991).  Both the earlier and 
current studies suggest that firms will integrate vertically if a need exists to safeguard 
specific assets (Williamson 1985, 2000).  This is particularly evident in make-or-buy 
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 decisions requiring increased levels of specific assets, thus requiring internal production 
versus outsourcing (Wang 2007; Masten et al. 1989, 1991).  There is also a strong, 
positive correlation between increased levels of investment in specific assets and the 
likelihood of a firm electing to integrate its shipping and warehousing requirements 
(Alvarez and Barney 2001; Maltz 1993, 1994).      
 
Vertical integration has appeared on several occasions as a means of safeguarding assets 
in the context of foreign market entry (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003; Erramilli and 
Rao 1993; Klein et al. 1990; Klein and Roth 1990).  In addition, the same notion to 
integrate vertically is upheld in the context of personal sales in circumstances requiring 
high levels of asset specificity (Wang and Wei 2007; Anderson 1985, 1988; John and 
Weitz 1988).  Leiblein and Miller (2003) also demonstrate a direct connection between 
vertical integration and higher levels of investments in specific assets and commitment 
to a particular channel.  Due to the foregoing it is proposed that:   
Proposition 11:  Firms will integrate vertically if a need exists to safeguard 
specific assets.  This is particularly evident in make-or-buy decisions requiring 
increased levels of specific assets, thus requiring internal production versus 
outsourcing. 
 
5.3.2 Issues Associated with Adaptation 
 
Issues surrounding adaptation can arise for an organization when their decision makers 
are constrained by bounded rationality and are challenged when amending contracts in 
order to attempt to adjust to external factors.  The theory of transaction costs suggests 
that an abundance of environmental uncertainty will increase the costs of amending the 
contracts (Pilling et al. 1994).  Klein and Roth (1993) support this further by indicating 
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 that companies that are confronted with reduced levels of environmental uncertainty 
have an increased satisfaction and affective commitment level with their partners versus 
those facing higher levels of environmental uncertainty.  Firms may choose to reduce 
transaction costs through the use of vertical integration as a mechanism to deal with an 
uncertain environment (Wang and Wei 2007). 
 
A very small number of studies assessing environmental uncertainty provide proof of a 
correlation between environmental uncertainty and either a hybrid governance mode or 
vertical integration.  Levy (1985); John and Weitz (1988), and Masten (1984) each 
provided manufacturing examples of vertical integration in uncertain environments, but 
this sample is quite limited.  Others have suggested that environmental uncertainty has 
no influence on a decision to vertically integrate (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984; Maltz 
1994).  It was subsequently suggested that environmental uncertainty may also require 
the impacts of either competition (Walker and Weber 1987) or asset specificity 
(Anderson 1985) in order to initiate a shift toward vertical integration (Jap and 
Anderson 2003).  The inconclusiveness of these studies may be the result of the 
blending of affective and calculative commitment whereby the the former is based in 
emotion and the later is logic-based.                     
   
Studies began to focus upon the possibility that environmental uncertainty was multi-
dimensional, with each dimension potentially creating a different effect.  The earliest 
research was delivered by Walker and Weber (1984) whereby they submitted that 
automotive manufacturers are influenced by volume uncertainty.  Because of this, the 
manufacturer may gravitate toward making parts instead of buying them, whereas 
technological uncertainty had no influence on the decision to outsource (Sanders 2005).  
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 Alternatively, Heide and John (1990) indicate that technological unpredictability 
reduces the likelihood of a sustainable relationship; however volume unpredictability 
bears no influence on the dyadic relationship’s opportunity for survival.  Their 
reasoning stems from the fact that firms become concerned about becoming locked into 
potentially obsolete technology (Wu et al 2006).  Along the same lines, Balakrishnan 
and Wernerfelt (1986) indicate that technological obsolescence can impose a negative 
influence on a manufacturer’s decision to integrate vertically.  In addition, suppliers 
may be less inclined to invest in assets that are buyer-specific because of technological 
uncertainty (McNally and Griffin 2004) and may exhibit reduced levels of commitment.   
 
Organizations tend to avoid vertical integration when they perceive they may be 
confronted with uncertain or evolving times (Contractor and Ra 2002).  Beyond 
concerns surrounding technological obsolescence, they also display apprehension and 
tend to relinquish control in favour of the market when environmental change appears 
rapid.  Klein (1989) contrasts environmental complexity versus environmental 
dynamism.  Complex environments encourage firms to vertically integrate, whereas 
dynamic and changing environments appear to encourage firms to exert less control and 
avoid hierarchical structures (McNally and Griffin 2004).  This is particularly evident 
with exporters and with their relationships in foreign markets.  Similarly, Klein et al. 
(1990) determined that the existence of several sources of environmental uncertainty 
will heighten the probability of using agents or distributors when operating within a 
foreign market.  Other evidence of mitigated investment and calculative commitment 
caused by environmental uncertainty can be found in research presented by Oerlemans 
and Meeus (2001). 
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 5.3.3 Issues Associated with Performance Evaluation   
 
Firms may face challenges with performance evaluation if their decision makers are 
constrained by bounded rationality and have problems measuring the relationship 
partner’s compliance with their obligations contained with the agreements.  Therefore, 
bounded rationality and behavioural uncertainty are important contributors to problems 
associated with both forms of commitment and performance evaluation.  Behavioural 
uncertainty in particular has received some attention in the commitment and transaction 
cost economics literature (Tsang 2000).  Specifically, a heightened quantity of 
behavioural uncertainty will correspondingly increase the costs of evaluating the 
performance of the relationship partners (Jean 2007).  Williamson (1985, 2000) 
suggests that firms will attempt to mitigate their performance evaluation costs through a 
shift towards vertical integration.   
 
There is some evidence of a positive relationship between behavioural uncertainty and a 
firm’s decision to utilize an in-house sales unit versus agents (Anderson 1985; Anderson 
and Schmittlein 1984; Weiss and Anderson 1992).  In addition, behavioural uncertainty 
appears to have the greatest impact of all the key aspects of the commitment and 
transaction cost analysis framework, specifically environmental uncertainty, frequency, 
asset specificity, and behavioural uncertainty (Anderson 1985; Anderson and 
Schmittlein 1984).  Furthermore, additional support was given for a correlation between 
vertical integration and behavioural uncertainty (Zhang and Rajagopalan 2002).. 
 
As well as inspiring and developing greater amounts of vertical integration, 
organizations will endeavour to mitigate costs associated with performance evaluation 
due to behavioural uncertainty by implementing hybrid governance mechanisms (Chen 
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 and Chen 2003).  An example of this is evident in a study by Heide and John (1990) and 
later in a similar study by Arino and Reuer (2004) whereby behavioural uncertainty 
confronted by manufacturers bears a positive relationship to the amount they search for 
a supplier’s qualifications and abilities through such actions as examining the supplier’s 
manufacturing and/or engineering capabilities.  As per the foregoing discussion, this 
study proposes the following: 
Proposition 12:   A heightened quantity of behavioural uncertainty will 
correspondingly increase the costs of evaluating the performance of the 
relationship partners.  Firms will attempt to mitigate their performance 
evaluation costs through a shift towards vertical integration.   
 
Having examined these issues in the context of transaction costs, attention is now turned 
to an exploration of the major influences in this area.  Largely, these influences are 
driven by governance structures of firms, asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty 
(behavioural and environmental).  Each will be examined in detail in the following 
section.  
 
5.4 Major Influences on Transaction Costs 
 
5.4.1 Influence of Governance Structures 
 
Scholars tend to categorize governance structures into three forms, namely hierarchy, 
market, and also a variety of intermediate or hybrid types.  Considerable research has 
been forthcoming that contrasts hierarchies against markets.  For instance, Walker and 
Weber (1984, 1987) compared purchases of components by an arm’s length supplier 
against the option of producing these same components in-house.  This is a typical study 
of market versus hierarchy governance structures.  Additional research of a similar 
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 nature during that time period includes studies by Masten (1984); Masten et al. (1991); 
Monteverde and Teece (1982); Walker and Poppo (1991).  Similarly, this topic of 
research was extended to include manufacturer’s representatives versus a direct sales 
force as a basis of comparison for market versus hierarchy structures and as a method of 
examining commitment levels between parties (Leiblein and Miller 2003). 
 
A unique approach was presented by several researchers whereby a continuous measure 
or gradient scale was employed to gauge the level of vertical integration existing within 
a firm’s structure, thus indicating whether a market or a hierarchy structure was evident.  
Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) describe governance structure as the amount of 
vertical integration expressed as a percentage ranging from 0% to 100%.  Others 
presented their findings of market to hierarchy comparisons in a similar fashion 
(Leiblein and Miller 2003; McNally and Griffin 2004).  Useful though this approach 
may prove, it was acknowledged by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) that 
comparisons across industries may not be conclusive due to differences in 
measurements and standards in such items as profitability, sales ratios, etc.   
 
Governance structures of the intermediate or hybrid category tend to manifest in various 
constructs.  Evidence of this can be observed in studies such as Klein et al. (1990) in 
which joint ventures are created in order to move into a foreign market.  In this 
example, the hybrid governance mode exists at an intermediate point between a foreign 
sales subsidiary (hierarchy) and merchant distributors (market).  Other studies produced 
comparable examples (Erramilli and Rao 1993; Osborn and Baughn 1990).  In addition, 
other examples described circumstances involving hybrid governance structures that 
evolve from the processes involved.  Particularly, Palay (1984) examined the degrees of 
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 relational contracting as an intermediate governance structure monitoring the level of 
commitment in relationships involving shippers and rail carriers.  This was presented by 
measuring five components of their agreements, specifically; the existence of long term 
and structural plans, methods of enforcement, adaptation to changes and evolving 
situations, and the types of adjustments that are made or contemplated.  Finally, bilateral 
governance was presented as a type of commitment mechanism involved in a hybrid 
governance structure (Claro et al 2006).  In this example, the level of joint involvement 
on the part of supplier-buyer dyads was measured in terms of their action, stability, and 
qualification efforts.   
 
Current research has presented evidence of a wider range of governance mechanisms.  
Specifically, Stump and Heide (1996) have observed the methods that buyers employ in 
order to safeguard the specific assets they have invested in sellers.  In particular, they 
examine certain control mechanisms available to the buyers including; (a) ‘the choice 
and selection of partners’; (b) ‘monitoring techniques’; (c) ‘the design of incentives’.  In 
a similar fashion, Parke (1993) examined the influences and results of opportunistic 
behaviour on the level of safeguards contained in agreements in strategic alliances.  In 
addition to these examples, further research surrounding a variety of matters involving 
safeguarding has continued to surface (Subramani and Venkatraman 2003; Anderson 
and Weitz 1992; Dutta and John 1995; Heide and John 1988, 1992).  Moreover, some 
evidence suggests too much governance may achieve the opposite of the intended result 
and negatively impact profitability and level of commitment while providing little in the 
way of protection (Diacon and O’Sullivan 1995).  This dissertation therefore suggests: 
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 Proposition 13:  Firms will gravitate towards either a hierarchical, market, or 
hybrid form of governance structure based upon the choice and selection of their 
partners, available monitoring techniques, and the design of incentives.      
 
5.4.2 Influence of Frequency 
 
Williamson (1975) expanded his framework to include ‘risk neutrality’ in the 
behavioural dimension, and also added ‘frequency’ within the transactional dimension.  
There has been some attention to these additions (Chiles and McMackin 1996), but very 
little of it has been empirical.  Williamson (1985) and Leiblein and Miller (2003) 
examined higher frequency levels, suggesting that it provides an incentive for firms to 
consider a hierarchical governance structure since it would likely be easier to recover 
costs in this way for larger transactions of a similar type.  Thus, lower frequency would 
increase commitment to a market or hybrid structure and partners.  The limited amount 
of further research on this specific topic has made it difficult to prove or disprove this 
contention.  Some studies have simply failed to make a connection between hierarchical 
governance and transactional frequency (Anderson 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein 
1984; Maltz 1993, 1994), while others have only examined cases using recurring 
exchanges (Yiu and Makino 2002) and would not be in a position to contrast against 
one-time transactions.  This dissertation will expand upon the current research and in so 
doing suggests the following for closer examination: 
Proposition 14:  Higher frequency levels provide an incentive for firms to 
consider a hierarchical governance structure since it would likely be easier to 
recover costs in this way for larger transactions of a similar type and in a 
similar region.  Otherwise a market structure or hybrid form would be more 
suitable.   
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 5.4.3 Influence of Asset Specificity 
 
Asset specificity plays a significant role in transaction cost economics and commitment.  
By definition, it addresses the degree of transferability of assets that are involved and 
support a particular transaction (Williamson 1985).  Assets that are deemed to have a 
high level of specificity represent sunk costs with negligible value beyond the particular 
transaction relationship and result in increased dedication and commitment to it (Wang 
2007).  Asset specificity itself can be further sub-divided into six categories 
(Williamson 1991); (a) ‘temporal specificity’; (b) ‘site specificity’; (c) ‘dedicated 
assets’; (d) ‘physical asset specificity’; (e) ‘brand name capital’; (f) ‘human asset 
specificity’.  The majority of the existing research tends to focus upon human asset 
specificity, particularly the studies surrounding transaction cost analysis and 
commitment applications (Bamberger and Meshoulam 2000; Lohtia et al. 1994).  The 
popularity is likely due to the increasing interest in human interests, and the fact that 
this form of investment is generally quite substantial and necessary in business.  In 
addition, the varying nature and availability of data lends itself to scholarly research in 
this area, particularly because of the sources available to researchers, e.g. secondary 
data such as financial reports, sales figures, and primary data including surveys, etc.   
 
Frequently, human asset specificity has been gauged on a scale similar to that which 
was introduced by Anderson (1985, 1988).  This ten item company scale “reflects how 
necessary it is for salespeople to forge working relationships with the firm in order to 
be effective and how much salespeople must learn” (Anderson 1985, p.243).  Other 
studies have successfully contributed various adaptations of this scale, thus extending its 
use further, including; Meilich (2005); Heide and John (1988, 1990, and 1992); Klein 
(1989); Klein and Roth (1990); Klein et al. (1990); Maltz (1993, 1994); Stump and 
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 Heide (1996); Weiss and Anderson (1992).  This approach has consistently displayed a 
significant degree of unidimensionality and internal consistency, as well as convergent 
and discriminant validity (Heide and John 1990; Klein et al. 1990). 
 
Human asset specificity research has presented other studies that utilize multi-item 
measurements while displaying sound internal consistency (Meilich 2005).  This is 
apparent in the studies by Erramilli and Rao (1993); Sriram et al. (1992).  However, 
there are a small number of studies that utilize single-item measures of either asset 
specificity in general (Parke 1993) or human specific assets (Bucklin and Sengupta 
1993; Walker and Poppo 1991).  In particular, one study gauges human asset specificity 
through a technique utilizing a single item which assesses the amount of time brand new 
sales representatives would require to familiarize themselves with the company’s 
customers and product line (Subramani 2004).   
 
Whereas the majority of studies undertaken in the realm of human asset specificity 
typically employ some form of survey instrument as a method of measurement, there 
are also some examples of research that assess this subject with the use of secondary 
data.  This can be observed through Monteverde and Teece (1982) whereby human asset 
specificity is measured by examining engineering cost ratings for automotive parts.  
Several other studies followed utilizing a similar technique and approach (Masten 1984; 
Masten et al. 1989, 1991).  However, this approach can be somewhat problematic and 
only provides approximations, thus leading to the possibility of construct validity issues.  
Recognizing the limitations of secondary data, more direct assessments may not be 
obtainable.  In these instances, multiple methods may be more appropriate in order to 
ensure construct validity.  Either way, to examine concept further it is proposed that: 
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 Proposition 15:  Increases in investments in assets that have a high degree of 
specificity are positively correlated with levels of commitment.   
 
5.4.4 Influence of Uncertainty         
 
Although decision makers may have the best of intentions and believe they are acting 
rationally, they may be limited by their abilities to communicate and process 
information (Simon 1957).  Referred to as bounded rationality, this concept becomes 
challenging during times of uncertainty, particularly when the situation involving an 
exchange cannot be determined in advance (environmental uncertainty) and 
performance levels cannot be assessed subsequently (behavioural uncertainty).   
 
Uncertainty within the environment requires the ability to modify agreements and adapt 
quickly to new and evolving situations.  For example, an insurer may choose to issue 
different contracts to agents at various stages of product and market maturity.  As the 
marketplace evolves, simplified contracts may require re-drafting and re-negotiation.  
Although this may have served its purpose initially as a low-cost entry technique, 
ongoing uncertainty may prove it to be more costly than if a more inclusive and 
comprehensive contract had been drafted and negotiated at the outset, thus removing the 
necessity to revise each agreement.  The costs in either case would be the responsibility 
of the insurer, but environmental uncertainty should bring on the consideration of the 
more comprehensive agreement and ultimately an increased level of commitment. 
 
Behavioural uncertainty, on the other hand, pertains to the challenges existing with 
determining whether or not adherence to the terms and conditions of pre-existing 
contracts has occurred.  Within insurance distribution channels, it is difficult to ascertain 
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 whether an agent has complied with the provision of the necessary information to 
customers in advance of accepting a policy.  Although it is a requirement under the 
regulations of the licensing authorities, not to mention a condition of the contract, 
verifying and measuring this activity could be prohibitive.  If it is not observed and/or 
measured, there will be an element of uncertainty as to whether or not the activity is 
completed and this could lead to a weakening of commitment. 
 
If a decision maker chooses to serve their own self-interests unscrupulously or with 
guile, they are considered to be acting opportunistically.  The challenge is in knowing in 
advance specifically who may be trustworthy or not (Mollering 2002).  Williamson 
(1985) includes behaviours such as cheating and lying, deceit, and contract violation in 
the context of opportunism.  Among the obvious challenges presented by opportunism 
is the usage of unique, specific assets which have little or no value beyond the 
relationship and the subsequent way in which the knowledge of this is used 
opportunistically (Kwon and Suh 2004).  For example, if an insurer invests significantly 
in training of an agent in order to enhance the relationship, the agent could exploit this 
investment knowing that the insurer would not readily replace the agent because of the 
size of the investment.  The agent’s exploitation could involve demands of increased 
commissions, bonuses and/or other concessions.  This may have the effect of 
temporarily increasing commitment because of the size of the investment, but if 
opportunism is discovered it could strain and weaken the relationship. 
 
5.4.5 Environmental Uncertainty 
 
In the context of transaction costs, environmental uncertainty describes “unanticipated 
changes in circumstances surrounding an exchange” (Noordewier et al. 1990, p.82).  
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 Among the other influences on transaction costs, environmental uncertainty presents the 
greatest challenges in terms of measurement and assessment, including that of 
commitment levels.  This may be the result of two competing pre-positions that appear 
in the research.  The existing studies tend to gravitate toward one of two particular 
perspectives.  The most prevalent of these perspectives stresses the unpredictability of 
the external environment, whereas the other view emphasizes both the complexity and 
unpredictability of the external environment (Lee et al 2003).   
 
Examples of the more common perspective of environmental uncertainty are apparent in 
Anderson (1985, 1988).  In these cases, a nine item scale is employed which focuses on 
the components connected to both the instability related to the environmental volatility 
and to the risks associated with exploring and entering into new ventures.  Heide and 
John (1990) extend this further by breaking unpredictability into two forms, i.e. 
technological and volume.  Stump and Heide (1996) incorporate this technological 
unpredictability scale into their study.  In addition, John and Weitz (1989) and 
Noordewier et al. (1990) employ similar scales in their research of the unpredictability 
characteristic of environmental uncertainty.   
 
A counter perspective of environmental uncertainty is presented by Klein (1989) and 
also by Klein et al. (1990).  These viewpoints suggest that environmental uncertainty is 
two-dimensional and includes both changeability and unpredictability.  In addition, it is 
proposed that the aforementioned two types of uncertainty have opposite impacts upon 
governance structures and commitment (Lee et al 2003).  In particular, they advocate 
that although unpredictability encourages companies to develop hierarchical structures, 
changeability creates the opposite result.  To illustrate this, Klein (1989) contrasts 
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 complexity and dynamism as fundamentals of environmental uncertainty.  In this 
example, uncertainty-complexity is defined as “the degree to which the respondent 
perceived the environment as simple or complex” and uncertainty-dynamism as “the 
rate at which changes in the environment occur” (Klein 1989 p.257).   
 
Researchers may wish to debate as to which perspective is correct or at least more 
appropriate in a given circumstance.  If the important components of the external 
environment negate reasons to develop a hierarchical governance mode, then perhaps 
Klein’s (1989) multidimensional perspective is more appropriate.  Otherwise, the 
traditional unpredictability perspective may be suitable.  Furthermore, the context in 
which the research is undertaken may dictate the perspective (Leiblein and Miller 
2003).  For instance, although the traditional unpredictability perspective of 
environmental uncertainty typically is utilized in domestic situations (Anderson 1985; 
Heide and John 1990), whereby complexity is likely to be manageable, the 
circumstances involved in Meyer (2001) research study examining decisions in foreign 
market entry, thus complexity would probably be more relevant. 
 
Further to the aforementioned multiple item scales and assessments, there are some 
studies which examined the environmental uncertainty concept through single item 
measurements (Anderson and Schmittlein 1984; Masten et al. 1991).  Specifically, 
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984 p.391) assess uncertainty as the “expected deviation 
between forecast and actual sales.”  Masten et al. (1991) utilize a different technique by 
requesting survey participants categorize components into one of two opposing views of 
uncertainty based upon their complexity.         
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 There are several transaction cost analysis researchers that have examined 
environmental uncertainty while utilizing secondary data sources.  Of particular note is 
Wakolbinger and Nagurney (2004) and also of Osborn and Baughn’s (1990) 
observation of technological power as determined by the magnitude of research and 
development-to-sales ratios.  Other studies utilizing secondary data sources to examine 
environmental uncertainty include Levy’s (1985) research into stock market returns as 
being correlated to unanticipated events and also Gatignon and Anderson’s (1988) 
categorization of country risk as an gauge of unpredictability.  Meyer (2001) uses a 
similar system to provide guidance in order to determine the choice of entry mode into a 
particular market and assess how committed the party is to following though with the 
decision..  
 
In order to further study the impact of environmental uncertainty, the following 
proposition is presented: 
Proposition 16:  The two types of environmental uncertainty have opposite 
impacts upon governance structures, i.e. unpredictability encourages companies 
to develop hierarchical structures whereas changeability creates the opposite 
result. 
   
5.4.6 Behavioural Uncertainty 
 
In the transaction cost economics context, behavioural uncertainty refers to the 
challenges associated with the monitoring and enforcement of contractual adherence 
and performance of exchange partners (Zhang 2006).  This serves as a solid measure of 
commitment levels.  When contrasted against environmental uncertainty and asset 
specificity, behavioural uncertainty appears to have received far less attention in the 
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 research domains (Klaes 2000).  However, the studies that do exist appear to 
contemplate issues of behavioural uncertainty in constructs similar to that of 
Williamson’s (1985) description.  Other research has produced studies extending the 
work of Anderson (1985).  Anderson (1985) describes behavioural uncertainty within 
the context of being associated with the challenges in assessing sales performance.  This 
is completed through the use of a seven item scale which focuses on such elements as 
the contributions of team sales and also the validity of production reports.  Furthermore, 
Anderson (1988) and Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) produced studies using 
adaptations of this technique.  A few other studies examined behavioural uncertainty 
using comparable methodologies and tend to consider it simply as a matter of 
performance evaluation (Stump and Heide 1996; Weiss and Anderson 1992).      
 
Also in line with environmental uncertainty and asset specificity, a small number of 
studies utilized single item assessments of behavioural uncertainty (Claro et al 2006).  
In particular, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) gauge behavioural uncertainty as a 
single item variable related to the challenges associated with equitably assessing the 
performance of individual salespeople.  In addition, Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) 
incorporated single item behavioural uncertainty assessments.  Unlike environmental 
uncertainty and asset specificity, there are only a handful of studies using secondary 
measures for behavioural uncertainty research, although it may be challenging in any 
event to garner information for this type of purpose (Fussell et al 2006).  However, 
Gatignon and Anderson (1988) successfully managed to examine international 
experience as a proxy for performance analysis within the context of foreign market 
entry, but this form of secondary data research of behavioural uncertainty is rare.  
Meilich (2005) also examined this and concluded that negative effects increase 
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 (including that of commitment) when in the context of being locked-in to a dominant 
supplier.      
 
This study will examine behavioural uncertainty further through examination of the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 17:  Actual or perceived behavioural uncertainty on the part of a 
dyad counterparty presents challenges with the monitoring and enforcement of 
contractual adherence and performance of exchange partners.   
 
The thesis has looked at the history and background of transaction costs, along with the 
most common influences and their impacts upon commitment in business relationships.  
Before looking specifically at its application to the Canadian insurance market, the next 
section of the study will explore the common purposes and applications for analyzing 
transaction costs. 
 
5.5 Historical Purposes and Applications for TCA 
 
5.5.1 Historical Purposes of Transaction Cost Analysis (TCA)    
 
At its most basic level, transaction cost analysis advises that if costs are low (or non-
existent) for a firm to adapt an activity within a market, enforce agreements, provide 
suitable safeguards, and monitor performance, then the situation is favourable for 
market governance (McNally and Griffin 2004).  This has been a recurrent theme in the 
academic literature and has been demonstrated with empirical applications.  Marketing 
researchers have been particularly active in this area due in large part to their collective 
interest in exchanges and commitment.  Some of this body of knowledge includes 
research examining decisions surrounding vertical integration (Whinston 2003; 
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 Anderson 1985; John and Weitz 1988), management of distribution channels (Lee et al 
2003; Spekle 2001; Anderson and Weitz 1992; Heide and John 1988), strategies 
involved in industrial purchasing (Noordewier et al. 1990; Stump and Heide 1996), 
compensation issues and general components of control of sales teams (Spekle 2001; 
Anderson 1988; John and Weitz 1989), and entry strategies into foreign markets (Meyer 
2001; Anderson and Coughlan 1987; Klein et al. 1990).  In addition to these, 
marketing’s general approach to research techniques and methodologies has aided in the 
facilitation and testing of research outputs.  The relevance and validity of the research 
results arises from the quality of the data which is often garnered at a micro-level of the 
firm, often supplied by the decision makers themselves (Vosselman 2002; Calfee and 
Rubin 1993; Joskow 1991), thus adding to the overall richness and quality.   
 
Although the focus on transaction costs has been increasing, the knowledge that has 
been created is not always being fully utilized.  This is likely due to a lack of awareness 
of advancements made to the early work (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975, 1985) on the 
transactions cost analysis framework.  Proof of this may be observed in the opinion of 
Madhok’s (2002) criticism of transaction cost analysis.  Later publications and research 
on the subject provide a critique of Williamson’s (1975) work on “Markets and 
Hierarchies” without referencing or acknowledging more recent refinements.          
               
An additional challenge confronting transaction cost analysis stems from the fact that 
the pre-existing empirical work has not been integrated solidly into other academic 
works yet there is a tremendous opportunity to apply it to the concepts of affective and 
calculative commitment.  It has provided insights for consideration, such as issues 
surrounding governance, e.g. protection of idiosyncratic investments (Subramani and 
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 Venkatraman 2003).  As well, it has provided tools and mechanisms as a means to 
handle these issues, e.g. pledges (Arino and Reuer 2004; Anderson and Weitz 1992), 
bargaining items (Heide and John 1990), enforcement (Stump and Heide 1996), and 
agreements (Yiu and Makino 2002).      
 
5.5.2 Early Application of Transaction Cost Analysis 
 
The analysis of transaction costs has been discussed and applied in several disciplines, 
particularly in marketing, law, and economics.  Everywhere from the economic issues 
surrounding marriage (Treas 1993) to international trade matters (Hennart and Anderson 
1993), transaction cost analysis has value and likely has been utilized.  To quote 
Williamson (1985), “Any problem that can be formulated, directly or indirectly, as a 
contracting problem can be investigated to advantage in transaction cost terms.”  The 
existing marketing research has supplied numerous examples of the breadth of issues 
involved in exchanges for which transaction cost analysis has been instrumental in 
providing explanation and theory.  This research tends to categorize the contexts under 
review into one of the following classifications: (a) ‘a specific test of the transaction 
cost analysis assumptions’; (b) ‘inter-organizational relationships of a horizontal 
nature’; (c) ‘inter-organizational relationships of a vertical nature’; and (d) ‘vertical 
integration’. 
 
5.5.3 Original Specified Tests of Transaction Cost Assumptions       
 
There have been some (not many) studies examining and testing the robustness of the 
assumptions surrounding transaction cost analysis.  For example, John (1984) and 
Stump and Heide (1996) approached the subject matter from the perspective of 
opportunism as having an indeterminate quantity that requires explanation or debate.  
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 That former research specifically examined the extent of the opportunism displayed by 
franchisees engaged in distribution of products of a large oil company.  The 
opportunism was viewed in light of a perceived context of a power structure within a 
bureaucracy and its negative effects upon commitment.  In addition, research work was 
undertaken by Anderson (1988) which also tested the assumptions of transaction cost 
analysis.  In this study, opportunistic behaviour amongst electronic industry salespeople 
was observed.  The intention of the study was to examine the influence of the potential 
causes that may have precipitated the opportunistic behaviour.    
 
5.5.4 Early Studies of Horizontal Inter-organizational Relationships 
 
Historically, transaction cost researchers have focused their attention on vertical inter-
organizational relationships.  But recently there has been a shift toward providing 
attention to transaction costs in relationships between firms positioned at a similar point 
in a value chain.  Likely the first study of its kind was completed by Gates (1989) in 
which technological cooperation was analyzed within the semiconductor sector.  In 
particular, he analyzed the degree to which the strategic orientation of a company may 
influence a decision-maker’s views of the transaction costs that arise when firms 
cooperate and the positive effect it has on commitment.  Subsequently, a more 
prominent study emerged on the matter (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).  This 
examination considered the involvement of uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity 
on power imbalances in co-operative marketing arrangements.  Further research around 
this time included work by Osborn and Baughn (1990) and Parkhe (1993).    
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 5.5.5 Early Studies of Vertical Inter-organizational Relationships 
 
Considerable research has been compiled since the early 1980s which examines the 
issues of governance and how it can be managed in value chains that are without 
common ownership (i.e. hybrid governance systems) (McNally and Griffin 2004).  The 
circumstances and issues that precipitated the evolution of these forms of networks are 
described by Monteverde and Teece (1982).  In that study, a manufacturer retains 
ownership of the production equipment yet the supplier is the producer of the parts in an 
automotive industry setting.  Recognition of the commitment levels of counter-parties is 
vital in these circumstances.  A later study was undertaken by Heide and John (1988) 
which suggests that representatives of manufacturers protect the assets they invest in 
their manufacturing principals by creating a corresponding investment in their client 
relationships, thus adding value to their own position.  Further research was conducted 
on the chemical sector by Stump and Heide (1996) whereby supplier and manufacturer 
relationships were examined.  Various alternative governance systems were investigated 
in this study and were considered in the contexts of monitoring and enforcement, the 
design of incentives, and the selection and ongoing commitment of partners.   
 
Quite common amongst the transaction cost analysis research are studies into 
governance mechanisms and their relationship to the evolution of strong and sustainable 
inter-organizational bonds and commitment levels (Whinston 2003; NG 2007).  This is 
evident in a study presented by Heide and John (1990) which employed transaction cost 
analysis to view precisely how suppliers and purchasers will foster close relationships as 
a method to protect their idiosyncratic investments and to aid in adjusting to uncertainty.  
An extension of this work is evident in Heide and John’s (1992) examination of the 
moderating effect of customary behaviours and standards within a relationship.  It is 
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 suggested that the objective should be avoiding an imbalance between the idiosyncratic 
assets and vertical control within the inter-organizational relationship (Whinston 2003).  
Other researchers have also examined the usage and impact of relationship bonds as part 
of the governance mechanism, including Pilling et al. (1994); Noordewier et al. (1990); 
Sriram et al. (1992) and Walker and Poppo (1991).  Moreover, the use of pledges in 
constructing commitment within principal and agent dyads was examined by Anderson 
and Weitz (1992).  
 
In addition to the aforementioned marketing studies on vertical inter-organizational 
relationships, the disciplines of economics and law have contributed considerable 
research surrounding the use of contracts and agreements (Spekle 2001; Whinston 
2003).  These studies assist in providing a framework for understanding the bilateral 
nature of sustainable exchange relationships.  A recognized study examining this 
phenomenon was presented by Joskow (1987).  In this example, the context of 
electricity utilities and their coal providers was examined with a view to consider the 
impact of asset specificity on the tenure of agreements.  As well, Leffler and Rucker 
(1991) and Palay (1984) studied agreements and contracts in terms of transaction costs.                     
 
5.5.6 Seminal Research into Vertical Integration      
 
The most prevalent (and oldest) studies on transaction cost analysis tend to concentrate 
on decisions surrounding vertical integration.  Common among these are manufacturers’ 
choices to integrate backward/upward in their supply line or forward/downward into the 
sales and distribution channel.  A seminal study was put forth by Monteverde and Teece 
(1982) in which a make-or-buy decision for assembly parts was analyzed using 
transaction cost analysis for two U.S. automotive producers.  Shortly thereafter, Masten 
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 et al. (1989) as well as Walker and Weber (1984, 1987) presented more research on the 
sourcing of components in the U.S. automobile industry.  The use of transaction cost 
analysis within the context of make-or-buy decisions was later extended into other 
manufacturing sectors by Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986); Levy (1985); Lieberman 
(1991); Masten (1984) and Masten et al. (1991).  This was once again advanced further 
by applying transaction cost analysis to observe the circumstances whereby a 
manufacturer would choose an outside firm versus in-house in order to handle their 
shipping (Maltz 1993) and warehousing (Maltz 1994) requirements. 
 
More recently, forward vertical integration has become the recipient of considerable 
interest, as transaction cost analysis studies examine the integration of manufacturers 
and suppliers into the sales and distribution channel in both international and domestic 
contexts and to observe the development of commitment between all parties (Yiu and 
Makino 2002).  An example of this focus is the study presented by Whinston (2003) in 
which transaction cost analysis is employed when manufacturers are considering 
forward integration into the distribution channel, and by their choice of direct (in-house 
employees) versus indirect (commissioned agents and brokers) distribution channels.  
Earlier, several research projects were presented which utilized transaction cost analysis 
to help comprehend the thought processes that manufacturers were engaged in when 
choosing between integrated (in-house) sales units or independent (brokers and/or 
representatives) distributors (Anderson 1985; Anderson and Schmittlein 1984; Weiss 
and Anderson 1992).  These works were subsequently advanced in an examination 
within a transaction cost analysis context of firms that choose to utilize both an in-house 
sales force as well as manufacturers’ representatives (McNally and Griffin 2004; Dutta 
et al. 1995). 
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 Forward vertical integration has also been researched within a transaction cost analysis 
framework in order to observe the processes of foreign market entry by firms.  
Anderson and Coughlan (1987) use these techniques to analyze the choices made by 
U.S. semiconductor firms when electing to employ an integrated sales force or to 
proceed through the independent channel.  Likewise, transaction cost analysis was 
utilized by Gatignon and Anderson (1988) when researching the level of control that 
multinational firms use when dealing with foreign subsidiaries in the context of their 
level of integration.  Subsequently, a series of studies emerged surrounding the 
strategies employed by Canadian exporters in terms of vertical control and the pressures 
on commitment (Klein 1989; Klein et al. 1990; Klein and Roth 1990, 1993).  Of 
particular note, the Klein and Roth (1993) study made a valuable contribution through 
its use of transaction cost analysis in an attempt to comprehend the items leading to an 
organization’s satisfaction level with its distributors in the international channels and 
the joint commitment to the relationship.  Similarly, studies such as an investigation of 
joint ventures in communist China (Hu and Chen 1993) and also the entry of service 
companies into foreign markets (Erramilli and Rao 1993) used these innovative 
frameworks.        
 
Transaction cost considerations play an important decision-making role in the various 
forms of governance structures.  Moving forward from this discussion the study will 
now examine the transaction cost influence on alternative governance structures such as 
outsourcing.  This is highly relevant to this research as it explores the topic in the 
specific context of  the intermediary (brokerage) insurance distribution channel. 
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 5.6 Seminal Research in Alternative Governance Structures 
 
5.6.1 Using Transaction Costs in Determining to Outsource 
 
Industry has witnessed a vibrant and steady move towards outsourcing, particularly in 
the past three decades.  In this context, outsourcing is defined as the contracting-out of 
activities that previously were conducted within the organization itself (McNally and 
Griffin 2004).  The list of activities could include, but not be limited to; payroll, I.T. 
services, cleaning, etc.  Typically, firms would choose to outsource activities that other 
firms could undertake on a more cost-efficient basis.  Generally, but not always, this 
includes non-core activities of the organization as it permits them to allocate more 
attention to efficiently focus on their in-house, core functions (Alvarez and Barney 
2001).   
 
This is not a new ideal nor is it a large paradigm shift (Leiblein and Miller 2003; 
Winkleman et al. 1993; Huff 1991).  The utilization of outside expertise has been 
around for quite some time.  But more recently, it has become apparent that the extent 
and nature of activities being outsourced is expanding (Wang 2007).  It is also notable 
that public acceptance for outsourcing is increasing, particularly in light of the evolving 
corporate and market conditions.    
 
The decision to make or buy has been a beguiling issue for management for some time.  
Hiemstra and van Tilburg (1993) have endeavoured to bring clarity on the definition of 
outsourcing.  They contend that it involves the sub-contracting of custom-made items, 
components, sub-assemblies, and even final products and/or services to another firm.  If 
similar components are simply purchased from the marketplace and are not specifically 
sub-contracted, that would not involve outsourcing in their estimation.  But both have 
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 an impact on make-or-buy decisions (McNally and Griffin 2004).  Ultimately, the 
decision involves choices such as hiring a firm or employing internal staff to perform a 
particular task.  If the choice is to make a component, the firm will conduct internal 
transactions with another division of the firm.  Conversely, if the choice is to buy a 
component, the firm will contract with another firm.  Too often this is undertaken as a 
financial decision and may be based upon costs alone in a similar fashion to the 
calculative form of commitment.  But there is also a strategic element to the decision 
and it impacts several levels including capacity, expansion plans, right-sizing the firm, 
the current economic environment, etc. (Spekle 2001; Rothery and Robertson 1995).   
 
The growth of outsourcing is brought on by cost reduction concerns and also by changes 
in management approaches (Spekle 2001; Winkleman et al. 1993).  But market forces 
and other technical considerations may also have considerable influence (Gupta and 
Gupta 1992).  Ultimately, the motivation for outsourcing can be summarized as being 
influenced by ‘costs’, ‘capacity’, ‘capital’, and ‘knowledge’ (Heimstra and van Tilburg 
1993).  Moreover, there have been strategic shifts toward focusing upon core activities, 
thus reducing the inefficiencies encountered when confronted with challenges that can 
occur in ancillary activities (Yiu and Makino 2002).  Outsourcing has assisted firms 
with maximizing the use of capital through the mitigation of investment in certain 
redundancies in fixed assets.  As well, improvements can be witnessed in quality and 
efficiency due to the involvement of outside functional or technical expertise which may 
not have been available in-house.  Also, reduced problems of an administrative nature 
may manifest themselves, and there may be a potential for the ongoing development and 
commitment of strategic business connections (Spekle 2001).   
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 Management that entertains an outsourcing strategy will typically consider non-core 
functions as a target while retaining core business processes in-house.  The core items 
will likely have considerable impact on that which differentiates the firm in areas of 
value and quality (Yiu and Makino 2002).  Through the outsourcing of non-core 
functions, the firm can better utilize and leverage its scarce financial resources, spread 
its risk, and focus on its core strategies and activities.  Cooperation, core-business, cost, 
finance, and quality will drive the outsourcing decisions (Yiu and Makino 2002; Beulen 
et al. 1994).   
 
The decision to outsource, along with its ongoing development and evolution, typically 
stems from the pursuit of cost efficiency.  In addition, firms may also consider 
outsourcing in order to gain access to expertise and other resources that may not be 
available in-house.  It may not be cost-effective to maintain these resources on a regular 
basis and outsourcing becomes a suitable method to obtain the services as-needed.  It 
can also mitigate or transfer some risks to an outside firm, as well as eliminate certain 
related costs such as training and some human resource costs (Meilich 2005).  But 
technological concerns and strategic issues should also weigh on the decision, and it 
should not be considered simply within the context of monetary costs (Arino and Reuer 
2004; Welch and Ranganath Nayak 1992).    
 
Many firms are now choosing to break down their internal (vertical) structures in favour 
of a disintegrated model involving inter-company and outsourced relationships (Ewaltz 
1991).  A key advantage to this structural arrangement is that it allows organizations to 
withstand challenging financial periods and markets as they are not required to shoulder 
the burden of the outsourced functions during those periods (Wang and Wei 2007).  As 
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 well, they can be quite nimble and accelerate rapidly in order to maximize favourable 
economic times and markets.  Competitive success requires a more focused company 
(Quinn et al. 1990), and this less integration may aid in improving the level of the firm’s 
focus.  Companies that have been able to recognize this concept will strive to remove 
(outsource) functional areas, departments, etc. and only retain that which is necessary to 
provide customers with the highest value from its core activities and competencies 
(Leiblein and Miller 2003).  The reduction or elimination of activities that appear distant 
(or unrelated) to the firm’s overall strategy will improve shareholder value and customer 
satisfaction.  This is a typical result of the lower costs that the company incurs as well as 
a reduced requirement for investment capital.   
 
It is imperative that firms also recognize that a mix of the cost approach combined with 
a focus on core competencies may be highly effective, but they also operate in times of 
changing markets with varying market forces at play (Meyer 2001).  Both external as 
well as internal environments require consideration during the decision process.  Due to 
the magnitude and structural changes that may have to be addressed, a decision to 
outsource should be influenced by the ongoing sustainability of the strategy, not to 
mention the impact of the immediate implementation thereof.  Therefore, outsourcing 
decisions should be considered in the context of the internal and external environments, 
the structure and strategy with the reconfiguration, and the costs associated with both 
changing versus not changing.       
 
5.6.2 Making the Decision to Outsource    
 
There are many issues that require consideration in terms of the internal and external 
environments when outsourcing is under review.  The list, although not intended to be 
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 exhaustive, would include items of either a qualitative or quantitative nature (Arino and 
Reuer 2004; Beulen et al. 1994).  The former may consider employment stability, 
confidentiality, overall strategy, operational links, manageability, and supplier 
dependence (Chen and Chen 2003).  In addition, the latter (quantifiable elements) may 
involve standard accounting items such as revenues, expenses, and investments.  
Conversely, when the firm’s strategy and structure are considered, it is necessary to 
undertake a qualitative perspective, as companies should include many of the softer 
issues that may not be numerically based.  These may include a comparison of the 
current level of integration versus the intended level; or the impact that change may 
have on the workforce, etc. (Zhang and Reichgelt 2006; Ewaltz 1991).   
 
The cost of changing versus not changing draws the firm into the realm of transaction 
cost economics.  Williamson (1979) recommends that firms need to recognize the 
importance and difference of production costs and transaction costs (Lacity and 
Hirschheim 1993).  There is considerable debate over the significance of production 
costs as some believe that outsourcers receive a cost benefit due to economies of scale.  
But this appears to be prevalent when dealing with standardized products.  In-house 
production may provide a cost advantage in situations whereby much customization is 
necessary.  Thus, the decision to outsource based upon production costs alone can be 
treacherous, and must be considered in the context of the functions and whether they are 
standard or custom (Lonsdale 2001). 
 
In terms of costs of coordination, Williamson (1979) suggests that outsourcing may 
drive higher costs in this area due to the monitoring and enforcement of the supplier.  
This may become excessive when supplier choice is limited and few alternatives exist, 
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 thus the application of commitment and transaction costs principles are warranted to 
ensure optimum results.  Increased vigilance and attention to contract details is 
warranted in order to mitigate coordination costs and to prevent opportunistic behaviour 
on the part of suppliers (Jap and Anderson 2003).  But this increased scrutiny, contract 
development, dispute resolution, invoice payment, etc. will add to the coordination costs 
(Lacity and Hirschheim 1993).  However, the development of a properly worded 
agreement may be the best line of defence in the prevention and/or resolution of 
disputes and enhancement of commitment.  Otherwise, the cost savings that were sought 
through outsourcing’s production efficiencies may vanish.   
 
Due to the difficulty in precisely determining costs, Williamson (1979) recommends 
considering costs further within three categories; specifically transaction types, 
uncertainty, and the threat of opportunism.  Each of these categories has an affect on the 
cost structure, and will influence a decision on a continuum either towards or away from 
the choice to outsource (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993).       
 
When comparing hierarchies to markets in terms of production costs, Williamson 
(2000) suggests that markets have the advantage due to economies of scale.  
Conversely, markets can cause firms to be subjected to higher coordination costs as 
opposed to instances whereby transactions are dealt with internally.  This constrains and 
places pressure on commitment.  But Williamson (2000) does expand on this notion by 
suggesting that depending upon the dimensions of either asset specificity or frequency, 
some transaction types are more effectively and efficiently handled through the markets 
and others by way of hierarchies.  Frequency, as noted earlier, is simply how often a 
transaction may happen, that is, whether it is only once in a while or if it is recurrent.  
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 Specifically, frequency refers to the buyer’s activity level in the market and how many 
times they intend to create a transaction.   
 
Asset specificity, on the other hand, can be sub-divided into different forms but overall 
it generally refers to a particular transaction’s amount and level of customization.  Asset 
specificity can be further divided into three categories, i.e. ‘human asset specificity’, 
‘physical asset specificity’, and ‘site specificity’ (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993).  A 
transaction would be defined as being highly asset specific if it cannot be transferable or 
adaptable for use by other firms because of the unique nature of one of the 
aforementioned categories, thus positively affecting commitment to the relationship.  
Human asset specificity describes the degree of specialized skill and training that is 
necessary to undertake the transaction (Meilich 2005).  Physical asset specificity details 
the nature and type of equipment that is required for the transaction and how unique or 
specialised it must be.  Site specificity provides a framework for the location 
requirements of a transaction and how certain these must be due to the high cost of 
moving either physical or human assets (or both) (Meilich 2005). 
 
Another model for categorizing asset specificity into three distinct groupings was 
provided by Williamson (1979).  They are divided into assets that are either 
‘idiosyncratic’, ‘non-specific’, or ‘mixed’.  An idiosyncratic asset would include those 
that are used for transactions demanding special knowledge or equipment such as a 
customized software program.  A non-specific asset typically refers to those that are 
more standardized, perhaps requiring non-specialized training or skills as they likely 
would not have to be customized for the purchaser.  Mixed assets are those that contain 
elements of both the idiosyncratic and also the non-specific groups, or more precisely 
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 some parts of the transaction may require customization and others may require 
standardization (Meilich 2005).  There is a direct and positive relationship between 
increases in investments in idiosyncratic assets (and to a lesser extent in the case of 
mixed assets) and to that of levels of commitment.    
 
As there are complex aspects to consider when contemplating a shift toward 
outsourcing, this study will examine the matter further by researching this proposition: 
Proposition 18:  It is necessary to balance both the quantifiable (transaction 
costs, revenues, expenses, etc.) and qualifiable (strategy, stability, etc.) 
considerations in order to determine whether to outsource or to gauge its 
effectiveness.   
 
Advancing the discussion further, this chapter will now consider the influence of 
transaction costs upon networks, supply chains, and other logistical concerns.  The 
intermediary channel in insurance distribution is typical of a supply chain, albeit in a 
service environment.  It is highly linked by various networks, and maintains an ongoing 
influence from matters of a transaction cost perspective.  The following section will 
elaborate on this in greater depth. 
 
5.7 The Influence of Transaction Costs on Networks 
 
5.7.1 Supply Chains, Logistics, and Networks 
 
Advancements in transaction cost economics are similar to those found in the area of 
supply chain management and logistics (Calza and Passaro 1997; Hobbs 1996).  The 
development of a logistics system can be viewed as an ongoing process of integration 
(Wakolbinger and Nagurney 2004).  The evolution has been enhanced by continuous 
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 improvements in information technology, thus facilitating external integration of 
electronic systems of the connected organizations within a supply chain (Nagurney et al 
2006).  Not unlike the variations that exist within markets and governance structures, 
these varying computerized systems can be categorized as one of the following: an 
overall or global system, a closed-community system, or an open-community system.  A 
global system is characterized as having world-wide agreement of general standards and 
is often referred to as an electronic market (Malone et al. 1987).  Participation in this 
type of system is typically open to any firm.  But if the focus is somewhat narrower 
(perhaps within a specific industry whereby a set of industry standards are created) 
communication will become standardized between firms.  It becomes difficult, if not 
impossible to communicate electronically with firms outside of this industry network.  
This arrangement is known as an open-community system.  Finally, where the intent is 
to communicate within a small unique network, a closed-community system will 
emerge.  In these instances, only a small number of participants communicate back and 
forth using these systems to bolster their relationships (Mollering 2002).       
 
Transaction-specific investments become necessary in both open and closed community 
systems.  The nature of the investment is related to the completion of specific 
transactions with specific community members (partners) and is generally comprised of 
hardware and software (Zhang et al 2004).  The extent of the investment will have a 
bearing on commitment levels due to the ease or difficulty in changing partners because 
of switching costs.  Conversely, if the computerized system is global, it is open to all 
and anyone can participate.  Little, if any asset-specific investments are required.  When 
confronted with the existence of community-type systems, consideration will have to be 
given as to the optimal choice of system involvement and selection.  If a particular 
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 community system has a longer pay-back period over others, a member may find 
themselves having to be locked in for an extended time.  If a company does not have 
sufficient financial resources to select from a healthy list of alternatives, they may find 
themselves forced to lock into a system they may not have chosen otherwise.  This may 
also preclude them from conducting ongoing business with other firms due to their 
current investment in a particular community system (Zhang and Reichgelt 2006) and 
have increased commitment forced upon them.   
 
The emergence of closer relationships between firms may result as investments in 
transaction-specific information technology increases.  As firms in particular supply 
chains demonstrate their commitment with these investments, a tighter coupling 
between them tends to manifest itself (Subramani 2004).  Increases in the number and 
strength of these relationships are often triggered by investments in EDI (electronic data 
interchange).  The resultant quasi-firms or networked forms of organization, 
emphasizing lateral forms of communication, become useful for exchanges of 
specialized knowledge (Johanson and Mattson 1987; Powell 1990).  This tendency is 
clearly more robust when mutual trust and obligation are present and understood.  Better 
service is the result through the use of EDI and the integrating functions of a group of 
firms in a data partnership (Zhang et al 2004).  Ultimately, a move towards a 
differentiation strategy from a cost strategy may result from the use of new information 
technology (Porter 1985).  Thus, fundamental changes in a particular industry’s 
strategies may emerge.  Therefore, it is suggested: 
Proposition 19:  The nature and level of transaction-specific investments bears 
a positive relationship with levels of commitment.       
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 Placing the foregoing EDI discussion within a transaction cost economics perspective, it 
becomes apparent that in order for those network relationships to thrive, the transaction 
costs must be lower than that which is present in the traditional market.  This is also true 
when the new information technologies no longer contain their transaction-specific 
characteristics, particularly whereby the networks become developed and are evidenced 
by containing less uncertainty and opportunistic behaviour (Zhang et al 2004).  Network 
relationships facilitate the exchanges of knowledge and improve feedback between the 
members (Winch 1989).  In situations whereby multiple members within a network 
exchange data, opportunities can arise to clarify and make adjustments to production 
processes, etc. on a continuous basis.  This continuity and commitment to the 
relationship aids in preventing opportunistic behaviour in the near term due to the 
understanding that it would have long-term negative effects.  Network member 
recognition of this fact results in a reduction in monitoring costs as well as the 
enforcement of contracts.  In addition, adjustment costs are mitigated.  Therefore, in 
networks involving multiple firms engaged in complex and uncertain production 
processes, commitment between the parties thrives and network transaction costs are 
less than those compared with traditional market relations (Sanders 2005).   
 
5.7.2 Inter-organizational Networks 
 
Expanding upon Williamson’s (1979) categorization of asset specificity, a further 
breakdown is required to ascertain as to whether particular activities are internal or 
generated within the market (Williamson 1975, 1985).  When transactions occur, certain 
costs will emerge due to “friction” in the economic structure.  Williamson (1985) 
further describes these transaction costs as being either (1) enforcement costs; (2) 
bargaining costs; or (3) information costs.  Enforcement costs are those that are 
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 incurred when renegotiating contracts and agreements, resolving conflicts and 
disagreements, and the general cost of enforcing performance levels (Wang and Wei 
2007).  Bargaining costs refer to those which arise due to the initial negotiating and 
development of contracts with an attempt to contemplate situations that may arise 
during future transactions.  Information costs describe those which are relevant to the 
search of background and information on a potential partner.  As always, if the 
aforementioned transaction costs prove to be low, it recommends that the activity under 
review be obtained via the market.  Conversely, when transaction costs are high, the 
activity should be undertaken within the firm (Alvarez and Barney 2001; Williamson 
1985).  Thus, it is proposed: 
Proposition 20:  If external (market) costs including enforcement, bargaining and 
information costs are high, firms gravitate toward undertaking activities 
internally.  Alternatively the firms undertake these activities externally when those 
costs are comparatively lower.  
 
5.8 Research Challenges and Concerns 
 
Although challenges have confronted scholars in the transaction cost economic 
research, as well as general measurement related concerns, there does appear to be a 
strong level of consistency as it pertains to the measurements and conceptual 
discussions of the various frameworks and TCE’s application to the analysis of 
commitment.  In particular, Anderson’s (1985, 1988) early studies on the subject matter 
have aided in the ongoing development of later structural examinations of behavioural 
uncertainty, environmental uncertainty, and asset specificity.  This appears to be a 
fulfillment of Day and Klein’s (1987, p.54) recommendation that measures be created 
“that build on previous operationalizations.”   
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 Recently, a further adaptation has emerged within the area of measurements, 
specifically that a number of studies have materialized in which transaction costs are 
measured directly as opposed to the traditional approach of assessing the alignment 
between transaction elements and governance structure (Nooteboom 2000).  This has 
resulted in a new perspective whereby transaction cost reasoning is tested directly, 
along with its implications.  In particular, a twenty item assessment was developed 
which examines expected transaction costs that are incurred in the development and 
commitment/durability of a relationship.  It then examines ongoing costs associated 
with monitoring and enforcing performance, as well as handling issues surrounding 
opportunistic behaviour (Fussell et al 2006; Pilling et al. 1994).  Several other studies 
produced examples of developments in measures of actual or perceived transaction 
costs, including; Nooteboom (2000); Kwon and Suh (2004); Dyer and Chu (2003); La 
Londe (2002); Mollering (2002); Vosselman (2002). 
 
5.9 Summary 
 
Transaction cost economics research is a dynamic area and due to the need for further 
development it will continue into the future.  The trend appears to be a furthering of the 
utilization of transaction cost economics approaches to address the issues with a 
particular emphasis on the sustainability and durability of inter-firm relationships and 
the assessment of commitment levels.  TCE’s application into specific industries is 
particularly useful for various supply chains and distribution networks. 
 
This chapter has presented the relevant literature of transaction cost economics theory 
with the purpose of providing the historical foundation for this study.  The tools of the 
key aspects of the transaction cost theory are valuable in providing a framework for the 
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 analysis of commitment levels in inter-firm relationships.  In particular, these key 
aspects include asset specificity, frequency, and uncertainty (both behavioural and 
environmental) and their individual effects upon affective and calculative commitment.  
In combination with the previous chapter’s examination of commitment literature, the 
theoretical base is now constituted.  The following chapter will tie together the theories 
of commitment and transaction cost economics and provide a linkage to the research 
that follows. 
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 6 Advancing the Body of Knowledge  
 
The two preceding chapters have provided an examination of the important literature in 
the fields of commitment and transaction costs.  The seminal works were explored in 
order to consider the genesis of these theories.  In addition, the more recent and relevant 
publications were presented in order to comprehend the evolution of these theories and 
appreciate their current status.  This chapter will synthesize the literature and provide a 
repository and basis from which the key notions and emergent sub-topics will be linked 
to this research study.  It will also provide a preview as to how the study will be 
undertaken, including an introduction to a conceptual model and theoretical framework. 
 
Certain sub-topics emerged from the foregoing literature review chapters that are 
particularly relevant to this study and specifically to the intermediary channel within 
insurance distribution.  Each of these sub-topics will be presented and discussed in 
greater detail in the following chapters, but for the purpose of clarity each will be 
exposed in this section. 
 
6.1 Emergent Sub-topics in Commitment 
 
The literature review provides insights into significant findings in the area of 
commitment.  These will be explored and expanded upon in the upcoming chapters 
detailing the outcome of the case study and the discussion.  However, for the sake of 
clarity, the following themes are those that emerged from the commitment literature:  
(a) structural and financial bonds; (b) key aspects of relationships; (c) stakeholder 
perceptions; (d) insurance distribution and the Canadian marketplace; (e) affective and 
calculative forms of commitment.  These themes are commonly examined and will be 
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 further discussed in the context of the following sub-topics through the development of 
the previously established propositions:    
Personal definition:  the individual belief and importance of commitment within 
relationships. 
Proposition 1:  An individual’s personal definition of commitment and the 
importance they place upon it will influence their degrees of calculative and/or 
affective commitment.   
Forms of commitment:  exploring the two main forms of commitment (i.e. affective 
and calculative) and understanding that the management of each type is different. 
Proposition 2:  Since calculative commitment results from deliberate evaluation 
on a cognitive level of the need for the relationship, it can be explained and 
measured through the use of transaction cost economics.  
Use of contracts:  the relevance, significance and value that are placed upon written 
agreements and the elements contained within them. 
Proposition 3:  The use of contracts has the potential to deliver clarity and 
certainty in a relationship thus increasing calculative commitment (supported by 
transaction cost theory). 
Resources:  insights into the results that are derived from how resources are allocated 
by each of the parties. 
Proposition 4:  The way in which resources are allocated within a relationship 
will provide an indication as to a party’s level of calculative commitment. 
Communications:  considering how the effectiveness and level of communication 
between parties can have an affect on the relationship. 
Proposition 5:  The effectiveness of the communication between parties has an 
impact upon commitment levels.    
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 Conflict:  how and how often disputes are managed on either side of a dyad. 
Proposition 6:  The level and history of conflict in the relationship, along with a 
party’s reputation for fairness will have an impact upon commitment levels.   
Opportunism:  the impact of opportunistic behaviour upon relationships. 
Proposition 7:  The presence of opportunism will have a negative impact upon 
commitment levels.   
Trust:  gauging the influences of trust and how it can alter the strength of commitment. 
Proposition 8:  Trust has a negative relationship with calculative commitment 
and a positive relationship with affective commitment. 
Dependence:  examining how the dependence on the relationship of one party affects 
the durability of the overall relationship. 
Proposition 9:  Dependence has a positive relationship with calculative 
commitment and a negative relationship with affective commitment.     
Asymmetry:  considering how partners of unequal size and capacity perceive each other. 
Proposition 10:  The direction and perception of asymmetry in a relationship 
has an impact on commitment levels.   
 
As mentioned, these will be explored further in the upcoming chapters.  In a similar 
fashion, the emergent sub-topics in transaction cost economics will be examined. 
 
6.2 Emergent Sub-topics in Transaction Costs 
 
The literature review also exposes significant matters involving transaction costs.  These 
will also be examined in the upcoming chapters detailing the outcome of the case study 
and the discussion.  The following themes are those that emerged from the transaction 
cost literature:  (a) issues confronting and confounding firms; (b) major influences on 
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 transaction costs; (c) purposes and applications for analysis; (d) outsourcing decisions; 
(e) influence of transaction costs on networks.  These themes are commonly examined 
and will be further discussed in the context of the following sub-topics through the 
development of the previously established propositions:     
Safeguarding assets:  considering the effect and value of attempts to mitigate 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the counter-party. 
Proposition 11:  Firms will integrate vertically if a need exists to safeguard 
specific assets.  This is particularly evident in make-or-buy decisions requiring 
increased levels of specific assets, thus requiring internal production versus 
outsourcing. 
Performance evaluation:  examining how partners measure performance levels of 
relationship partners and subsequently interpret this information. 
Proposition 12:    A heightened quantity of behavioural uncertainty will 
correspondingly increase the costs of evaluating the performance of the 
relationship partners.  Firms will attempt to mitigate their performance 
evaluation costs through a shift towards vertical integration.   
Governance structures:  examining the value and validity of various forms of 
governance structures, including the components of contracts and agreements. 
Proposition 13:  Firms will gravitate towards either a hierarchical, market, or 
hybrid form of governance structure based upon the choice and selection of their 
partners, available monitoring techniques, and the design of incentives.      
Frequency of transactions:  gauging how changes in transaction frequency bear a 
relationship to changes in commitment levels. 
Proposition 14:  Higher frequency levels provide an incentive for firms to 
consider a hierarchical governance structure since it would likely be easier to 
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 recover costs in this way for larger transactions of a similar type and in a 
similar region.  Otherwise a market structure or hybrid form would be more 
suitable.   
Asset specificity:  examining the results of varying the levels of investment in assets, 
etc. that are unique to a particular business arrangement or relationship.  
Proposition 15:  Increases in investments in assets that have a high degree of 
specificity are positively correlated with levels of commitment.   
Environmental uncertainty:  assessing reactions to market conditions during periods of 
uncertainty. 
Proposition 16:  The two types of environmental uncertainty have opposite 
impacts upon governance structures, i.e. unpredictability encourages companies 
to develop hierarchical structures whereas changeability creates the opposite 
result.   
Behavioural uncertainty:  considering changes in a partner’s conduct and performance 
and its resultant impact upon commitment levels. 
Proposition 17:  Actual or perceived behavioural uncertainty on the part of a 
dyad counterparty presents challenges with the monitoring and enforcement of 
contractual adherence and performance of exchange partners.   
Outsourcing:  exploring the impact of the choice to outsource elements of the supply 
chain. 
Proposition 18:  It is necessary to balance both the quantifiable (transaction 
costs, revenues, expenses, etc.) and qualifiable (strategy, stability, etc.) 
considerations in order to determine whether to outsource or to gauge its 
effectiveness. 
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 Levels of investment:  comparing the degree to which each party allocates time, funds 
and other resources into a particular relationship. 
Proposition 19:  The nature and level of transaction-specific investments bears 
a positive relationship with levels of commitment.       
External factors:  assessing the influences on the firm of various external factors.   
Proposition 20:  If external (market) costs including enforcement, bargaining 
and information costs are high, firms gravitate toward undertaking activities 
internally.  Alternatively the firms undertake these activities externally when 
those costs are comparatively lower.  
 
The foregoing topics will be utilized in support of applying the principles of transaction 
costs economics and commitment theories.  The levels of commitment of each party 
will be assessed while recognizing that the durability of relationships can and does 
evolve over time.  In addition, reactions to these changes by the counter-parties will be 
examined in the case study and discussion that follows.  
 
6.3  Revisiting the Research Question 
 
This study’s objective is to increase the body of knowledge of commitment through 
exploratory case study research.  As indicated, the primary research question will 
explore the utility of transaction cost economics theory as a tool in an effort to increase 
understanding of commitment and is lead by the following question: 
Does Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explain the varying degrees of 
calculative commitment levels in relationships between insurers and brokers 
in the Canadian property and casualty insurance sector? 
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 The research design purposely selected three important stakeholder groups as the 
primary data source.  These included insurance company executives and relationship 
managers from ING Canada along with property and casualty insurance brokerage 
owners and senior managers.  It is recognized and acknowledged that other perspectives 
may be equally valid.  For example, regulators, suppliers, and customers can and likely 
do have divergent opinions or perspectives on commitment.  However, the limitations of 
a PhD dissertation precluded interviewing all stakeholders.  Furthermore, it is argued 
that the opinions of the selected groups are essential in advancing the knowledge further 
in this field of study. 
 
6.4 Introduction of the Conceptual Model and Theoretical 
Framework 
 
Notwithstanding the countless influences that can impact commitment levels in a typical 
principal and agent relationship, the majority can be categorized into one (or a blend) of 
the previously named transaction cost factors.  These include asset specificity, 
frequency, and behavioural and environmental uncertainty.  The data in this study 
confirms that dyad members are committed in an affective and/or calculative way 
because of these drivers. 
 
Each of the four factors has its impact in different ways on different people and at 
different times.  Moreover, the factors influence each other.  In the context of insurance 
distribution networks, a broker may sense a level of market upheaval (environmental 
uncertainty) and as a result some insurance companies begin to tighten their 
underwriting requirements and cancel low-volume broker contracts without notice 
(behavioural uncertainty).  To protect and preserve his/her business, the broker 
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 reallocates some additional resources in favour of one particular insurer that is deemed 
to be willing to work collectively with the broker towards their mutual objectives (asset 
specificity).  Thus the volume of new customers and premium income will increase in 
favour of that relationship versus other relationships (frequency).  In this scenario, the 
broker has increased his/her commitment to that particular relationship in both an 
affective and calculative way.  That is, the broker determined that a change was 
warranted because of external influences and felt compelled to re-direct business to a 
favoured supplier. 
 
Potential scenarios depicting diverse contexts are as plentiful as the imagination can 
conjure up.  In any event, each will contain a proportion of the transaction cost factors 
and will have some bearing upon one or both of the forms of commitment.  To depict 
and summarize these conceptual scenarios, this study has drawn the key lessons and 
propositions which link the theories of transaction cost economics and commitment 
together.  In so doing, it has lead to the development of the following model and 
framework entitled ‘The Commitment Wheel.’  This model will assist in guiding the 
research and aid in addressing the primary research question of this thesis. 
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Figure 1 – “The Commitment Wheel” 
 
 
 
Theoretically and graphically central to this model is commitment in its two forms, i.e. 
calculative and affective.  The proportion of each is dependent upon the factors of 
transaction costs and the dyad members themselves.  The study concludes although the 
calculative form is typically dominant, the affective form is normally present to varying 
degrees depending upon a particular context.   
 
Surrounding the central hub of the ’Commitment Wheel’ are the four key factors or 
“tools” of transaction cost economics, i.e. asset specificity, frequency, and behavioural 
and environmental uncertainty.  Any or all of these factors in combination will impact 
commitment in either of its forms.  Conversely, they can be influenced by each other or 
by the form of commitment that is present.  Without limiting the number of potential 
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 scenarios and combinations, one example could include a broker that observes market 
uncertainty and senses a level of unusual behaviour in one partner.  To ensure the future 
of his/her own operation, the broker invests heavily in another insurer relationship 
which requires specific training and equipment for brokerage staff.   
 
The placement on the wheel of the specific tools of transaction cost economics, i.e. 
frequency, asset specificity, and the uncertainty factors (behavioural and environmental) 
depict their close influences upon the particular forms of commitment.  Specifically, it 
shows the close relationship between calculative commitment and asset specificity and 
frequency.  Conversely, the close relationship between affective commitment and the 
two uncertainty factors is displayed.  Alongside each of these factors in the outer 
concentric circle is a deliberate placement of each of the related themes and influences 
that were developed in this study.     
 
Some scenarios are less deliberate yet upon reflection demonstrate commitment.  This is 
evident when transaction frequency creeps up or down in terms of a particular dyad 
partner.  If the staff members of a brokerage find it either easy or difficult to transact 
with a particular partner, the frequency will naturally adjust.  This is also apparent if an 
insurer does not extend the benefit of the doubt to the brokerage in the event of 
borderline or dubious cases.  The net effect is a reduction in affective commitment 
because of negative emotions entering the relationship.  In addition, neither side is 
likely to make idiosyncratic investments in the relationship. 
 
Around the outer ring of the ‘Commitment Wheel’ are those building block categories of 
commitment and transaction cost economics that affect the individual factors closely.  
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 Whereas they all may have effect on any factors, they are depicted adjacent to the one 
with the tightest linkage.  For example, trust, dependence and opportunism are closely 
linked to behavioural uncertainty, while contracts and governance structures are closely 
linked to asset specificity.   
 
The wheel displays the fact that while the four factors of transaction costs assist in 
explaining the origins of commitment, each of the factors can also impact other factors.  
They can stimulate commitment levels singularly or in tandem.  Moreover, the two 
forms of commitment can influence behaviour or behaviours in the four factors of 
transaction costs.  For example, a broker that is has been affectively committed to a 
particular insurer may be inclined to continuously invest in idiosyncratic investments in 
favour of that relationship.   
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 6.5 The Way Forward 
 
As previously discussed, the creation and development of theoretical frameworks such 
as the “Commitment Wheel” which incorporate theories and models from the literature 
can assist in focusing and binding the research (Huberman and Miles 2002).  In the 
context of exploratory case studies, conceptual or theoretical frameworks may be less 
important (Hussey and Hussey 1997) or less clear in structure, however they can aid in 
arranging data collection while enabling exploration of a wide range of topics (Barnes 
2001).  The “Commitment Wheel” blends TCE and Commitment theories together 
while providing guidance in this study.  In so doing, chapters 8 and 9 will investigate 
and discuss the utility of theoretical contributions from transaction cost theory, 
specifically frequency, asset specificity and uncertainty (both behavioural and 
environmental) and employ them as a tool in an effort to further understand the 
constructs of calculative and affective commitment.  To accomplish this, an exploratory 
case study has been conducted.  The methodology and method employed in this study 
will be exposed and discussed in the following chapter. 
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 7 Methodology 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This section will describe and provide details of the methods and methodology forming 
the basis of this research endeavour.  The initial segment of this chapter will consider 
the philosophical assumptions supporting the research, whereas the second segment will 
discuss the research methods in use.  Finally, this chapter includes a description of the 
perspective and positioning of the subsequent interpretation and analysis of the research 
discoveries, and will address issues surrounding reliability, validity, and generalisations.  
 
Management research methodologies have a fundamental basis in either a deductive or 
inductive philosophy (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  Each of these philosophies has 
value.  In particular, the inductive approach has an extensive history in management 
research (Gill and Johnson 1997).  Not unlike other research within the social sciences, 
many are of the view that the span of management research requires more tools than 
those of a singularly deductive form, and that empirical research is necessary to ground 
theories with concrete substantiation (Eisenhardt 1989; Swamidass 1991).  In addition, 
Tranfield and Starkey (1998) indicate there is agreement within this field that 
management research cannot function within a lone epistemological or ontological 
perspective.  It is a fragmented and heterogeneous discipline (Whitley 1984; Tsoukas 
1994), relying on theories, information and methods from other social science areas 
(Tranfield and Starkey 1998).   
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) suggest that the combination of the following three items 
give rise to a uniqueness or distinctiveness of management research, specifically; 
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 • Multi-disciplinary tactics - the amount and usage of knowledge from other fields 
which researchers can integrate within current research; 
• Concerns surrounding access - as key managers are inclined to be influential and 
in demand, they may be unwilling to provide access for research unless they 
perceive a corporate or individual reward or gain; and 
• Consequences of a practical nature – managers (particularly senior managers or 
executives) have a reduced propensity to become engaged in the process unless 
the intended outcomes provide a potential opportunity for taking some type of real 
action or for the requirement to heed the practical consequences of the findings. 
 
To provide a context for the research project, the following segment will identify the 
research questions and the objectives of this undertaking.  
 
7.1.1 Research Question 
 
With the use of exploratory case studies, this research will empirically examine 
principal and agent perceptions of commitment levels within broker/insurer dyads while 
using transaction cost considerations of asset specificity, frequency and uncertainty.  In 
particular, the research will endeavour to make the following contribution to 
knowledge: 
 
Does Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explain the varying degrees of 
calculative commitment levels in relationships between insurers and brokers in 
the Canadian property and casualty insurance sector? 
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 7.1.2 Research Objectives 
 
In order to consider the foregoing research question, the following research sub-topics 
were identified from the literature review to guide the research.  Specifically, they are: 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s asset specificity factor in commitment. 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s uncertainty (behavioural and environmental) 
factors in commitment. 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s frequency factor in commitment.  
 Are there other factors that impact or influence transaction costs and/or 
commitment? 
As noted, this research examines these questions and issues from the perspective of both 
insurers and brokers through exploratory case studies.    
 
The existing academic literature contains a knowledge gap which, if identified, would 
provide a stronger link and could lead to refinements of transaction cost economics and 
a deeper understanding of the issues underlying commitment levels.   
 
7.2 Methodology Section 
 
Some academics have suggested that due to the failure to completely comprehend and 
properly consider and articulate the underlying philosophy as well as the ontological 
and epistemological foundation of research, a weakening of the findings in management 
research in the late 20th century, both in practice and in reporting has emerged 
(Alvesson and Deetz 2000).  While considering the suitability of each research tradition 
for a particular project, both the objectives of the research and the researcher’s 
epistemology are important considerations (Smith 1998).  To address these concerns 
while avoiding the impact of these errors, the initial segment of this chapter will address 
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 the methodology of this research, positioning it within the ‘qualitative’ and ‘social 
constructionism’ philosophies.  While doing so, the chapter will briefly describe 
alternative methodologies and constructs.  Ultimately, this will present a justification for 
the choice of the research methods (discussed in the second section of this chapter), and 
will also provide the basis for the assessment of the impact of methodological 
assumptions and perspectives on the research project (Burrell and Morgan 1979).       
 
7.3 Considering Method, Epistemology and Ontology 
 
The following segment will open with a brief description of the underlying assumptions 
forming the philosophical foundation of modern research.  In particular, this will ground 
the research in philosophies which address the nature of the reality under consideration 
(ontology) and how knowledge of that reality can best be acquired (epistemology).  
 
An awareness of the philosophical perspective forming the foundation for the research 
is essential since the selection is central to research design decisions.  It is crucial as it 
leads directly to the selections of evidence deemed necessary as well as the data 
gathering and interpretation methods (Gill and Johnson 2002).  Ultimately, this will 
provide an epistemological and ontological basis for addressing research questions 
(Hussey and Hussey 1997; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).     
 
7.3.1 Ontology Defined 
 
The dictionary definition of ontology is “the study of the nature of existence and being 
in the abstract” (Webster 1988).  Ontology basically involves a set of assumptions of 
what can be accepted to truly exist (Smith 1998; Schacter 2000).  Throughout social 
science research an important distinction must be determined as to whether the world is 
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 ‘external’ and ‘objective’ or if it is ‘socially constructed’ (based on the perspectives of 
mankind) (Hussey and Hussey 1997).  These two contrasting views are commonly 
segmented into either a ‘positivist’ or ‘interpretivist’ ontology (Hussey and Hussey 
1997).  A recent addition of another distinct ontological characterization under the title 
of ‘nominalism’ is also occasionally utilized (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).   
 
There is common acceptance of an overlap between paradigms as illustrated in Figure 2.  
In this example, one may gravitate along the continuum and while doing so the 
assumptions and features of one category are slowly relaxed and progressively replaced 
by those of another (Hussey and Hussey 1997; Lincoln and Guba 2005). 
 
Figure 2: Research Methods Continuum 
 
Source: (Hussey and Hussey 1997, p.51); adapted from (Morgan and Smircich 1980, 
p.492)  
Approach to social sciences
PhenomenologistPositivist 
Reality as a 
projection of 
human 
imagination 
Reality 
as a 
social 
construct 
Reality as a 
realm if 
symbolic 
discourse 
Reality as a 
contextual field 
of information 
Reality as a 
concrete 
process 
Reality as a 
concrete 
structure 
 
 
7.3.2 Epistemology Defined 
 
By definition, epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and justification, 
and it provides much of the justification for choice of a particular methodology 
(Schwandt 2001).  An interpretivist (illustrated as a phenomenologist in Figure 2 above) 
recognizes that knowledge reflects the researcher’s individual objectives, experience, 
culture and history.  This study presumes that because sense-making activities happen 
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 within the framework of these life experiences, knowledge is created and expanded 
through a social construction of the world (Weber 2004).  Generally speaking, the 
epistemology of a qualitative researcher is constructivist and existential (non-
determinist) (Stake 1995). 
 
7.3.3 Contrasting Interpretivism and Positivism 
 
Each of the research methods and methodologies contain different weaknesses and 
strengths.  However, each does have value.  They can each impart a different form of 
knowledge regarding the topic under examination.  The final choice must be a reflection 
of existing knowledge about the topic being studied while taking into consideration the 
current objectives.  Recognizing that each researcher will have their own individual 
preferences, the finest research will match preference against topic in order to use the 
right tool to obtain the desired results.  Alvesson and Deetz argue: 
“If we are to be consummate researchers, we need to have a deep understanding 
of the strengths and weaknesses of different research methods and data-analysis 
techniques. We also need to have a deep understanding of the different sorts of 
knowledge we obtain using different research methods.” (Alvesson and Deetz 
2000).   
Conversely, counter-arguments to this theoretical discussion have manifested.  For 
example, Weber considers whether any substantive and practical differences are 
apparent between interpretivism and positivism, thus suggesting that the differences 
may be situated more in the choice of research method as opposed to any significant 
difference at a meta-theoretical level (Weber 2004). 
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 7.3.4 Positivism 
 
Positivism, or the ‘scientific method’ as it has also been referred to, dominating natural 
science research in the Western world, was widely adapted by social scientists over 
most of the 20th century (Gill and Johnson 1997; White 1999).  Positivists suggest the 
following: 
• The world exists externally;  
• The world’s properties should be examined through objective methods;  
• Only observable knowledge is valid;  
• Positivists generally search for facts based upon specified correlations and   
associations among a set of variables (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).   
Positivism emphasises ideals such as reliability, objectivity, and generalization.   
 
Traditionally, it has been generally acknowledged that research with its basis in this 
paradigm including within the social sciences has been quite successful in expanding 
the world’s knowledge (Weber 2004).  In spite of this consensus, by the late 1960’s 
researchers started to criticise the realist assumptions of value-neutral and value-free 
concepts which underpin the positivist approach in the social sciences.  The critics 
contended that positivistic methods remove contexts from meanings during the process 
of building quantified measures of phenomena (Lincoln and Guba 2005).  Specifically, 
quantitative measures will often exclude the research subject’s meanings and 
interpretations from research data, and replace them with external meanings (e.g. 
existing theories, researcher’s perspectives, etc.) and interpretations on that data.  Gill 
and Johnson submit that interpretative approaches reject positivism’s basic 
understanding of human action and behaviour, arguing:  
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 “…unlike animals or physical objects, human beings are able to attach meaning 
to events and phenomena that surround them, and from these interpretations and 
perceptions select courses of meaningful action which they are able to reflect 
upon and monitor.” (Gill and Johnson 1997, p.133). 
 
Notably, the concerns surrounding the logic of positivism when applied to social 
science research is nothing new.  In the 1940s, Karl Popper along with a number of 
sociologists including Max Weber, Alfred Schultz, and Carl Becher lobbied for greater 
use of field-based research by the middle of the 20th century (Denzin and Lincoln 
1994).  It is now a fairly common belief that this criticism of positivism’s quantitative 
hypothesis-testing style gave rise to an increased use of qualitative methods (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1994; Alvesson and Deetz 2000). 
 
7.3.5 Social Constructionism and Interpretivism 
 
The goal of an interpretative approach is to understand how people evaluate and make 
sense of their world, with human action being perceived as having a purpose and being 
meaningful rather than being determined externally by social structures, drives, the 
environment or economic stimuli (Gill and Johnson 1997).  It is “….the study of how 
things appear to people – how people experience the world” (Gill and Johnson 1997, 
p.133).  Stake suggests that interpretation is a significant component to all research 
(Stake 1995). 
   
It is frequently suggested that positivism differs from interpretive research by not setting 
out to seek causal explanations of behaviour.  Instead, interpretive research improves 
and enriches our notion and understanding of action through exploring the meanings, 
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 feelings, beliefs, and attitudes of humans in social contexts (White and Hollingsworth 
1999).   Moreover, interpretive research does not predetermine independent and 
dependent variables, but concentrates on the broad complexity of human sense-making 
as situations emerge (Weber 2004).   
 
The development of social constructivism has been attributed to the works of Berger 
and Luckmann (1966), Watzlawick (1984) and Shotter (1993).  Within the interpretive 
realm, researchers perceive the world to be socially constructed, and the researcher 
should interact with participants in order to comprehend their social constructions.  
Through the observations available within the medium of language one can perceive 
how people make sense of the outside world via the sharing of their experiences with 
others (Easterby-Smith 2002). 
 
The general purpose of interpretive research is to appreciate and accept a phenomenon 
by way of the connotations people may allocate to it, to clarify particular elements, to 
categorize a phenomenon through how it may be perceived by participants in a 
prescribed set of circumstances.  Interpretive researchers begin with the assumption that 
access to reality (socially constructed or otherwise) is optimally achieved through social 
constructions including consciousness, language, and shared meanings.  It can generate 
social-scientific reports of social life by expanding upon the meanings and concepts 
used by the subjects themselves.  To simplify this and situate it within a management 
research context, it could be restated that interpretation is the study of a ‘socially 
constructed’ management development, or tool, or reaction (Radnor 2004).  Within the 
social realm this typically translates into the collection of information with depth.  This 
is achieved with the use of qualitative and inductive methods including discussions, 
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 interviews, and participant observation.  The output is represented from the perspective 
of the research subject(s). 
 
In management studies, interpretivism focuses upon the meanings that executives, 
managers and employees place on the values, rules, and norms that provide guidance to 
the organisation.  In addition, it examines the influence of other cultural phenomena on 
the members of the organisation which aids in defining their overall reality (White 
1999). 
 
Some criticisms of interpretivism have recently emerged, including; 
• The tenets of interpretivism (e.g., ‘reason’, ‘intention’, and ‘motive’) submit 
that capable social subjects are involved in an ongoing and continuous 
monitoring of their conduct; specifically, the prevalent form of daily social 
activity is rather routine and effectively lacking motivation; 
• Many and varying (perhaps competing) accounts of a focal social subject’s 
actions require exploration in order to provide clarification and validation, 
likely due to external influences.  Simply stated, there is more to reality than 
that which is expressed in the dialogue of subjects; 
• Failure to recognize the role of existing social structures that both produce 
and condition social interaction, in particular the divisions of interest and 
power relationships – subjects may be either partially or completely unaware 
of those structures; and 
• Ιt is inherently conservative as it neglects the potential structures of conflict 
in a society, and consequently the possible sources of social change (Radnor 
2004).  
157 
 
 7.4 The Researcher’s Role under Social Constructionism 
 
The basis and nature of interpretivist study calls for the researchers themselves to in 
effect become instruments of measurement.  The researcher will interpret (measure) the 
phenomena being observed.  This activity of striving for clear comprehension will 
impact and is impacted by their individual life-worlds.  Because of this, interpretive 
researchers must understand that their research actions have an effect upon the research 
objects they are examining (Weber 2004).  They also need to appreciate that the 
knowledge they develop will typically be a reflection of their individual objectives, 
culture, experience, history, etc.  They embark on a path to purposively constitute and 
advance knowledge.  Put simply, they attempt to make sense of the world, 
acknowledging that their sense-making actions take place within the structure of their 
individual life-worlds and the distinct goals they may have for their work.  Ultimately, 
knowledge is developed through social construction of the world (Weber 2004).  Final 
research output in qualitative case studies are expected to resemble a ‘thick description’, 
an ‘experiential understanding’, and/or a ‘multiple reality’.  The journey toward seeking 
complex meaning or explanation cannot be simply designed in or captured 
retrospectively (Denzin and Lincoln 1994).  Apparently, it requires ongoing and 
continuous attention (Stake 1995). 
 
If the research is of a pure phenomenological variety and is seeking to describe rather 
than explain, it should commence from a perspective free from hypotheses or 
preconceptions (Husserl 1970; Lester 1999).  This however is not the epistemological 
positioning of this study.  Instead, as more recent humanist and feminist researchers 
suggest, the ability of embarking without any preconceptions or bias is unrealistic 
(Lofland 2002).  Rather, they stress the importance of clarifying how interpretations and 
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 meanings have been attached to findings, not to mention ensuring that the researcher is 
visible in the framework of the research as an interested and subjective participant as 
opposed to an impartial and detached observer (Smith 1998).  While conducting this 
research project, particularly within my own professional field, I have taken a reflective 
stance throughout the study.  It is important to remain vigilant due to the relationships 
that exist between researcher, the research questions, and the nature of the inquiry 
(Radnor 2002).  Moreover, it is necessary to maintain a heightened awareness of the 
notions of reflection on as well as in action which reverberates clearly with the subject 
matter in each of the interviews (Stake 1995). 
 
7.5 Critical Management Research Concept 
 
Another significant theory in the current ontological and epistemological literature is 
‘critical theory’, or more specifically when applied to management studies, ‘critical 
management research’ (Alvesson and Deetz 2000).  Critical management research 
provides a critique of the restrictions and inadequacies of current management research 
techniques and practices in both conventional qualitative and quantitative methods 
(Alvesson and Deetz 2000).  This theory, generally speaking, has its basis on a couple 
of assumptions, neither of which are applicable or under examination within this study.  
Whereas critical theories were considered for this study, they were ultimately discarded 
in favour of a social constructionist concept as explained earlier.   
 
7.6 Qualitative Research 
 
Into the late part of the 20th century, standard research was pre-occupied with 
positivistic or neo-positivistic theory, with research techniques concentrating on 
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 principles of: ‘neutrality’, ‘objectivity’, ‘methods’, ‘scientific procedure’, 
‘quantification’, ‘generalisation’, ‘replicability’, and ‘development of laws’ (Alvesson 
1996; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  This trend led to a preponderance of quantitative 
research methods, the upshot of which provided considerably less attention being 
allocated to describing, counting, and coding events, usually at the risk and expense of 
understanding why particular actions may have occurred (Denzin and Lincoln 2003b).   
 
A methodological evolution manifested towards the latter three decades of the 20th 
century, and thus qualitative research had emerged as a field or method of inquiry and 
examination in its own right (Huberman and Miles 2002; Denzin and Lincoln 2003a).  
Qualitative research crosses multiple disciplines, fields of study and subject matter.  It 
involves a relatively complex, interconnected vocabulary, with its own set of 
perceptions and assumptions.  Its epistemology can be traced to many of the customs 
associated with positivism, post-positivism, foundationalism, post-structuralism, as well 
as the many qualitative research perspectives and methods associated with interpretive 
and cultural research (Denzin and Lincoln 2003b).  Denzin and Lincoln (2003) submit 
this generic definition:  
“Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the 
world.  It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world 
visible… involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world.  This 
means that qualitative researchers study things in the natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meaning 
people bring to them.”  (Denzin and Lincoln 2003b, p.5). 
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 Qualitative investigation is an all-encompassing term for the range of philosophical 
orientations in interpretive research.  Although it is suggested that qualitative methods 
lack the statistical precision of quantitative research, this is offset by its exploration in 
greater depth of the underlying ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, 
p.3).  Studies of a qualitative nature appear in many forms and are characterized by 
several methods including: ‘phenomenological’, ‘ethnographic’, ‘case studies’, 
‘hermeneutic’, ‘naturalistic’, and ‘holistic studies’ (Stake 1995).  A significant aspect of 
qualitative research (unlike quantitative examination with its pre-specified intent) is that 
it is much more evolutionary.  It commences with a preliminary problem statement, 
design, interview questions, etc. and subsequent interpretations are developed 
throughout the sequence of the research which may lead to enhancements in the 
research itself.   
 
Research within disciplines such as management has extensive records of qualitative 
methodologies.  Three examples include: (a) Taylor’s qualitative analysis of labour; (b) 
the Hawthorne experiments regarding motivation; and (c) the surfacing of case study as 
an integral management research approach (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002; Yin 2003). 
 
To summarize, as Bell (1999) recommends, researchers should contemplate during the 
design phase the nature and variety of data necessary to support their research questions 
(Bell 1999).  This will help guide the selection of research methods, including choices 
between the quantitative and qualitative concepts (Payne 1951; Hussey and Hussey 
1997).  Once chosen, these decisions are awkward to change however they may be 
supplemented with other methods (Robson 1993).    
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 7.7 Summary of Methodology  
 
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) have indicated that both the selection of research topic and 
the choice of method will involve philosophical options concerning that which is 
important and how best to observe and analyse a topic.  This particular research 
undertaking will be based on a qualitative or interpretivist model.  The decision is a 
based on three fundamental characteristics of the research topic and in particular the 
study is exploratory and explanatory in nature and seeks to inform the reader about the 
topic.  Ultimately, the desired output is socially (not abstractly or naturally) constructed 
and therefore requires a qualitative sense to be comprehended.  Essentially, it is a study 
containing the perceptions about a topic from a specific group of individuals.  The study 
involves gauging individual perceptions, attitudes, and motivators which are anticipated 
to be rather diverse, bearing a close relationship to their different situations, thus 
signifying the attainment of the richness and depth that qualitative data imparts in 
understanding this phenomenon. 
 
Finally, this study fosters and extends an ontological posture expressing that reality and 
human activity are not exclusive (Hussey and Hussey 1997).  Epistemologically, from a 
qualitative and interpretative research standpoint this study will attain the ‘thick data’ 
essential in understanding the viewpoint and inspiration of insurers and brokers in 
building commitment in their relationships, while empirically examining the influence 
and impact of transaction cost economics within this field. 
 
The foregoing section has defined the fundamental methodological philosophies and 
grounding of this research endeavour.  The following section will provide an analysis 
focusing on the choice of research methods.   
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 7.8 Method Section 
 
There is considerable debate that the choice of a suitable and correct methodology 
depends upon the characteristics of the research being contemplated and the precise 
research questions being addressed (Robson 1993; Yin 1994; Gill and Johnson 1997).  
The following section will commence with a brief discussion of the major research 
alternatives, highlighting their comparative strengths and weaknesses for this study.  
Arguments in support of the application of the case study methodology as being the 
most appropriate for this study are put forth, followed by an analysis of the practices 
used in accomplishing the field research.  The section closes with an examination 
pertaining to the analysis and theory-building approaches undertaken while evaluating 
the data. 
 
7.8.1 Purpose of the Research – Descriptive, Exploratory, or Hypotheses 
 
Beyond a rigorous literature review, research should originate by ascertaining its overall 
nature or goal: descriptive, exploratory, or hypothesis testing (Hussey and Hussey 
1997).  Its relevance may vary from resolving theoretical matters capable of wide 
generalisation (as indicated earlier, this is difficult to attain in qualitative research), to 
solving unique problems of a practical nature in one location (Gill and Johnson 1997). 
 
Exploratory research investigates situations for which little may be known, with the 
objective being to attain preliminary insight within a discipline or topic in order to 
develop a fundamental framework, model or theory.  An exploratory case study 
commonly resembles a pilot study; in particular the research design and data collection 
methods ordinarily are not pre-determined (Scholz and Tietje 2002).  Case studies were 
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 traditionally perceived as the ‘method of choice’ in exploratory research (Platt 1992b; 
Yin 2003).  
 
After a primary level comprehension of a topic is acquired, descriptive research is an 
appropriate method of ascertaining and/or describing characteristics, variables and 
influences.  Within the case study method, a descriptive case study varies from an 
exploratory study in that it uses a reference theory or a model that leads the data 
collection and case description (Scholz and Tietje 2002).  The goal is to understand the 
significance of a phenomenon, distribution and frequency (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 
1993). 
 
The fine-tuning of original models and frameworks resulting from effective descriptive 
research establishes the potential for testable hypotheses.  From this stage, the work can 
be sub-divided into either of two categories, i.e. analytical study or predictive research.  
Analytical study reaches beyond describing variables to analysing the underlying ‘how’ 
or ‘why’ in a given situation, whereas predictive research attempts to forecast 
repetitions.  Generally speaking, hypothesis-testing in management endeavours to 
resolve problems immediately at hand.  This is an essential feature for gaining 
managerial access for research.  
 
Though it is tautological, the research should acquire data with a sufficient level of 
detail to meet the intent of the research (Barnes 2001), whether that is explanatory, 
descriptive, or testing in nature (Meredith et al. 1989). 
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 Recognizing the existence of a limited amount of academic knowledge for the topic 
under consideration, it is submitted that this research undertaking is exploratory 
research.  However, the use of a transaction cost model as possible base model or entry 
point in classifying the research findings suggests that some key elements of descriptive 
research must also be considered. 
 
7.8.2 Research Methods - Comparisons and Selections 
 
Even highly abstract and theoretical research involves the use of data.  Researchers must 
take into account the type and nature of data necessary to support their research 
questions during the design phase (Bell 1999).  Philosophic research methodologies 
require fundamental choices between the quantitative and qualitative style and this will 
drive the choice of research methods (Payne 1951; Hussey and Hussey 1997).  Once 
made, these choices are awkward to change, although other methods may be used to 
supplement the approach (Robson 1993).    
 
Robson (1993) makes reference to three ‘real world’ approaches for the collection of 
empirical research data: ‘experiment’, ‘survey’ and ‘case study’.  There are advantages 
and disadvantages to each approach.  The ultimate choice of strategy is based on: 
1) The type of research question;  
2) Control over subject behaviour, and;  
3) Timing - contemporary versus historical phenomena (Yin 1994).   
  
The method chosen for this research is the ‘case study’.  The following section presents 
the justification and rationale for this decision.  This is followed by an in-depth 
examination of the case study method. 
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 7.9 The Use of Case Studies in Research 
 
Case studies have an extensive history in management research projects, including 
Taylor’s analysis of workers and the Hawthorne experiments.  It has grown in 
significance as academics recognize that management cannot be divided into discrete, 
independent functions, but instead must be examined holistically.  They can focus on a 
wide array of topics including: a single event, an individual, a neighbourhood or a 
group, or even a decision, a programme, or an innovation (Robson 1993; Silverman 
2001).  A case study is an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within some real-life context” (Yin 2003, p.13).  It is particularly suited for 
“... research areas for which existing theory seems inadequate.” (Eisenhardt 1989, 
p.548).  It is “… a strategy to be preferred when circumstances and research problems 
are appropriate…” (Platt 1992a, p.46).  Case studies have been utilized for studies 
within many disciplines (Mitchell 1983; Robson 1993), most notably within the social 
sciences (Silverman 2001) and management research (Gill and Johnson 1997; Barnes 
2001). 
 
Yin has been broadly recognized as having advanced the case study methodology as a 
specialized research strategy.  It is particularly suitable for descriptive, exploratory, or 
explanatory studies (Yin 1981; Yin 1984).  However, other academic authors have 
provided significant contributions including Stake (1995), Eisenhardt (1989) and Hamel 
et al. (1993) (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  By virtue of their intensive character, case 
studies tend to focus on a single or a limited number of events, and may include various 
levels of data collection and analysis (Robson 1993; Yin 1994).  They may also include 
both quantitative and qualitative data (Hussey and Hussey 1997).   
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 Whereas this research project will assume a standpoint similar to Yin’s, other 
researchers have espoused a diverse focus on case studies.  In particular, Stake 
perceives case studies as being more closely aligned to ‘action research’ (Stake 1995; 
Stake 2003), thus it will have less concern with validity and greater concern with the 
opportunity for the researcher to foster change within the research setting (Easterby-
Smith et al. 2002). 
 
Ordinarily, a case study would be the preferred strategy when; (a) ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions are put forth; (b) when the examiner has limited (if any) control over events, 
and; (c) when the focus is aimed at a current phenomenon within a real-life context.  It 
is particularly useful in dealing with time-dependent relationships (Strauss 1987).  The 
case study method is “… a strategy to be preferred when circumstances and research 
problems are appropriate…” (Platt 1992a, p.46).  Case studies have traditionally been 
seen as appropriate for exploratory studies (Platt 1992a; Robson 1993; Yin 1994; 
Gummesson 2000), which is the core function of this research.  
 
Yin (2003) re-asserts the position that cases studies are suitable for descriptive, 
exploratory, or explanatory (causal) research.  Generally, exploratory case studies are 
carried out when not much is known about the focal topic and with the objective being 
to obtain initial insights into a field or subject matter while developing a preliminary 
model or framework (Yin 1981; Platt 1992a; Robson 1993; Yin 2003).  They also 
function to map or illustrate the research limits, territories, or boundaries, and can 
provide guidelines for the advancement of further research questions and hypotheses.  
Exploratory case studies have historically been acknowledged as being appropriate for 
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 exploratory research (Platt 1992a; Robson 1993; Yin 1994; Gummesson 2000; Yin 
2003).   
 
Not unlike all research methods, exploratory case studies require a purpose as well as 
the principles and criterion by which the exploration will be judged as successful or not.  
A case study should originate with a sound research design which sets out; “the logical 
model of proof that will allow the research to draw inferences concerning causal 
relations among the variables.” (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, p.77-78).  
 
Just as in any investigation, a research project must begin with a concrete plan, i.e. the 
case study design.  Yin (1994) outlines five elements to be included in the research 
design:   
1)  The research question;  
2)  The propositions (similar to hypotheses) or purpose for exploratory work; 
3)  The unit(s) of analysis; 
4)  A logic model, and; 
5)  The criteria for interpreting findings.   
 
Researchers should create a conceptual framework prior to embarking on the case study 
in order to clarify “the main features (aspects, dimension, factors, and/or variables) of a 
case study and the presumed relationships” (Robson 1993, p.148-150).  Such research 
constructs, possibly a priori, underpin the accurate advancement of essential 
measurement tools (Eisenhardt 1989).  Robson indicates, “any failure to carry out the 
pre-specified design… is often lethal as far as interpretation is concerned.” (Robson 
1993, p.150).  It is noteworthy that continuous refinements and enhancements to the 
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 case study design are still appropriate throughout the course of research, which includes 
refining the research question itself (Mintzberg 1973; Hussey and Hussey 1997).  
 
For this exploratory research project, whereby current research instruments are limited 
and theory and concepts are rudimentary, the richness of the qualitative data emerging 
from the project will enable the research output to explore concepts in the outer world.  
It will help facilitate capabilities for seeking patterns that are insightful, interesting and 
offer the possibility of offering predictive, explanatory power or comprehension 
(Meredith 1998).  Similar to all research methods, exploratory case studies require a 
prior intention and stated criteria by which the exploration will be judged a success.  
These were included in the case study design.   
 
Following the acquisition of a preliminary understanding of this particular subject area, 
other case studies (such as the descriptive variety) would have greater opportunity for 
ascertaining and describing characteristics, variables, and influences of various issues.  
The goal will subsequently be to comprehend the relevance of a phenomenon, plus its 
distribution and frequency (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1993).  The result will likely be 
further research, including explanatory case studies examining causal effects, including 
the development of ‘logic models’ (Tellis 1997; Yin 2003).    
 
The foregoing discussion has provided the rationale for the choice of an exploratory 
case study as the favoured method in this instance for linking the research methodology 
with the acquisition of qualitative research data.  Moreover, the selection of an 
exploratory case study is upheld by: 
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 • The apparent absence of academic research exploring these issues from the 
perspective of a key participant; and  
• The richness and depth of the judgment of key individuals in extending a greater 
knowledge of the underlying issue(s); 
• The opportunity for transaction cost economics to assist in exploring 
commitment levels within various inter-organizational relationships.   
 
7.10  Description of this Case Study 
 
The research methodology will be comprised of three case studies within the property 
and casualty (P&C) insurance distribution network of ING Canada, specifically in the 
Province of Ontario.  Whereas a larger number of case studies would be desirable, 
limitations of time and resources precluded expansion of this research into additional 
brokerages, departments, and geographic regions.  This remains an area for future 
research, as briefly discussed in the “Conclusion” chapter.  
 
The choice of these particular cases emerged from a combination of the Literature 
Review, a pilot case, discussion with interested parties, and is bounded by practical 
research issues addressed below.  The overall research has been designed to collect the 
perspectives and insights from several insurance brokerage principals and senior 
managers, along with their corporate relationship management counterparts at ING 
Canada, and reviewed by senior executives of the insurer.     
 
7.10.1 The Pilot Case 
 
Upon finalizing the choice to engage in a qualitative study involving interviews, it was 
determined that it would be appropriate to conduct a pilot study in order to assist in 
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 shaping the questions and topics for the three subsequent case studies.  The pilot study 
involved four internal ING Canada relationship managers and five brokerage principals. 
 
The pilot case also confirmed the belief that brokerages and insurers have significantly 
different perspectives of the elements of commitment.  A number of the participants 
commented on the insurance company’s various programs intended to build and sustain 
commitment levels between the organizations, and compared them to the final delivery 
and implementation by staff.  This was also discussed in “Services Marketing, 
Integrating Customer Focus Across the Firm” (Zeithaml et al 2003).  Furthermore, the 
pilot case findings confirmed the importance of understanding the perspectives of the 
internal relationship managers.  The findings of the pilot study were rolled into and 
reported in the individual case studies.       
 
7.10.2 The Three Case Studies 
 
The first case, the ‘Brokerage Principal Case Study’, interviews owners and senior 
managers of P&C brokerages of varying sizes across Ontario, including those situated 
in both urban and rural locations.  The second, the ‘Regional Vice President/Branch 
Manager (Corporate) Case Study’, incorporates the views of ING Canada management 
and staff which are directly involved and responsible for the maintenance of the inter-
organizational relationships between the insurer and the brokerages.  The third case puts 
forth the perspectives of key members of ‘ING Canada’s Executive Team’.  Within the 
research design, acquiring evidence from the first two case studies will allow for cross-
case analysis (Yin 2003b).  This also assists the executives in providing their post-case 
perspectives for the third case study. 
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 The ‘P&C Brokerage Case’ was chosen as it is considered to be a difficult functional 
area to measure (Stein 2001).  Examining one of the more difficult areas may reveal, in 
a clearer manner, management issues underlying ‘commitment’.  The pilot case 
confirms this proposition, as indicated by a pilot case interviewee, “Insurance 
brokerages, by their very nature, have got to be one of the hardest businesses in which 
to try to measure commitment.” (personal communication 2001). 
 
The third case study, i.e. the ‘Post-Case’, included eight interviews with highly senior 
executives of ING Canada, including the CEO, various division Presidents, etc. in order 
to capture the perspectives at the highest levels of the insurance company which also 
happens to be the largest property and casualty insurer in Canada.  These interviews 
were intentionally scheduled relatively late in the interview phase, thus permitting the 
achievement of two goals.  Primarily, the aim was to capture the viewpoints of 
executives at the highest level of the insurance industry.  Secondly, to be enabled to 
include discussion of the preliminary research findings during the interviews, thus 
providing a key validation for the case study results.  Eight interviews were considered 
adequate to test the research findings, and included representatives from almost all 
functional areas.   
 
Each case study was chosen based upon its own merit.  However, by choosing to 
undertake these three specific case studies, as well as supporting validity (Yin 2003a), it 
supports the meeting of the overall research objectives of analysing the perspectives and 
insights from both sides of the counterparts, i.e. agent versus principal viewpoints, and 
between different levels of senior company management.    
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 There are some notable advantages and disadvantages in this study of having the 
author/interviewer also serve as an employee of ING Canada.  In terms of advantages, 
the participants in these case studies are extremely busy people thus making it difficult 
to gain access to them for interviews.  But by being personally known to each of them 
access was greatly improved and an environment of cooperation and openness was 
evident.  Also, due to their busyness they appeared to appreciate the fact that the 
interviewer was familiar with industry jargon thus allowing a quicker pace in the 
discussions.  However, among the disadvantages it would not be unreasonable for a 
reader of this study to question the impact of the relationship between the interviewer 
and the respondents because of the employment arrangement.  A conclusion on the part 
of the reader could be made that respondents would be less than frank or alternatively 
may desire to disguise their responses with personal or political messages intended to be 
taken back to others within the other case studies.  This is understandable, but it is 
unlikely because of the interviewer’s knowledge of the respondent’s integrity, frankness 
and professionalism.     
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 Table 5: Case Selection Logic  
Property & Casualty Insurance Brokerage Principal Case 
 
• Brokerages are difficult to measure and assess due to their very nature, i.e. independent 
businesses, diverse goals, regions, time horizons, etc.; 
• Principals are at different stages in the evolution of their businesses, some of 
contemplating retirement and succession planning, others are pursuing growth 
strategies, and still others are primarily concerned with retention levels and operational 
excellence;  
• Firms may contain either a sole owner or have one or more partners; 
• ING Canada is the largest manufacturer of property & casualty insurance products in 
Canada (6,700 employees in 50 offices across Canada in 2006), and it tends to be 
represented by the majority of brokers in Ontario, Canada; 
• This case study will permit the examination of one region/province in Canada in depth; 
• Includes both urban brokers (24) as well as rural/small town brokerage operations (22) 
in order to analyse for differences; 
• Typical brokerages generate between $3 and $7 million (CAD) in premium income 
annually, and operate with 8 to 14 staff members.  This is mentioned for illustrative 
purposes only, recognizing that some locations are outside of this range.   
 
Regional Vice President/Branch Manager (Corporate-Relationship) Case Study 
 
• Interviewing those (11) ING Canada management staff members charged with the 
responsibility of maintaining relationships between the insurer and the brokers will 
provide the views of the broker principal’s corporate counterpart on the same set of 
commitment and transaction cost issues addressed in the P&C Brokerage Case Study; 
• Senior regional management are responsible for the relationship, including assurance of 
product acceptance, delivery of training, encouragement of increased volume, etc.  They 
are measured on a style of a balanced scorecard; 
• The delivery of corporate programs may come with the risk of miscommunication and 
incorrect and unintended implementation issues.  The perspective of the brokerage’s 
corporate counterparts is necessary in ascertaining variances of understanding and 
accepting different initiatives. 
Cross-Case Analysis 
 
• After the analysis of the separate case studies, the data will be merged in order to 
undertake analysis of similarities and differences between the independent brokers and 
their corporate relationship counterparts; 
• Explore whether transaction cost-related commitment issues arise; 
• Seek differences in perspectives, requirements, priorities, etc.  
Post-Case – (ING Canada Senior Executives) 
 
• A series of eight interviews with ING Canada senior executives, including the CEO and 
divisional Presidents and Senior Vice Presidents will be used to communicate the earlier 
findings, gain their feedback and responses, and validate research findings; 
• The combined datasets permit comparisons of perceptions between senior executives, 
relationship managers, and brokers.  
 
The timeframe necessary to conduct interviews, approximately 12 months, permitted 
close to a population rather than sample approach for the corporate & post cases, but 
simply a representative sample of the population for the brokerage case.  This has the 
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 benefit of removing questions and issues associated with sample selection related to 
those population-based cases, and serves to increase the generalisability of the research 
findings.  Naturally, some participants were unable or unwilling to participate.  The 
number of refusals is noted in Table 6, and was surprisingly small and the reasons given 
generally were vacations and tight schedules. 
 
Table 6: Case Study Interview Statistics 
Case Study No. of 
Interviews 
(refusals) 
Location Dates 
Brokerage Case 24 + 22 = 46 
(4) 
Ontario (urban & rural) 
Brokerage Offices 
September 2004 
to November 
2005 
Corporate Case 11 
(2) 
Various ING Canada branch 
offices across Ontario 
November 2005 
to September 
2006 
Post-Case 8 
(1) 
ING Canada Head Office  
(Toronto, Ontario, Canada) 
September 2006 
to December 2006
 
After the in-case analysis is complete, the data is re-grouped and analysed for 
‘independent broker’ and ‘corporate’ perspectives, contrasted against ‘executive’ level, 
as well as other groupings to extract the maximum value from the research output.  For 
example, in comparing and contrasting broker/corporate viewpoints, the ‘broker’ case 
study is compared separately to the ‘executive’, as is the ‘corporate’. 
 
7.10.3 Field Research 
 
The primary data collection consisted of semi-structured interviews, typically forty-five 
minutes to one hour in length, capturing that which the participants consider significant, 
and framing those issues in their terms (Meredith et al. 1989).  Interviews can: 
“yield rich insights into people’s experiences, opinions, aspirations.  Interviews, within 
management research, are essential sources of case study information” (Yin 1994, 
p.84).  When done effectively, interviewees are permitted to speak for themselves, 
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 offering verifiable facts along with their insights, opinions, and other contextual 
information (Robson 1993).  This is particularly suitable for sensitive areas of research 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).     
 
The independent insurance brokerage distribution system in Canada, in its current state, 
firmly requires the use of personal interviews, as participants wish to be heard and 
passionately feel that qualifying and clarifying their responses (beyond a survey) is 
necessary due to the numerous changes ongoing in the industry.  The sense is that a 
survey at this juncture would not capture the essence of the true state of affairs (pilot 
case study 2003).   
 
7.10.4 Identification of Potential Interviewees 
 
In order to increase reliability and validity, a census, not a sampling approach was 
employed.  Therefore, each broker principal within a specific category (Integrated 
Financial Services) and each appropriate ING Canada manager or executive responsible 
for the relevant relationship management was approached to be interviewed.  The names 
and titles of the individual brokers, managers, and executives were acquired from the 
ING Canada database, and corroborated with the Registered Insurance Brokers of 
Ontario, as well as matching against organization charts, personal knowledge, and the 
‘snowball’ techniques of asking each interviewee for the names of other appropriate 
individuals whom the researcher should contact.  
 
Once identified, each participant was sent an email requesting an interview.  This also 
included a brief description and purpose of the research.  Copies of these items are 
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 included as Appendix B.  After approximately one week from the point of the initial 
contact, a telephone discussion followed requesting and confirming their participation.   
 
Appendix A contains the Master Interview List, including a description and titles of 
interview participants.  In addition, the list contains details regarding the small number 
of participants declining to be interviewed, and the steps taken to address and/or 
compensate for the loss of that data to this study. 
 
Recent studies of executive workloads (Corneil et al. 2002) document that executives 
are increasingly busy, with tight deadlines and greater demands.  It is held, but cannot 
be proven, that access was improved through the researcher’s credentials as a long 
serving industry member.  Furthermore, familiarity with the industry regulations, 
language and culture of the Canadian financial services industry enabled the researcher 
to put forward relevant questions, probe and influence the course of discussion into 
constructive areas, and challenge participants into revealing and explaining their 
perceptions more fully. 
 
7.10.5 The Interview Guide 
 
Building upon the findings from the Literature Review and the pilot case, as well as 
internal ING Canada documents and communiqués, and incorporating techniques on 
questionnaire design widely imparted in literature (Payne 1951; Fink 1995; Gill and 
Johnson 1997; Hussey and Hussey 1997; Smith 1998), a semi-structured or open-ended 
interview template was created in order to capture that which brokers and ING 
managers consider significant, and to frame those issues in their terms (Meredith et al. 
1989).  Because of the exploratory character of this study, open-ended questions support 
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 Burgess’s recommendation to probe deeply, solicit unreserved responses, and thereby 
expose formerly hidden details thus opening new lines of enquiry (Burgess 1982).   
 
Within the individual research topics, questions were created to engage the participant 
in a discussion, while the interview guide provided a structured flow to the discussion 
through each research topic.  Both the open-ended style of the questions and the guide 
itself provided flexibility for participants to address each topic and question in 
sequence, while allowing interviews to flow in diverse ways.  The relatively small 
number of questions and topics provided an atmosphere in which the researcher could 
be highly adaptable.  Throughout the course of each interview, all research interests 
were covered, with no significance or impact noted in the order of the coverage of these 
research items.     
 
The use of the aforementioned Interview Guide was intended to ensure a steady flow of 
rich and insightful perspectives from the respondents.  The guide was not a script but 
more of a track to provide guidance as to a listing of topical issues to delve into.  The 
open-ended approach to questioning the individuals allowed them to expand on areas 
they had more to say about and vice versa.  They were not asked leading questions in 
any form nor were they directed to a particular viewpoint.  The guide was helpful in 
ensuring the majority of the topical areas were touched upon regardless of the quality 
and quantity of their responses.  Because of this there is a reduced chance of bias toward 
responding in a manner that would be perceived as receiving the approval of the 
interviewer.  The respondents were given the opportunity to express themselves freely 
and they did so.        
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 An important component of the pilot case included the testing of the initial 
questionnaire on a small sample of similar participants.  They provided direct feedback 
and input on the instrument itself, ultimately leading to minor adjustments and 
refinements. 
 
The Interview Guide is included in Appendix C. 
 
7.10.6 Field Procedures 
 
The primary data collection strategy for this study consisted of 72 semi-structured one-
hour interviews, i.e. 50 for the broker case and 22 for the corporate case.   
 
The interviews were conducted between September 2004 and December 2006, primarily 
at the interviewee’s office.  The geographic boundary of the study was simply the 
Province of Ontario/Canada, and participants were involved from cities and towns 
throughout the province.  The extensive distance involved was a contributor to the 
lengthy timeframe necessary to complete the full complement of interviews.  In 
addition, the participants’ frequently busy schedules required protracted lead times in 
order to successfully book, and often reschedule the interviews.   
 
An offer of confidentially and anonymity is commonly extended to participants in order 
to achieve a higher level of honesty and accuracy at a reduced risk to participants 
(Folkman 2000).  At the commencement of each interview, participants were extended 
the offer of a guarantee that no attribution of comments would appear in the study’s 
written report and publications.  It is interesting to note that a significant number of 
participants declined this offer, but this had no impact on the study.  In each case, either 
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 a tape recorder or a video recorder was used to record the interviews in order to ensure 
the accuracy of the subsequent transcripts, and to enable the interviewer to focus on the 
discussion (Fink 1995).  A written summary and analysis was completed immediately 
following each interview in order to capture additional details, interpretations, thoughts, 
and other related information (Radnor 2002).  Participant confidentiality was secured 
and managed mainly by codifying the identity of interviewees and segregating the 
interview contents and identities in separate files.  Each of these items was stored in 
secure environments.  
 
Following the recommendations of Yin (2003a), a case study protocol was developed 
for this study.  The intent of the protocol was to outline and document the case study 
research.  Utilizing a case study protocol enhances reliability and is essential for 
multiple-case research design, as in this study.  In addition, this protocol incorporates 
the research questions, logic and processes employed during the research itself, leading 
to improved construct validity (Yin 2003a).  The documentation also includes the 
scheme for the collection and analysis of the data garnered during the course of the 
study, as well as listing each of the administrative components of this study.  
 
As an added feature, a case study database was maintained during the course of the 
research.  The contents of the database included the following elements: raw material 
(e.g. interview transcripts, field notes, documentation obtained throughout the data 
collection, and survey items); codified data; coding scheme; memos, communiqués, and 
various other analytic items.  An extract from this database is included as Appendix D. 
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 7.11  Ethics 
 
Historically, both professional and religious organisations have developed ethics 
guidelines to direct their constituents in their actions and behaviours (e.g. Canadian 
Medical Association 1995).  However, the topic of ethics within the context of social 
research has become a heightened area of interest (Frankfort-Nachmias 1996; Bell 
1999; Bulmer 2001).  By its very definition, social research involves “the study of 
human society and of individual relations in and to society” (Webster 1988).  
Moreover, the field of research ethics can be specifically defined as: “(in 
research)…ethics are usually taken as referring to general principles of what one ought 
to do” (Robson 1993, p. 30).  Social science “researchers are constantly interacting 
with a complex and demanding socio-political environment that influences their 
research decisions…” (Frankfort-Nachmias 1996, p.76).  Thus, it has become 
incumbent upon ethical researchers to take into account and deal with the research 
choices which may impact any (or all) of the research participants, other researchers, 
users of the research, and society itself (Radnor 2002). 
 
Individual research participants have the right to know and provide their consent for 
their involvement and participation in research activities (Bulmer 2001).  Whereas 
codes of ethics typically state that consent must be informed and be comprehensible for 
it to be meaningful, but most will also acknowledge that exceptions can be justified 
under certain conditions (Sieber 1992).  For this particular research, informed consent 
was acquired through the use of an advance letter of introduction describing the project 
along with a subsequent follow-up telephone call.  The nature of the participant’s 
voluntary involvement was evident from the use of this approach and there was never 
any attempt made to apply pressure or persuade reluctant participants. 
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Numerous ethical issues can arise surrounding the power relationship existing between 
researchers and their participants, however Easterby-Smith et al. indicate that many of 
these issues are often mitigated or absent in management research (Easterby-Smith et al. 
2002).  In this thesis undertaking, the voluntary nature of participating was not a 
concern since individuals were free to decline their participation when contacted.  Also, 
for the sake of clarity, the researcher/interviewer is ‘organizationally' one level (or 
more) below the executive level of the company.  Therefore, no implicit organizational 
pressure to participate or threat/consequences of non-participation could be implied.  In 
terms of the brokerage principal interviews, the researcher has only an indirect working 
relationship with them, as the interviewer is typically involved in the distribution of 
other financial products and services other than property and casualty insurance. 
 
Within the Canadian context, one particularly relevant framework for identifying and 
addressing the ethical issues germane to this research are the principles identified by the 
‘Canadian Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving 
Humans’ (Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 1998).  The 
principles relate chiefly to issues of human dignity, free and informed consent, and 
confidentiality and privacy.  As mentioned, each of these issues was addressed by the 
research design. 
 
To summarize, ethics involves guidelines of conduct and can have an impact on all 
research decisions (Bulmer 2001).  This study has endeavoured to identify ethical 
considerations and issues and has undertaken proactive steps to address them. 
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 7.12  Secondary Data 
 
In support of the interviews mentioned earlier, this thesis also employed documentary 
analysis in order to determine the appropriate application of transaction cost economics 
in the insurance distribution channel, all with a view to ascertaining the various levels of 
commitment that can exist.  The bulk of this analysis occurred during the literature 
review stage of the study. 
 
Documentation analysis within a case study setting has been well developed by earlier 
sociologists including Marx, Durkheim and Weber (Macdonald 2001).  Unfortunately, 
there has not been a strong tradition of documentary analysis within management 
research (Gummesson 2000; Barnes 2001).  Not unlike other methodologies, evaluation 
of historical and documentary evidence must address these important aspects: 
credibility, authenticity, representativeness and meaning to generate sound research 
findings (Scott 1990).   
 
Documentary evidence must first exist in order to undertake documentary analysis, and 
access to this evidence must be acquired.  The documentation for this study was 
accessed from several sources, including (but not limited to) ING Canada records and 
files, individual brokerage files, industry associations and self-regulatory organizations 
(SROs), and governments at both the National and Provincial levels, among other 
sources and bodies.  Some of the relevant industry groups include:  
• RIBO (Registered Insurance Brokers of Ontario) 
• IBAO (Insurance Brokers Association of Ontario) 
• CLHIA (Canadian Life & Health Insurers Association) 
• OSC (Ontario Securities Commission) 
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 • FSCO (Financial Securities Commission of Ontario) 
 
Analysis of the evidence and supporting documentation resulting from the literature 
review, the pilot case, and that which manifested during the research itself was 
integrated into the global research findings. 
 
7.13  Analysis Strategies 
 
“Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study.” (Yin 
2003a). 
It is necessary for researchers to create a conceptual framework in advance of 
commencing a case study in order to distinguish “the main features (aspects, 
dimensions, factors, variables) of a case study and the presumed relationships” 
(Robson 1993, p.148-150).  A framework such as this will set out “the logical model of 
proof that will allow the research to draw inferences concerning causal relations 
among the variables.” (Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, p.77-78).  Eisenhardt has 
indicated that without a sound research design and focus, it is easy to become 
overwhelmed by the volume of data (Eisenhardt 1989).   
 
The occurrence of analysis and method are simultaneous during case study research.  
Within qualitative case studies, researchers are occupied with data interpretation from 
the outset through to the conclusion of the research process (Radnor 2002), thus they 
become intimately familiar with their data.  Concurrently, they examine the dataset from 
a distance endeavouring to reveal patterns and explanations.  In particular, the data 
collection and analysis occur as an iterative or cyclical process, whereby researchers 
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 move between the literature and field data and back to the literature again. Yin (2003) 
suggests that by including a general analytic strategy within a case study the researcher 
can be guided in the decisions regarding what will be analyzed and for what purpose.   
 
Yin (2003b) provides a clear-cut procedural approach for case studies, stressing field 
protocols, case study questions, and a guide for the final report.  Yin submits that such 
steps signify a key tactic in enhancing the reliability of the research.  Likewise, Stake 
(1995) has presented a series of essential steps for utilizing the case method, including 
posing research questions, assembling and analysing data, and ultimate interpretation.  
A distinguishing feature is Stakes’ bias in favour of a more naturalistic approach, the 
significance of the philosophical foundations of case method, and the importance of the 
portrayal of the contexts.   
 
Trochim (1989) contemplates pattern-matching as being one of the most advantageous 
strategies for analysis.  This form of logic contrasts a predicted pattern with an 
empirical one.  Internal validity is improved when the patterns coincide.  If the case 
study is an explanatory type, the patterns might be related to the independent or 
dependent variables. If it is a descriptive study, the predicted pattern must be specified 
in advance of the data collection.  Yin (2003b) prescribes the use of rival explanations 
for pattern-matching when there are independent variables involved.  This requires the 
creation of rival theoretical propositions, but by and large the concern remains the 
extent to which a pattern matches the predicted one.  In comparison, exploratory 
research typically focuses on pattern-finding as opposed to pattern-matching. 
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 Yin imparts other potentially viable analytic techniques including: time-series analysis 
and explanation-building.  By and large, the analysis should rely upon the theoretical 
propositions that brought about the case study.  In situations whereby theoretical 
propositions are absent, the researcher should outline a descriptive framework 
throughout which the case study has been organized. 
 
Likewise, Miles and Huberman have also submitted alternative analytic techniques for 
analysis of qualitative research data.  These include the usage of arrays to present the 
data, developing displays, charting the frequency of events, ordering the information, 
among other methods.  It is necessary to complete this in such as way that it will not 
bias the results (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
 
Explanation-building is regarded as a style of pattern-matching whereby the analysis of 
the case study is accomplished by developing an explanation of the case.  Clearly, this is 
suitable for an explanatory case study, but it is also appropriate for exploratory cases as 
well, serving as an integral component of a hypothesis-generating process.  
Explanation-building is an iterative procedure that starts with a theoretical statement, 
subsequently refines it, revises the proposition, and repeats these steps.  The literature 
advises of the challenges with this technique including the potential for a diminishing 
focus. 
 
7.13.1 Data Analysis in this Research 
 
Although it is a tautology, groundwork for the data analysis does not start at the moment 
the researcher initially pulls together all of the interviews and other research data.  In 
practicality, it started at the time the researcher chose a research area and developed the 
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 appropriate questions.  At that moment, the researcher has chosen components from 
among a vast, complex, and interconnected universe as being ‘of interest’.  
Subsequently, after the choice has been finalized, the researcher will develop a filter 
through which to consider the literature, methodology, and other research facets.   
 
Similarly, this research expands and extends upon an assumption that transaction cost 
economics theory will have several useful and interesting conclusions in explaining the 
commitment phenomenon between principals and agents in the Canadian insurance 
sector.  Throughout this research process, specific interview questions (included in 
Appendix C) were developed and refined in order to explore the topic in question. 
 
The specific data analysis strategy employed for this research, as described by Radnor 
(2002) is discussed in below in Table 7. 
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 Table 7: Radnor’s Steps for Qualitative Analysis  
Analysis Steps Description 
Topic Ordering  Choosing major topics by way of returning to the original 
research  questions and objectives 
 Re-evaluating interview questions in order to identify other 
topics 
Constructing the 
Categories 
 Construct categories inside of each topic 
 Categories could be either explicit (indicated by 
interviewees) or implicit (constructed by the researcher) 
 Categories can also develop out of reviewing the interview 
transcripts and/or the pilot case 
 Category construction could also take into account the a-
priori question responses which were included in the 
interview template 
Reading for Content  Coding of content of each interview by category/topic 
 Could be electronic (as in this research) or manual format 
 Potentially new categories might appear (or be discarded) 
during this step 
Completing the 
Coded Sheets 
 Classify on the reference documents (one for each 
category/topic) all relevant material in the interview 
transcripts related to the topic 
Generating Coded 
Transcripts 
 Merge the applicable statements from individual interview 
transcripts into a distinct document for each category (data 
fragments may surface in more than one topic) 
 The statements/fragments should be self-explanatory and 
make sense when viewed out of context 
 As indicated, extracts/fragments can be included in more 
than one category as they are not mutually exclusive 
 New categories can materialize throughout this stage by way 
of examining any residual ‘non-categorised’ transcript text 
Analysis to Interpret 
the Data 
 Shift in favour of interpreting the data/categories as opposed 
to a description of the data 
 Study and analyse sub-sets of the extracted data in search of 
different meanings 
 Write statements that support and summarise the data within 
the categories and topics, thus leading to an enhanced 
comprehension of what is occurring  
 Choose specific and relevant quotes in order to ground the 
research findings in the data 
Source: (Radnor 2002)  
 
 
At the completion of the descriptive/interpretive stage of the analysis, the researcher is 
enabled to comprehend (with new insight and clarity) the discoveries under the different 
categories and topics.  Nevertheless, this is the point at which the serious work of 
interpretation really starts (Radnor 2002).  By way of exploration and by searching for 
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 patterns and relationships, as well as making connections across categories and topics, 
the researcher can endeavour to develop abstract conceptualizations of the phenomena 
being examined. 
 
Whereas the aforementioned stresses a systematic approach or protocol for data 
analysis, it should be emphasized that a systematic approach in itself does not provide 
knowledge of the data.  A common example illustrating this point is the use of 
descriptive statistics in quantitative research.  The outcome of the analysis is extremely 
dependent upon the objectivity, experience, and diligence of the researcher in mining 
the knowledge enclosed within the data.  All the same, qualitative procedures will aid in 
administering a comprehensive exploration of the research data. 
 
7.13.2 Case Study Analysis in this Research 
 
Within this research project, the qualitative data analysis was steered by descriptions of 
qualitative research approaches and techniques developed over the past forty years 
(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Miles and Huberman 1994; Silverman 2001; Radnor 2002).  
The individual cases were initially analyzed separately while focusing on the specifics 
and complexities of each case (Stake 1995; Eisenhardt 1989).  As Yin (2003a) pointed 
out, each case study consisted of a ‘whole’ study, whereby convergent evidence was 
sought regarding the facts and conclusions.  The data analysis followed by analyzing 
within-case data while searching for cross-case patterns (Eisenhardt 1989).  This 
subsequently permitted the unique details and patterns of each case to manifest, which 
was examined for within the other cases, thus leading to improved reliability and 
validity.   
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 There were three tactics employed in searching for cross-case patterns.  Initially, the 
dimensions suggested by theory were identified and intra-group similarities and 
differences were identified.  Secondly, the cases were compared and similarities and 
differences listed.  Finally, to triangulate, the data collected from different sources and 
of different types were compared.  As the patterns were corroborated by evidence and 
data from other sources, the findings were well-grounded (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
The methods utilized in this study followed the aforementioned steps suggested by 
Radnor (2002).  As indicated earlier, every interview was taped with a recording device 
in order to capture the responses of the participants.  Upon completing the transcription 
of each interview, coding methods as demonstrated in Appendix D were utilized in order 
to establish themes and patterns.  In order to further establish relationships between 
responses and propositions, the transcriptions of each response was cut out of the page 
with scissors and placed upon a board.  Connected and related thoughts were linked 
with thread in order to visually depict relationships within and between items.  The 
responses were then re-analysed and re-ordered until such time as no further discernable 
patterns manifested.  This process aided in establishing and confirming the presence of 
patterns and also suggested strong support for the propositions.  
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 Table 8: Data Collection Methods 
Data 
Collection 
Method 
Source Anticipated Contribution and Analytic 
Approach 
Pilot Case 
Interviews 
Exploratory interviews with 6 
typical brokerage principals and 6 
ING Canada executives and senior 
managers 
- Focus & confirm the research questions 
and topic 
- Case study approach & techniques 
Document 
Review 
and 
Analysis 
 
 
Review & analysis of transaction 
cost economics-based (TCE) and 
commitment literature, published 
and unpublished reports, corporate 
policies and guidelines, and both 
internal and published 
documentation  
 
- ING Canada and insurance industry 
documents & academic literature examined 
for elements and the evolution of TCE and 
commitment; information sources; 
discussion of limitations & supports for 
TCE 
- Impact on decision-making processes 
- Used to supplement & substantiate 
evidence from other sources (Yin 1994:81) 
Interviews  
 
Semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews with 46 brokerage 
principals and 11 senior managers 
of ING Canada (57 participants in 
total for both cases)  
- Two case studies 
- Principal data collection instrument 
- Qualitative, interpretative analysis 
(Radnor 2002)  
Secondary 
Analysis of 
Surveys  
- Financial & non-financial 
statements of brokerages  
-Industry-wide employee surveys 
(1999 through 2005)  
- Internal documentation, records, 
performance data, etc. generated 
at ING Canada (2001-2005) 
-Triangulation with other data sources 
Post Case Interviews with eight of the most 
senior executives of ING Canada 
- Final case study 
- Garner executive perspective 
- Validate research findings 
 
 
In summation, when appropriately done qualitative case study research has explanatory 
and enlightening capacity about the situation under review.  It can simultaneously 
examine various observations revealed within the area of study while enhancing the 
comprehension of issues within the parameters of the research area (Silverman 2001).  
The literature provides guidance with several areas in which the researcher should 
carefully review to make certain the analysis is of the highest quality, including: 
1. demonstrate that all relevant evidence has been considered and examined;  
2. all rival explanations have been addressed;  
3. the analysis addressed the chief aspects of the case study, and;  
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 4. the researcher’s wisdom, knowledge, skill and experience are leveraged to the 
greatest extent possible in order to enhance the study. 
   
Each of these areas was addressed within this study.  The author was, and remains, 
exclusively accountable for the organizing and analysis of the data, and also for the 
development of the case studies discussed in this dissertation. 
 
7.14  Reliability, Validity and Generalisability 
 
Whereas all research methodologies are concerned with validity and reliability, 
successful research data and findings must be ‘consistent’, ‘objective’, ‘unbiased’, and 
‘unambiguous’ (Mann 1985).  A judicious research design, incorporating ethical 
considerations, should arrive at valid and verifiable conclusions.  This would be within 
the context of a given societal model.  Methodology literature typically emphasizes the 
maximisation of four aspects of the research: ‘internal validity’, ‘external validity’, 
‘construct validity’, and ‘reliability’ (Yin 1994; Easterby-Smith et al. 2002).  
Triangulation, as described in the following section, is often used as an integral source 
of reliability in exploratory studies (Eisenhardt 1989).   
 
In case studies, reliability is not measured on its replicability but instead on whether the 
process of interpretation is adequately transparent and logical such that others can 
comprehend.  Subsequently, in theory, the same processes conducted on the data should 
then lead to the same results.  Silverman (2001) provides four principles to guard 
against ‘anecdotalism’, including: 
 Refutability – use ‘Popperian’ logic to search for examples which might 
disconfirm current beliefs; 
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  Constant comparison – follows the principles of grounded theory in seeking new 
cases and settings which will extend the current theory; 
 Comprehensive data treatment – conducting an initial analysis leading to 
theories and conclusions; and 
 Tabulations – heightened rigour in organising data, and suggesting that 
frequency of observation extracts knowledge from the source data. 
 
Reliability will be augmented through the creation and evolution of a case study 
protocol (Yin 1994).  This should encompass the fundamental documentation necessary 
to provide the researcher with the much needed focus, can assist in organizing the 
interviews, and will ascertain that the chain of evidence is meticulously documented.  
(Stuart et al. 2002).  If a sound research design and focus is absent, the volume of data 
can become overwhelming (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Generalizability, commonly referred to as external validity within quantitative research, 
considers the applicability of research findings to other, similar situations.  There 
currently exists pervasive agreement that generalizability, specifically in the sense of 
validating or discovering universal laws applicable to all similar conditions, is neither 
an attainable or even useful objective of qualitative research (Schofield 2002).  On the 
other hand, qualitative researchers lack a shared impression of the application of 
generalizability within qualitative studies.  Despite the fact that certain qualitative 
researchers have vigorously rejected generalizability as a goal (Denzin 1984) others 
have advanced differing arguments, advocating that the proper criterion is analytical 
instead of statistical generalization (Yin 2003a).  Guba and Lincoln make a case for 
‘fittingness’ – whether the particular qualitative research conclusions are useful in 
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 understanding other areas, yet Stake (1995) submits that generalizability surrounds 
‘naturalistic generalization’ – i.e. building tacit and explicit knowledge to enhance 
understanding of other similar conditions.  Other more recent methods include ‘meta-
ethnography, qualitative-comparative’ method (Ragin 1987), and Schofield’s ‘what is, 
what may be, what could be’ model (Schofield 2002). 
 
Table 9 below, summarises how this research addressed the issues of reliability and 
validity. 
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Table 9: Case Study Validity and Reliability Strategies 
Tests Case Study Tactic Research 
Phase  
Action Taken in this Research 
Construct 
Validity  
Use of multiple 
sources of evidence 
Data 
collection 
Use of interviews, documentary 
evidence and physical artefacts 
Establish chain of 
evidence 
 
Data 
collection 
 
Interview data both taped and 
transcribed in real time; multiple 
evidence sources entered into 
customised object-oriented database 
Have key informants 
review draft case 
study report 
Composition One conference paper and one journal 
article based on case studies reviewed 
by key informants before publication 
Internal 
Validity  
Do pattern matching Data analysis Patterns identified across cases 
Do explanation 
building 
Data analysis Some causal links identified 
Do time series 
analysis 
Data analysis Not performed in this research, but 
under consideration as part of follow-
up work 
Do logic models Data analysis Not performed- requires time series 
data 
External 
Validity 
(Generalize) 
Use rival theories 
within single cases 
Research 
design 
Not used because of exploratory 
nature of research and lack of existing 
theory 
Use replication logic 
in multiple-case 
studies 
Research 
design 
Multiple cases investigated using 
replication logic 
Reliability  
 
Use case study 
protocol 
Data 
collection 
Same data collection procedure 
followed for each case; consistent set 
of initial questions used in each 
interview 
Develop case study 
database 
Data 
collection 
Interview transcripts, other notes and 
links to online and physical artefacts 
entered into database 
Source: (Yin 1998) 
 
 
Contained in the research design, the third case study functioned to validate the 
interpreted findings through eight interviews with the most senior executive of ING 
Canada.  This was accomplished by presenting and discussing the research findings 
individually with them, and the provisional theories which had emerged from the study 
until that moment with these interviewees.  This provided an opportunity to rebut or 
acknowledge the case study findings, plus it provided a forum for discussion on any 
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 issues deemed of significance to each individual, thus increasing confidence in the 
research findings. 
 
7.15  Triangulation 
 
Within the qualitative research field, including exploratory research (Eisenhardt 1989) 
and qualitative case studies, a crucial aspect of validation is triangulation (Yin 2003a).  
Denzin refers to triangulation as: “the combination of methodologies in the study of the 
same phenomenon.” (Denzin 1978, p.297).  The necessity for triangulation surfaces due 
to the ethical requirement to confirm the validity of the processes.  Stake (1995) 
indicates that triangulation functions to ensure accuracy and take into account 
alternative explanations.  Triangulation heightens the certainty that observed differences 
are in fact grounded in the data as opposed to the method, with any limitations of a 
particular technique compensated by way of the strengths in another (Todd 1979).    
 
Triangulation may happen at several different levels.  Denzin (1984) identified four 
forms of triangulation: ‘investigator, data, methodological, and triangulation of 
theories.’  Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (2002) remark on each of these definitions 
in the following ways: 
1. Data source triangulation – whereby the researcher determines if the data 
remains the same in different conditions and contexts;  
2. Investigator triangulation -- several investigators examine the same phenomena;  
3. Theory triangulation -- investigators with differing perspectives interpret the 
same results; and  
4. Methodological triangulation -- one approach is followed by another, thus 
increasing confidence in the interpretation (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002, p.146).   
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Table 10 provides details as to how these concepts were applied within this study. 
 
Documentary analysis is one particular method available for triangulation (Denzin 
1978).  As Yin indicates, “the most important use of documents is to corroborate and 
augment evidence from other sources” (Yin 1994, p.81).  The research design 
incorporated in this study was developed from an analysis of internal (ING Canada and 
brokerage) documents, along with those found in the literature review, as well as 
government and self-regulatory organization information, and other industry reports and 
documents.  These were gathered in advance of and throughout the field research phase.  
Each of these sources provided strength to the research findings through triangulation. 
 
Table 10: Triangulation (Applied Within this Research Project) 
Triangulation Research Response 
Data Census (not sample) of senior executives within post case 
Large (representative) sample in other cases 
Incorporates differing perspectives from across the 
organisation    
Multiple data sources 
Investigator Not applicable – one researcher only 
Methodological Analysis of secondary survey analysis 
Use of Pilot and Post Case strategy 
Document analysis 
Triangulation of Theories Use of Transaction Cost Economics theory to explain case 
findings 
Commitment Theory 
Principal/Agent Theory 
 
 
Considering the dynamic nature of the financial services industry in Canada, as well as 
the political context of government, it is necessary to verify the accuracy of 
interviewees’ statements in discussing their management issues (Hammersley 1998).  
The research design of this study does include secondary analysis of existing survey 
data, including the 2003 and 2005 ING Canada Employee Survey and 2004 ING 
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 Canada Broker Survey.  These survey findings will be utilized to validate research 
findings through triangulation. 
 
7.16  Building Theories 
 
“Nothing is as practical as a good theory.” (Lewin 1945)  
Gilbert has suggested that a theory “highlights and explains something that one would 
otherwise not see, or would find puzzling.  Often, it is an answer to a ‘Why?’ question.” 
(Gilbert 2001, p.17).  Acknowledging that the development of a theory is a fundamental 
objective of research (Eisenhardt 1989; Swamidass 1991; Hussey and Hussey 1997; 
Meredith 1998), Gill and Johnson note that while:  
“the terms ‘theory’ and ‘hypothesis’ are often used interchangeably, in its 
narrowest sense a theory is a network of hypotheses advanced so as to 
conceptualize and explain a particular social or natural phenomenon.”  
(Gill and Johnson 1997, p.26).   
 
Traditionally, theory has been developed by blending observations from relevant 
literature, common sense and experience.  By examination of the literature for existing 
theory(s), researchers detect facets that are “ambiguous, deficient or contradictory” 
(Handfield and Melnyk 1998, p.313), even when the body of knowledge is inadequately 
assembled (Stuart et al. 2002).  Theory-building is not only challenging, but it also takes 
time (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 
Phenomenological research is especially compatible with exploratory studies and theory 
development.  As Mintzberg has indicated:  
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 “Theory building seems to require rich description, the richness that comes from 
anecdotes.  We uncover all kinds of relationships in our hard data, but it is only 
through the use of the soft data that we are able to explain them.”(Mintzberg 
1979, p.587).   
 
In order to support such an interpretivist perception that theory stems from observations, 
qualitative data analysis generally begins with descriptive observations that relate the 
state of the actors, acts, activities, events, goals, objects, space, time, and feeling 
dimensions.  The description will situate the qualitative narrative record of noteworthy 
events occurring during the study.  This record might also contain focused observations 
on particular elements of interest, thus leading to an explanatory array of concepts 
(Robson 1993).  Others have affirmed that: “a qualitative understanding of the 
quantified factors is still required for theory to be accepted…” (Meredith 1998, p.442).   
 
As is the case for all forms of research, advanced selection of potential constructs from 
the relevant literature can influence and provide focus for the primary research design in 
theory-building.  Researchers can subsequently integrate into their research instruments 
measures to consider these constructs.  If the constructs later prove valuable during the 
research, “the researcher then has a firm empirical grounding for the emergent theory” 
(Eisenhardt 1989, p.536). 
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 7.16.1 Theory-Building from Case Studies 
 
“Case research has consistently been one of the most powerful research 
methods in operations management, particularly in the development of new 
theory.”   
(Voss et al. 2002, p.195). 
Eisenhardt (1989), while integrating earlier works (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Yin 1984; 
Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 1994), debates that the case study method is valid for 
uncovering new theories, yet warns of the chance that theory generated inductively 
(while empirically valid) might neglect to attend to larger challenges.  Ultimately, it 
might lack generalisation capacity (Eisenhardt 1989).  Despite this, Yin submits that: 
“case studies, like experiments, are generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to 
populations or universes” (Yin 1994, p.10).   
 
Gill and Johnson have suggested that theory-building from case studies is quite 
appropriate in the early phases of investigation of a subject area, and also when a new 
perception is required (Gill and Johnson 1997).  Whereas it is utilized in many areas, it 
is quite commonly used in operations management studies (McCutcheon and Meredith 
1993; Handfield and Melnyk 1998).   
 
The advancement of theoretical frameworks, consisting of a collection of models and 
theories from the relevant literature, assists to ‘focus and bound’ the data (Miles and 
Huberman 1994; Barnes 2001).  In exploratory case studies, theoretical frameworks 
may not be as important (Hussey and Hussey 1997), or may not be as clear in their 
structure.  However, they do offer a structure for data collection while allowing 
exploration of a wide variety of topics (Barnes 2001). 
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 A genuine aspect of case research, particularly in theory-building, surrounds the 
researcher’s capacity to adjust interview questions, as well as adding cases to the study 
in order to examine emergent topics or to respond to unforeseen opportunities 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Beach et al. 2001).  An important component is the preservation of 
that which Yin considers a ‘chain of evidence’, with explicit citation of specific bits of 
evidence at each stage of the study.  These include the collection of data, both within-
case and cross-case analysis, the overall findings, and the conclusion (Yin 1981). 
 
The chief objective of this research is two-fold.  Initially, it is to explore the 
applicability of transaction cost economics on commitment levels within principal and 
agent insurance distribution in the Canadian property and casualty insurance industry.  
The second objective is to detect alternative models, refinements or sub-models which 
explain the impact of transaction costs from the perspective of senior insurance industry 
executives and managers. 
 
7.17  Summary of the Methodology Chapter 
 
As previously indicated, the choice of research methodology should be driven by the 
research question under examination (Hussey and Hussey 1997), which in turn will 
drive the choice of methods.  This preceding chapter has justified the choice of the 
methodological standpoint as developed in a qualitative interpretist approach.  It has 
identified the specific methodology assumed in accomplishing this exploratory research.   
 
The methodology used is a qualitative approach and the method is a case study.  
Handfield and Melynk (1998) suggest that such ‘exploratory theory-building’, or 
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 alternatively confirmation of transaction cost economics theory, are appropriate for the 
case study method (Handfield and Melnyk 1998, p.320-339; Stuart et al. 2002). 
 
This research case study analysis will explore the transaction cost economics theory in 
order to understand key industry participants’ reactions to factors affecting commitment 
levels.  Ultimately, this will serve to validate or disprove this theory, with the potential 
for refinements in the theory or the identification of new theory(s) which are a closer 
match for the reported industry participants’ behaviour in endeavouring to enhance 
commitment levels.  It is anticipated that sub-theories will identify conditions which 
support and those which obstruct the continuum of commitment levels in the Canadian 
insurance intermediary distribution channel.  
 
It is hereby submitted that this study is appropriately grounded in methodologies and 
methods, and it is suitably positioned to make a contribution to knowledge within this 
field.  Recognizing that it is beyond the requirements of a PhD dissertation, it is further 
suggested that this study has an opportunity to make a practical contribution to the 
insurance sector’s management.  Within management research, the latter is crucial in 
obtaining access to senior managers and executives as they may otherwise choose not to 
participate (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002). 
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 8 Case Study – Interviews 
 
This chapter will present the findings uncovered during interviews with the three 
stakeholder groups, i.e. broker principals and senior managers, ING relationship 
managers, and ING Canada senior managers.  Linkages to key elements of “The 
Commitment Wheel” are evident and are used to categorize aspects of the theories while 
they are applied to the interview process. 
 
The presentation of the interviews is structured in such a way as to provide an 
immediate comparison of the perspectives of the three groups.  Each topical area will 
provide a selection of representative responses for each group where relevant rather than 
presenting three separate case studies.  The intent is to demonstrate and pinpoint areas 
where the viewpoints of the groups are similar and also where the perspectives differ.   
 
The case studies analyzed sixty-five interviews ranging in length from forty-five to 
seventy-five minutes.  These were broken down as follows:  46 interviews with brokers 
and/or brokerage management, eleven interviews with ING Canada relationship 
managers, and eight ING Canada executives.  Separate transcription, coding, and 
analysis were conducted independently between the three separate groups, although the 
same interview guide was utilized in order to remain focussed upon the key subject 
areas. 
 
The findings of the interviews will further explore the propositions that were developed 
during the literature review.  To recall these propositions and themes they are re-
presented below:   
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 8.1  Application of the Principles of Transaction Costs & 
Commitment  
 
1. Measurement of commitment levels by the counterparty 
2. Fluidity of commitment levels within the industry 
3. Asymmetry resentment 
4. Behavioural reactions to changes in commitment levels 
For ease of readability, all direct quotes from the case study interviews will be in italics.  
While direct quotes are attributed to a particular interview, unless specifically noted to 
the contrary quotes have been selected as being representative of underlying themes, 
opinions and/or comments emanating from multiple interviews.  In addition, to preserve 
the anonymity of the participants while maintaining an appropriate classification 
system, each respondent has been assigned a unique identification number.  This code 
follows each of the selected responses.  The system is as follows: 
 
BPU-1 to BPU-24 = Urban brokerage participants (owners and senior managers) 
BPR-25 to BPR-46 = Rural brokerage participants (owners and senior managers) 
RM-1 to RM-11 = ING Canada relationship managers (RVPs and RBMs) 
EX-1 to EX-8 = ING Canada executives 
 
8.2 Commitment 
 
8.2.1 Personal Definition of Respondents & Importance 
 
Proposition 1:  An individual’s personal definition of commitment and the 
importance they place upon it will influence their degrees of calculative and/or 
affective commitment.   
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 Each of the respondents stressed the importance of commitment to these relationships, 
both the commitment of the counter-party and that of themselves.  Although they 
recognized the fact that individual circumstances may change, they discussed that 
commitment to the relationship was essential for the mutual success of each party and 
that the concept should not be taken lightly. 
• I enter into these arrangements for the long term.  I hope that the other side is 
thinking the same way (BPU22); 
• What’s the use giving until it hurts, and there is nothing coming back the other 
way?  It’s a two-way street (BPR40); 
• We’re in it for the long term.  We expect the brokers know this and that they are 
too (RM5); 
• As a publicly-traded insurance company, we guard our reputation and public 
image.  We cannot even let rumours emerge that we are not committed to this 
business, or to a particular distribution channel, or to a specific relationship.  
We take this matter of commitment seriously and defend vigorously if it is called 
into question.  We also expect this of our partners.  If commitment wanes or 
dissipates, we investigate (EX2).  
 
8.2.2 Affective and Calculative Commitment 
 
Proposition 2:  Since calculative commitment results from deliberate evaluation 
on a cognitive level of the need for the relationship, it can be explained and 
measured through the use of transaction cost economics.  
One current belief suggests that commitment is an affective state of mind which an 
individual or partner has regarding a counterpart.  This is referred to as “affective 
commitment” and it is evident whereby an individual desires to forge a linkage with 
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 another because of shared values, a likeness or commonality, or they identify closely 
with them (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  In this sense, affective commitment is regarded as 
an emotional attachment to the relationship.  Alternatively, the other category of 
commitment tends to be more behavioural than the affective form.  This second 
category is classified as “calculative commitment” and results from deliberate 
evaluation on a cognitive level of the need for the relationship.  It takes into account 
whether or not there is value in maintaining the relationship with the counterpart.  This 
is conducted through the assessment of the pros and cons, costs, investments, inputs and 
outputs (Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
• It’s a balancing act.  I feel close to some insurance companies and the people 
that work there, but I don’t feel good about investing further in that particular 
contract because I don’t like their products, or pricing, or whatever.  Something 
holds me back.  On the other hand, there are some companies that look great on 
paper.  You know, they have the right products at the right prices, good systems, 
and everything.  But I can’t stand them on a personal level.  Something holds me 
back again.  I think the companies need both.  Good people skills in order to 
make our relationship feel right and they need good products and systems in 
place.  I like to see both (BPU-16); 
• Sometimes I lean more towards my gut feel.  I link more towards the people I 
trust and like dealing with.  The company can have all the right stuff, but I trust 
my instincts (BPR-34); 
• Business is business.  I have enough friends and I am not looking for new ones.  
I want an insurance company to be there with the right mix of stuff like 
technology and pricing, and do what they say they are going to do.  I don’t have 
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 to socialize with them.  They just have to do their part for me to be a success, 
because I’ll do my part (BPR-41); 
• Each broker and their staff are unique.  We have to be prepared to deal with 
them in the way that makes them comfortable and shows that we are open for 
their business.  Some want to feel they are close to us, person-to-person, and 
others are strictly dollars and cents and want the latest and greatest operating 
solutions out there.  We have to be prepared to step up and meet these individual 
needs.  But first we have to understand what those individual needs are (RM-
10); 
• A large part of our commitment to the brokers is demonstrated in assisting them 
in being successful and providing them an opportunity to demonstrate their 
commitment to us.  This is conducted in several ways, either through their words 
or actions.  By communicating regularly with us, meeting with us, and providing 
us with input affords us the chance to get closer with them and gain an 
understanding of who they are.  These forums can be costly, but their value is 
immeasurable and hopefully demonstrates that we are keen to listen and learn.  
The brokers’ actions are observable if they take these opportunities and 
dialogue with us in a non-adversarial way.  As well, if we see concrete actions 
unfold such as more premium directed our way, or an improvement in the risks 
they send us, or if they invest in our systems, programs, technology, or 
whichever that will enhance their business for our mutual benefit (EX-1). 
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 8.2.3 Contractual Terms and Pledges 
 
Proposition 3:  The use of contracts has the potential to deliver clarity and 
certainty in a relationship thus increasing calculative commitment (supported by 
transaction cost theory). 
Because of the importance placed on the relationship, both insurers and brokers alike 
agree on the value of well-crafted written agreements.  These are not intended to be an 
immediate display of distrust at the outset of their relationship, but to bring a sense of 
clarity to the understanding of each party’s responsibilities and obligations.  As well, it 
can serve as a reference document in the future during changes of management and 
ownership of either party.  General comments regarding contracts include: 
• They’re a necessary evil (BPR-45); 
• The hope is that we never have to refer to them, but if we do it’s probably 
because we are already in a dispute, so hopefully the contract will spell out the 
remedy and not lead to more problems (RM-9); 
• It’s simply good business!  (EX-3) 
Incidents of contractual breaches and violations still occur for varying reasons and 
should be anticipated (Williamson 1996) and a written document may not always 
prevent the occurrences.  However, they can prescribe a remedy or contemplate punitive 
measures that have been pre-determined.  Moreover, agreements can be regularly 
adjusted to reflect changes in market conditions and the economy in order to address 
compensation levels and rewards for performance and production.   
• Most of the contracts that I have been involved with are almost identical.  I 
assume the insurance companies either work together on them, or they borrow 
clauses and conditions from their competitors’ contracts.  Other than 
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 compensation arrangements, I don’t see any great advantages in one contract 
over another (BPU-2); 
• I suspect that no one ever reads these things unless a dispute happens.  Most 
guys I know just flip to the Appendix where the money is discussed (RM-7); 
• These agreements are treasured assets to an insurer.  Kind of a “good fences 
make good neighbours” thing (EX-6).       
An exchange of pledges typically occurs in the negotiation of these agreements.  
Beyond the standard clauses identifying duties and obligations, the written pledges 
usually address issues surrounding the quality and quantity of production, territorial 
understandings, commission and bonus levels, and exchanges of investments in the 
relationship (Anderson and Weitz 1992).     
• I know with certainty how much revenue we’ll get if my brokerage performs at 
different levels (BPR-28); 
• Sometimes brokers will fail to hit their premium income levels, or their loss rate 
starts to get out of whack.  When that happens, I simply point to the agreement if 
they are not happy with their comp.  They can’t have it both ways.  They’ve got 
to keep up their end of the deal (RM-01); 
• It’s hard to forecast or determine where you are without some form of 
commitment to premium and loss projections.  For the most part, I would say 
that I am confident and pleased with our broker community’s dedication to the 
seriousness of this (EX-4). 
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 The following quote is indicative of the general feelings of the majority (if not all) of 
the participants in the study with respect to contracts and pledges. 
• The person that doesn’t appreciate the value of these agreements is probably the 
guy who wouldn’t have lived up to his commitments anyway.  If they were 
written or verbal, it wouldn’t matter.  A door-lock only keeps an honest person 
out (BPU-23). 
 
8.2.4 Resource Allocation Behaviour within the Channel 
 
Proposition 4:  The way in which resources are allocated within a relationship 
will provide an indication as to a party’s level of calculative commitment. 
Within the distribution channel, the insurers and brokers continuously monitor the 
allocation of each other’s resources in favour of their relationship.  Although it is not 
necessarily a contractual requirement to allocate additional staff, funds, or time to the 
relationship, each of the parties indicate a willingness to earmark more of their 
resources toward a particular relationship provided it benefits them overall and it is 
recognized by the other party.   
 
The individual reasons given for choice of resource allocation vary, although themes do 
emerge.  The macro reasons include: the state of the economy; market pricing; recent 
and longer term reputation of the other party; amount of available resources; etc.  
Responses regarding individual reasons for specific resource allocation include: 
• I am willing to dedicate staff and/or money to a particular product line as long 
as it has positive effects.  It could be ROI, one-stop-shop for my clients, solving a 
service problem, and so on (BPR-28); 
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 • If I see the insurance company putting their money where their mouth is, I am 
willing to do the same (BPR-31); 
• My intent is always to allocate a higher percentage of staff, marketing dollars, 
time, whatever to the markets that treat us right, meet us half-way on things, and 
the ones I respect (BPU-17); 
• If it goes right, we will devote at least the size of the insurance company’s share 
of our premium.  In other words, if ING holds 55% of our book of business, we 
try to allocate at least that much of our resources towards ING (BPU-20); 
• When we see the insurance companies coming up with new technology, product 
innovations and so on, we know they are making an investment in the channel.  
When they speak to me personally and say they are willing to share the cost of 
advertising or whatever, I’m really satisfied that I have a partner in their 
product and I’m willing to allocate a little more in their direction (BPU-22); 
• When a broker demonstrates that they’re thinking strategically, have a plan in 
place for where they’re going, this is someone we can work with.  If we work 
together, we can earmark some time and money for them and make some great 
things happen (RM-2); 
• If I see a broker trying, and they are investing in our mutual relationship, even if 
they are failing, it means a lot.  They’ll get my full support and I’ll do what I can 
to help them or guide them.  Whatever’s reasonable and in my power (RM-3); 
• It means more than the financial or performance result.  Dedicating more 
towards us means they value and trust us (RM-5); 
• As the expression goes, “their success is our success.”  It would be folly to not 
invest wisely in our valued relationships (EX-2); 
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 • We have developed a segmentation program that categorizes brokers based 
upon a number of factors.  They can choose to deal with us in a number of ways.  
For each of the different ways we dedicate our resources differently, but 
appropriately (EX-4); 
• We like to reach out to the broker community and ask them how they would like 
us to allocate our resources in the most effective ways that can benefit both of 
us.  For the most part, the brokers take this seriously and have been quite 
forthcoming and candid (EX-6). 
 
8.2.5 Communications 
 
Proposition 5:  The effectiveness of the communication between parties has an 
impact upon commitment levels.    
In order to achieve the common objectives of both insurer and broker, healthy two-way 
communication is essential (Mohr and Nevin 1990).  All parties made this abundantly 
clear during the interviews, and also recognized their own obligations to fulfill this. 
• Strangely enough, we tend to communicate more with the companies we like 
(BPU-19); 
• With the different insurers, it seems like an upward or downward spiral.  The 
ones we talk to more, the more business we do with them, and vice versa.  It is 
like a trend.  If the pattern is increasing, so is the volume (BPU-5); 
• Much as I like having a chat, it’s the quality of the communication that’s 
important.  We have to be regularly talking about something of substance for it 
to be valuable to me, unless I am being treated to a dinner or a hockey game 
(BPR-41); 
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 • I recognize that our brokers are busy people.  We all try to walk the balance 
between reaching out to them and informing them of things, but at the same time 
not wasting their time (RM-4); 
• Communicating seems to be where relationships are made, healed, or fall apart.  
It is important to be in touch simply to tell the broker that we are open to listen 
to them, hear their problems, and acknowledge their ideas.  Simply keep the 
lines open (RM-5); 
• It remains vital that we effectively communicate in as many ways as possible.  
Good ideas are of no value if they remain secret.  Challenges cannot always be 
solved in isolation.  Whether it is in person, one-on-one or in a group, by phone, 
email, whatever is most effective, communication is essential (EX-8).     
 
8.2.6 Conflict History and Reputation for Fairness 
 
Proposition 6:  The level and history of conflict in the relationship, along with a 
party’s reputation for fairness will have an impact upon commitment levels.   
Each of the stakeholders considers the dispute history of the other party in their own 
way.  They each place their own level of importance on how the other tends to manage 
disagreements, and may consider this as being symbolic of commitment levels.  They 
may also consider the other party’s dispute or dispute history with other parties, such as 
other insurers, brokers, or customers.   
• I deal fairly.  I want to be dealt with fairly (BPU-4); 
• We should always settle our agreements like adults, not school kids (BPU-19); 
• I hate hearing about disputes concerning other brokers, because it makes me 
think that maybe my disagreements are being discussed publicly (BPR-31); 
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 • If an insurance company chooses to ignore my issues, I start to wonder how they 
deal with our mutual customers.  This then becomes a reflection on our 
brokerage (BPR-33); 
• We try to listen.  We try to be equitable with all brokers.  Sometimes decisions 
may be precedent setting, or the result may give a broker an unfair competitive 
advantage over other brokers, and we try to be reasonable and fair with each of 
them.  To avoid this, sometimes a dispute is not settled to the broker’s 
satisfaction.  This does not mean we are not committed to that broker, but the 
decision may have far-reaching implications and sometimes that is 
misunderstood (RM-3); 
• Some people feel that the way to get what they want is to yell and scream louder 
than everyone else.  It’s not productive and can be viewed negatively (RM-7); 
• If we have to keep going over and over the contracts line-by-line in order to 
figure out who’s right and who’s wrong, we are going to waste a lot of time.  
Some folks waste everyone’s time, including their own, in hostile fights that 
could have been resolved with good communication.  They are only hurting 
themselves because others will look at them differently in the future (RM-8); 
• Whereas contractual terms, clauses, agreements, and contracts in general are 
drafted with the intent of anticipating areas of disagreement or 
misinterpretation, invariably disputes will arise.  It is a testament to the 
character of the people involved in the dispute if they can reconcile their 
differences amicably, even if they are not content with the final outcome.  If they 
can recognize and understand the perspective of the other side, they are clearly 
better off in the long run (EX-1). 
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 8.2.7 Opportunism 
 
Proposition 7:  The presence of opportunism will have a negative impact upon 
commitment levels.   
In extreme cases, fears of asymmetrical resource allocation may turn towards 
opportunism.  In these cases, concerns arise that unfair practices and treatment may 
emerge from the dominant party against the lesser one (Heide and John 1990).  Each of 
the parties remains vigilant of this fact and tends to monitor the actions of the counter-
parties on an ongoing basis.  This aids their relationship in avoiding becoming 
dysfunctional.   
 
Among the methods suggested, the parties observe resource allocation behaviour of the 
counter-party.  Some indications of this include:  investments in training and 
technology, co-operative marketing efforts, effective communication levels, etc.  When 
these are improved and/or increased by the counter-party in favour of the party, fears of 
opportunism tends to dissipate.  But when the opposite occurs, suspicion and 
dysfunction can manifest. 
• No one likes being made a fool of.  I am not going to be short-changed.  I don’t 
short-change other people I do business with, and I will not accept it against me.  
I’ve been fortunate in the last bunch of years that I’ve been dealing with 
straight-shooters.  It may be good luck, or it may be that I am getting better at 
picking those that I choose to do business with (BPU-23); 
• We’ve put a lot of time and money into some relationships, all the while 
assuming the relationship we were investing in was going to get some attention 
from the other company.  Not always so.  We get excuses like ‘budget cutbacks’, 
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 or ‘now is not a good time’ among others.  There has to be some advanced 
understanding on both parts or you can be taken advantage of (BPR-34); 
• Just like any relationship, both sides must contribute and been seen to be 
contributing.  Some brokers can’t afford to invest heavily in the relationship in 
terms of dollars, but we can measure their investment in other ways, like the 
amount of business they send our way, how much time they spend training their 
staff on our stuff, and so on (RM-2); 
• The consequences of poor relationship management can be immeasurable.  One 
episode of opportunistic behaviour can leave an indelible mark and deep 
wounds that may never fully heal.  As well, damage to one’s reputation can be 
long-lasting.  With this in mind, as well as it is simply correct, we strive to treat 
everyone fairly while observing the behaviour of those we deal with (EX-6). 
 
8.2.8 Trust 
 
Proposition 8:  Trust has a negative relationship with calculative commitment 
and a positive relationship with affective commitment. 
Being intangible, trust is an extremely difficult concept to measure.  Relationships such 
as the insurer and broker arrangement must have a basis in trust, particularly as there are 
issues brought to bear upon them such as distance, empowerment, and communication.  
Having an appreciation for the other partner’s well-being and not undertaking negative 
actions against them would be a method to assess a party’s benevolence (Geyskens and 
Steenkamp 1995). 
 
During the interviews, all parties expressed that trust is the cornerstone upon which 
solid relationships are constructed.  Most spoke passionately on the subject, and many 
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 indicated that trust is something that is not noticed unless it is absent.  Alternatively, 
trust within a relationship is reviewed while contemplating a further significant 
investment with the other party.  But for ongoing relationships to survive, trust is both 
implicit and necessary. 
• I don’t work with anyone I can’t trust.  Just blow it once and we’re history 
(BPU-17); 
• It’s a two-way street.  I put my trust in them and I expect them to put their trust 
in me.  If they ever felt that I couldn’t be trusted, for any reason, I’d want to 
know why.  But that’s part of the communication game.  I’d certainly tell them if 
I felt that something they did broke our trust, and give them a chance to explain.  
It’s too important.  We can’t be looking over our shoulders all the time.  We’ve 
got business to do.  We need trust (BPU-18); 
• We’re talking about hundreds of thousands, even millions of dollars of premium, 
commissions, and so on changing hands between us.  Trust is the key (BPU-23); 
• It’s all about knowing the other guy.  We, the brokers, are always here, but the 
person we deal with at the insurance company gets moved around and we find 
ourselves dealing with someone new.  Then they have to get to know us, and 
we’ve got to figure them out.  It’s constant dance with new partners (BPR-38); 
• Sometimes we trust the guy at the insurance company, but we don’t trust the 
insurance company and sometimes it’s the other way around.  We don’t have a 
particular trust problem with ING or the ING person, but we could be assigned 
a new guy and that could always change.  Then we’ve got start all over.  At least 
we’re happy that the company is OK (BPR-42); 
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 • Trust is an essential component of our relationships.  Most brokers are pretty 
good people, and we don’t anticipate any problems.  We strive to be trustworthy, 
and our expectations of them are the same (RM-9); 
• Good communication will build trust.  We’ve got to keep dialoguing.  Each of us 
has to share our thoughts about what we like and dislike about the things that 
are going on around us and affecting us (RM-11); 
• There is no substitute for trust.  Relationships will deteriorate or become 
dysfunctional without healthy trust.  It’s built over time through the actions and 
the follow-through by individuals.  Failure to keep one’s promises, or over-
promising and under-delivering can be toxic and causes relationships to break 
down.  In addition, the far-reaching effects include an indelible black mark on 
one’s reputation.  This can have tragic consequences (EX-4).   
 
8.2.9 Dependence 
 
Proposition 9:  Dependence has a positive relationship with calculative 
commitment and a negative relationship with affective commitment.     
A level of dependence will emerge in instances where there is a measure of asymmetry 
between two partners in a relationship.  One firm’s dependence upon their dyad partner 
has been historically recognized and defined in distribution channels as their need to 
maintain the relationship with that partner in order to achieve their objectives (Kumar et 
al 1995).  The need varies directly with the level of asymmetry, that is, the more 
significant the dependence is between the two parties, then the more that one of the 
parties needs the other in order to benefit from their joint involvement.  Naturally, a risk 
can develop involving opportunism and exploitation by the stronger party.  The 
respondents addressed this issue during their interviews. 
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 • I’m the little guy and the insurance company is huge.  We need them because 
they have the product and without them we have nothing to sell.  But I take 
comfort in the fact that there are other insurance companies out there, and I’m 
the guy that holds the relationship with the clients.  The insurance company 
needs me too.  But I also remember that they need other guys like me.  So guys 
like me stick together and have different associations and councils that we form 
and belong to.  When we stick together, we become the big guys against the little 
insurance company.  It’s a constant power struggle.  Because the insurance 
companies have associations and groups they belong to as well.  It’s like the 
tide.  Goes in and out.  Keeps changing (BPU-13); 
• Just because I’m a small broker in small town Ontario doesn’t mean I’m going 
to get pushed around.  But to be fair, no one has tried to push me around.  But 
it’s implied that I’m small and the insurer is big.  They know that I need them, 
and they know that I know that they need me.  It’s alright (BPR-37); 
• It’s a relationship that should work for both of us.  We each bring our unique 
talents and bits and pieces to the relationship.  There is an amount of 
dependence upon each other, but it’s healthy.  It works as it should in almost all 
cases.  There’s a few occasional upsets, but generally no one takes advantage of 
the other (RM-9); 
• The term ‘dependence’ can conjure up negative images but it doesn’t have to.  
Over-dependence can be a symptom of weakness, and in the wrong set of 
circumstances can lead to consequences that are unsatisfactory.  It is incumbent 
upon an insurance company like ING to assist brokers that are in declining 
circumstances because otherwise more dire results could occur such as 
exploitation or neglect of our mutual customers, and so on.  Our goal is not to 
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 treat brokers like opponents, but to treat them as partners.  Each of us brings 
something special and unique to the table in pursuit of a common objective.  It 
would do neither of us any good to weaken or disparage our partner.  In fact, 
the opposite is necessary (EX-4).         
 
8.2.10 Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment 
 
Proposition 10:  The direction and perception of asymmetry in a relationship 
has an impact on commitment levels.   
It is recognized as a challenge in gauging the level of commitment of the other party 
(Ross, Anderson, and Weitz 1997).  Misperceptions and miscalculations can lead to 
disagreements, as well as a perception of asymmetry in favour of one’s self.  The 
consequences of the one-sidedness can include a with-holding or reallocation of 
resources, poor communication, ill feelings, or in the worst case a breakdown of the 
relationship.   
 
All parties recognized this issue, and in some cases appeared quite animated in their 
responses due to their passion.  Each side wished to know what the other was thinking 
as they viewed the relationship as a partnership.  Their statements reflected their desire 
for a two-way closeness, with each side contributing to the dyad in a fair and equitable 
fashion.  They use their own perceptions of these contributions as a tool for assessing 
the other party’s level of commitment. 
• I like to make sure our operation gives in equal proportions to the insurance 
companies we deal with.  If I give, I expect them to give back in a timely fashion 
(BPU-2); 
• Even if I don’t say anything, I’m watching them (BPU-21); 
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 • This can be a deal-maker or deal-breaker (BPR-31); 
• If I can, I try to find out what they’re doing for my competition as well (BPR-
45); 
• We do our best to make sure that we support, financially and otherwise, our 
brokers that are in the habit of supporting us (RM-1);   
• Sometimes to our detriment we give more to our brokers than they 
proportionally give back to our relationship.  But we want to demonstrate 
leadership, and it’s hoped that they recognize it.  They don’t always.  Sometimes 
it’s appreciated (RM-11); 
• A good relationship is based on reciprocity.  It must be timely, proportionate, 
and measured (EX-5).   
 
8.3 Transaction Cost Issues 
 
8.3.1 Safeguarding Assets 
 
Proposition 11:  Firms will integrate vertically if a need exists to safeguard 
specific assets.  This is particularly evident in make-or-buy decisions requiring 
increased levels of specific assets, thus requiring internal production versus 
outsourcing. 
Considerable trust and a sense of partnership is an absolute requirement to the 
sustainable success of the broker-insurer relationship.  In most commercial 
environments there is a strong, positive correlation between increased levels of 
investment in specific assets and the likelihood of a firm electing to integrate its 
operations (Maltz 1993, 1994).  But the nature of the broker-insurer relationship calls 
for idiosyncratic investments on both sides and without the fear of opportunism.  The 
221 
 
 goal should also be a desire on both sides to remain in the independent distribution 
channel and not be concerned with the other party encroaching upon their jurisdiction, 
thus necessitating a safeguarding of assets. 
• We’re not concentrated, and I like it that way.  We keep a professional distance 
from each of the insurers we deal with and don’t share everything.  This may 
cost us a bit more for the freedom because we pay more for our systems and 
training, don’t get the support that others might get, and so on.  But we are our 
own masters and dictate our own terms (BPU-1); 
• When we made the conscious move several years ago to get closer to a short-list 
of markets like ING, our costs dropped dramatically.  Although we have to share 
our secrets with our main partner, they also step up with funds to ease the 
burden a bit.  They spend great gobs of cash on things like R & D on I.T. 
systems, new ways of doing business, training, marketing, etc.  To answer your 
question, I find it less necessary to safeguard our assets from our true partner.  
I’ve no fear of them taking advantage of us (BPR-41); 
• The brokers should understand that in the same way we offer things up to them 
that we have invested heavily in, they too should be open and not fear us taking 
advantage of them.  In fact, it should be quite the opposite.  Before they invest in 
something, perhaps we can offer some advice and expertise for them to ensure 
they are investing wisely (RM-8); 
• In this business reputation is everything.  We do not take advantage of our 
brokers.  But I can’t speak for other relationships that the broker may be 
involved in.  But in this industry, generally speaking we by and large have 
reputable players.  I don’t think it’s in anyone’s best interest to endeavour to 
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 gain an edge over a partner by taking advantage of them opportunistically in 
terms of knowledge of their investments (EX-3).  
  
8.3.2 Performance Evaluation 
 
Proposition 12:  A heightened quantity of behavioural uncertainty will 
correspondingly increase the costs of evaluating the performance of the 
relationship partners.  Firms will attempt to mitigate their performance 
evaluation costs through a shift towards vertical integration.   
Matters surrounding behavioural uncertainty tend to have a significant impact on the 
need for performance evaluation techniques, particularly in the independent (broker) 
channel (Weiss and Anderson 1992).  In fact, it impacts the entire transaction cost 
analysis framework including frequency, asset specificity, and environmental 
uncertainty as well.  A technique often incorporated to mitigate issues of performance 
evaluation is to enhance governance mechanisms (e.g. contractual terms, reward and 
penalty systems, etc.).   
 
Due to the decentralized nature of the independent brokerage channel and the need for 
trust and empowerment, issues revolving around performance evaluation tend to arise.  
Many of these issues surface because of a lack of clear objectives or a subsequent 
impairment in communications.  In any event, uncertainty leads to a heightened level of 
performance evaluation of relationship partners along with the related costs. 
 
• Every year the insurance companies ask us for an estimate of how much 
premium we are going to send their way.  We give them our best estimate, but 
then they change their prices or how they do things or whatever, and they get 
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 upset because we didn’t give them what we said we would.  Then they want to 
change the terms of how we do business together going forward.  They’ve got to 
learn to see things from our end (BPU-22); 
• They have expectations of us, fair enough.  But we have expectations of them 
too.  We need their rep to be there when we need him.  If we want to run a 
campaign then timing is an issue.  We’ll try to give advance notice, but more 
often than not they have their own programs their trying to sell to us (BPU-24); 
• A true partner would not only measure our success, and the success of our 
partnership, but also offer their assistance if they see us starting to slip.  Our 
major markets, like ING and Aviva seem to operate this way.  But some of the 
smaller ones just squawk when they don’t get their share and seem to point the 
finger of blame.  I don’t think that’s very productive for the relationship (BPR-
27); 
• Good business is run on good information.  We use performance evaluation 
techniques to assist us and our broker partners in looking for trends, symptoms 
of problems, and so on.  The reports are tools to help and guide us, and not 
primarily used to whip people (RM-10); 
• The reports that we rely on are generally the same for all brokerages across the 
board.  We use the reports not only to monitor their performance, but also to 
give input and feedback to our own business.  These are not meant to be 
punitive, but more of an informational and analytic nature.  Naturally, if a 
particular brokerage is being rehabilitated, we need a quicker frequency of 
reports and likely of a more detailed nature, but again this is to assist them 
versus penalize them (EX-3). 
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 8.3.3 Governance Structures 
 
Proposition 13:  Firms will gravitate towards either a hierarchical, market, or 
hybrid form of governance structure based upon the choice and selection of their 
partners, available monitoring techniques, and the design of incentives.      
As a related topic to outsourcing decisions and its impact on each party’s sense of 
commitment level, respondents were asked to provide their thoughts about governance 
structures.  In particular they were asked about how and if minor shifts in contractual 
obligations, terms, conditions, and responsibilities affected their perceptions about 
potentially hidden motivations of the counter-party.   
 
The industry provides examples of brokers becoming highly-concentrated with a single 
insurer, risking a loss of independence and ostensibly becoming a vertically integrated 
agent instead of a broker.  Moreover, insurers are taking equity ownership positions as 
well as providing significant collateralized loans in favour of brokerages.  The blurring 
of roles in a non-transparent fashion has raised concerns in regulatory circles, as well as 
within the brokerage community as a whole from those choosing to not participate in 
these shifts.  As in other industries, much of the governance structural shifts are 
prompted by an inner need to safeguard assets (Stump and Heide 1996).  The result has 
been the emergence of a widening range of governance mechanisms.   
 
• I’ve seen brokers becoming so concentrated with one company that I don’t know 
how they have the nerve to call themselves brokers.  To me, they’re employees of 
the insurance company (BPU-11); 
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 • There are benefits to concentrating.  We leverage the ING branding, they treat 
us more like partners, we cost share and revenue share more, and we can focus 
our attention on the thing that matters – making money (BPR-37); 
• There are trade-offs to concentration.  We get a better share of the profits but 
we’re obliged to participate in the things they tell us to participate in (BPR-38); 
• I wonder if the brokerages that are owned or partly owned by an insurer ever 
disclose this fact to their clients.  People may question the broker’s 
independence (BPR-44); 
• Although there are a few exceptions, in my experience brokers will concentrate 
and move closer to us because they want to.  They see the benefits that it brings.  
Done correctly with the right people there are benefits to all parties, including 
the customer who receives great advice and service from a more highly trained 
individual (RM-10); 
• Fiddling with governance structures can be tricky.  If undertaken with the 
correct market intelligence, a willingness to embrace change and the benefits 
that can accrue, and the flexibility to adjust when necessary, anyone can 
succeed within one of these hybrid models (EX-2).  
 
8.3.4 Frequency of Transactions 
 
Proposition 14:  Higher frequency levels provide an incentive for firms to 
consider a hierarchical governance structure since it would likely be easier to 
recover costs in this way for larger transactions of a similar type and in a 
similar region.  Otherwise a market structure or hybrid form would be more 
suitable.   
Although there is considerable debate in the academic literature about the 
conclusiveness of transaction frequency upon commitment levels, the respondents 
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 addressed the matter in terms of the insurance distribution context.  It appeared to have 
some relevance for them, but not necessarily in terms of individual transactions, but as a 
percentage of either customers or premium income or both that is directed towards 
particular insurance companies from brokers.   
 
There has been a move in the industry over the past decade referred to as a 
concentration strategy.  This is a deliberate strategy for brokerages to reduce the number 
of insurance companies they represent down to three or four firms, depending upon the 
circumstances.  The idea is to specialize with a smaller number of companies with 
varying appetites for risk in order to cover a fairly broad spectrum while not trying to 
cover the entire market.  It is an efficiency strategy, and the belief is that any losses in 
sales or client needs that cannot be met and served by the reduced line-up will be more 
than offset by improved efficiency, reduced costs, and more sales due to enhanced 
knowledge of the remaining insurance companies that are represented.  The true test of 
the value of the frequency of transactions upon commitment levels must be considered 
in the context of the evolving industry.  A broker may appear to be directing more 
business to a particular insurer, but that may be by default because industry 
consolidation has left them with no choice and it is not due to deliberate concentration.   
 
The frequency of transactions may also be indicative of the length of time the 
relationship has endured.  Both recent frequency and enduring frequency were included 
in the responses of the interview participants as they described this influence on 
commitment.  
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 • We have been doing business with ING for many years.  As long as they don’t 
make a mess of things I’ll stay with them.  We’re comfortable with things as they 
are (BPU-11); 
• ING has been consistent with us over the years.  They deserve some loyalty from 
us (BPU-18); 
• ING seems to be changing into a new company.  They’ll earn my loyalty if they 
don’t go backwards, but the way I see it if they change everything, they’re not 
the same company so I don’t owe them anything (BPU-20); 
• Our brokerage has been sending more and more business towards ING because 
they have been making it easier and easier to do business with them.  My other 
markets are crying for business, but we’ve got to do what’s good for us.  I hope 
ING recognizes this (BPR-41); 
• We have to assess each brokerage’s performance individually.  We have to look 
beyond the volume numbers, and determine what the underlying causes are for 
all situations such as volume increases, decreases, or even if things stay don’t 
change.  A broker may send us more business because they were cancelled by 
another insurance company and they have no choice.  Why were they cancelled?  
Was it bad business?  Also it may sound like a bad news story if they send us 
less, but when we examine it further we may find that they are cherry picking 
and sending us only good quality business because they have take on another 
company to pick up some of the bad.  But all things being equal, people do vote 
with their dollars and they will probably send more our way because they are 
generally more committed to us at that point (RM-5); 
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 • Assessing transaction frequencies and shifting volumes is both an art and a 
science.  At a theoretical level it is an endorsement that someone wishes to do 
business with you, but you must drill below the surface to ascertain why (EX-2). 
 
8.3.5 Asset Specificity 
 
Proposition 15:  Increases in investments in assets that have a high degree of 
specificity are positively correlated with levels of commitment.   
By definition, Williamson (1985) posits that asset specificity addresses the degree of 
transferability of assets that are involved and support a particular transaction.  In the 
context of this research, it is extended to include those assets that support a specific 
relationship or series of ongoing transactions.  These assets referred to in the interviews 
addressed those that represent sunk costs with negligible value beyond the relationship.  
As Williamson (1991) suggests, respondents tended to discuss asset specificity in terms 
of their own context.  These contexts are characterized as specificity of a nature that is: 
1. temporal; 
2. site specific; 
3. human asset specific; 
4. dedicated assets; 
5. physical assets; 
6. brand name capital. 
Interview participants were asked to provide their views within the context of any or all 
of the aforementioned categories of asset specificity.  Similar views were evident, but 
the respondents varied in terms of which category they deemed most relevant from their 
perspective.   
• I’ve learned the hard way to be careful with committing my cash or my staff too 
heavily in favour of a particular product line, company, or whatever.  Now I do 
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 a lot more due diligence up front before throwing money at a project.  That’s not 
to say I don’t look at specializing in a particular line or anything.  I do, but I’m 
more careful that I’m not wasting on a flavour of the month thing (BPU-15); 
• When we dedicate our service people or our producers to a particular insurer, I 
mean getting them extra training or attending courses and like that, we’ve got to 
be sure that that insurance company is going to be around for the long haul, and 
that we’re going to be in it with them for a good while.  Otherwise it’s a waste of 
time and money, neither of which we have a lot of.  We still do it though.  To me, 
when the insurance company comes up with what I see as a good idea or 
product or system or something, and they invite us in, it’s a sign of good faith 
from them that they want to work together with us and other brokers (BPU-17); 
• Me and my partners are always on the look-out for opportunities to make our 
business better, more efficient, more profitable.  If an insurance company has a 
great I.T. system and it makes us better to get hooked up to it, we’ll consider it.  
Even if it means pulling some staff out of the line-up for a while to learn the 
system, or the product, or even if we have to pay some cash to be a part of it.  If 
it makes sense, we’ll do it.  Of course there’s a risk to it if our relationship falls 
apart.  But you got to be careful (BPU-22);   
• It works two ways.  If we get into some kind of arrangement with a company on 
say a system or product commitment or something, we kind of think hard about 
breaking up with that company.  Makes us think twice about some things.  It 
makes us more rational sometimes (BPR-41); 
• I remember the days when we tried to be all things to all people.  I was with a 
different company then and it was in my early days.  The challenge was that 
when we came out with something new, it was offered to all brokers.  Special 
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 brokers didn’t feel special.  There wasn’t the segmentation that we do today.  
Good stuff was wasted on brokers that didn’t want to be that close to us.  Now I 
see the difference.  We do more cost sharing.  We’ll invest in new technologies 
and product development and the brokers step up to be first in line to be a part 
of it.  Well, in truth, it is those special brokers with which we have strong 
relationships that do the stepping up.  This is as it should be (RM-1); 
• We hope it is a definitive sign to the brokers when we make unique investments 
in their business, making them more effective, because as it is said that their 
success is our success.  We invest in training programs for them, marketing 
initiatives, and lots of other things.  I think they value it more if they have to pay 
even a portion of it.  It makes them think twice about discontinuing down the 
path with us in the future.  It makes them more committed to us (RM-2); 
• Without doubt, many of these unique investments present a locking-in challenge, 
because they are sunk costs.  But with challenges come opportunities.  These 
investments should be trumpeted as evidence of commitment to the broker 
community, and in particular to the brokers with which we share these 
opportunities.  As well, it provides us with clear evidence when we see 
investments from the brokers as to who is committing to us, and also evidence of 
that which is important to them.  People tend to vote with their dollars (EX-3). 
 
8.3.6 The Influence of Environmental Uncertainty 
 
Proposition 16:  The two types of environmental uncertainty have opposite 
impacts upon governance structures, i.e. unpredictability encourages companies 
to develop hierarchical structures whereas changeability creates the opposite 
result.   
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 The current state of the insurance landscape in Canada can be characterized as 
displaying considerable environmental uncertainty.  Consolidations continue at a steady 
pace with insurance companies either merging to gain scale or larger companies are 
acquiring smaller firms for various reasons.  Brokerage firms are undertaking similar 
changes, with fewer yet larger brokerages being the result.  This has an impact upon 
industry participants as the players are changing or evolving. 
 
The changing environment can hamper the ability of each party to plan and predict for 
the future.  For example, if a broker was to maintain a stable of insurance companies 
that it represents within the range of five insurers, and subsequently two of those 
companies are merged, the result is a change in the broker’s modus operandi.  Decisions 
have to be made as to whether to replace that company with a new insurer, or maintain a 
reduced stable of insurers that it represents.  If a replacement is made, new product 
training is necessary, along with considerable internal operating changes.  Or existing 
clients will have to be converted to the new or to another insurer.  Occasionally, the 
decision is made that clients will be converted to the new insurer, but the new insurer 
may not have an appetite for the same type of risks that the former company did, thus 
unless the broker has an alternative some clients may be lost as a result. 
 
From the insurance company’s perspective, broker consolidation can result in reduced 
premium income if a brokerage decision is made to remove certain insurers from the 
combined stable of companies that both merged operations had formerly represented.  
This may also represent a shift in power in favour of the brokerage as premium income 
becomes concentrated in the hands of fewer brokers. 
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 • I used to represent six companies.  Now I represent two.  I never made a change 
in my company choices.  These changes were thrown at me because of industry 
consolidation (BPU-1); 
• We are starting to feel less like an independent broker and more like an agent.  I 
was almost down to one company that I represented.  Good thing I saw it 
coming and added a different one a few years ago (BPU-16); 
• I try to get close to companies like ING that look like they are in it for the long 
term.  I don’t want to get shut out of the market (BPU-22); 
• The uncertainty out there is making us cozy up to the big guys.  The smaller ones 
probably won’t be around for long so we’ve got to be in the good books of the 
big ones (BPR-25); 
• Many of the brokers are approaching retirement age and their retirement 
income will come from the sale of their brokerages.  This creates a lot of 
uncertainty for us since many of the operations are selling out to their 
competitors while they try to gain efficiencies.  We win some and we lose some, 
but either way things change (RM-9); 
• There is a rapid rate of change in the industry, and still much more to come.  As 
an insurance leader, people look to us for advice and guidance, yet we too are 
affected by the changes.  Our premium income could be impacted negatively if 
we do not navigate through these waters appropriately.  But on the other hand, 
we have to remain cognizant of the sensitivities of the brokerage community as 
they are impacted by the consolidation of the manufacturers (EX-4). 
 
 
 
233 
 
 8.3.7 The Influence of Behavioural Uncertainty 
 
Proposition 17:  Actual or perceived behavioural uncertainty on the part of a 
dyad counterparty presents challenges with the monitoring and enforcement of 
contractual adherence and performance of exchange partners.   
By its very nature, insurance distribution in the intermediary channel requires 
decentralization and distance between the principal and agent.  This presents challenges 
for effective communication, and places pressure on relationships.  When 
communications deteriorate between the parties, uncertainty about the counter-party’s 
behaviour and intentions tend to manifest.  It becomes difficult, if not impossible to 
predict whether the other party will fulfill their obligations to joint efforts and deliver on 
their responsibilities (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993).  Insurers are concerned that they are 
adequately prepared for production levels in terms of resources, and brokers need to 
ensure that the insurance company is prepared to handle the amount of business that is 
directed towards them.  Respondents tended to discuss behavioural uncertainty from 
their own perspectives only. 
• Sometimes the insurance companies change priorities and want us to participate 
in their different programs, product changes, and so on.  Often times there’s not 
enough explanation as to why, or we hear about it more from the broker 
community rather than from the source.  It can be hard to figure out which 
direction they want to focus on (BPU-3); 
• We’re busy.  They’re busy.  It makes it hard for us to tell them which way we’re 
going or for them to tell us where they’re going.  It leaves us both guessing and 
leads to hard feelings.  We’ve got to talk more or we are going to always be 
suspicious and not trust each other (BPR-37); 
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 • Some brokers are fiercely independent and wear this independence as a badge 
of honour.  Because of this they don’t want to share their business plans with us, 
and it makes it hard for us to gauge production levels and do our own planning.  
Although that’s really a minority of brokers, it’s interesting to note that usually 
these are the same folks that say we’re under-staffed when things get busy.  I 
guess they think we’re mind-readers (RM-2); 
• Effective communication is essential to our mutual success.  We each have to get 
better at keeping the other informed of our intentions, our plans and strategies, 
and our directions.  We have to operate as one, and the goal must be to reduce 
or eliminate uncertainty in order to move forward (EX-6). 
 
8.3.8 Logistics and Outsourcing Decisions 
 
Proposition 18:  It is necessary to balance both the quantifiable (transaction 
costs, revenues, expenses, etc.) and qualifiable (strategy, stability, etc.) 
considerations in order to determine whether to outsource or to gauge its 
effectiveness. 
Insurance distribution systems are similar to other supply chain management networks 
particularly when considered in the context of the principal/agent (broker) system.  The 
advancements in those supply chains have direct application to the insurance arena 
(Calza and Passaro 1997; Hobbs 1996).  Connections are made via electronic data 
exchanges which tend to create communities, albeit at a cost.  Due to the rapid changes 
in the information technology field, respondents found that they had ample experiences 
to draw upon during their interviews.  Moreover, they tended to display a heightened 
level of passion and sensitivity when the topic of outsourcing and differing distribution 
channels was presented for discussion.  As ING operates in both the direct channel via 
Belair Direct and the intermediary channel via ING Insurance, channel conflict arises as 
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 some brokers feel that they are in competition with their principal (ING).  Brokers with 
robust segmentation programs on the other hand tend to understand that customers that 
gravitate towards a direct writer tend to be more mobile and transient, and are not 
typically the type of customer segment that the brokerage community would wish to 
seek. 
• On the one hand ING wants us to hook up to their systems, spend time and 
money on their stuff, which is all well and good.  But on the other hand they are 
taking our customers away with Belair, advertising on the radio, dealing direct 
with the public.  That’s our job.  It makes a lot of us suspicious, but I don’t think 
ING will change (BPU-19); 
• ING is making it easier and simpler to do business with them with their I.T. 
systems, websites, in-house training programs, and whatever else.  Outsourcing 
their distribution to the broker community brings the best talent to the right 
place.  They do what they do best, like underwriting and claims, and we manage 
the customer relationships.  It doesn’t bother me one bit about Belair.  I don’t 
want customers that don’t want to develop a relationship with a local 
professional.  If the customer doesn’t recognize the value we bring, we don’t 
need him (BPU-22); 
• Gone are the days of pencil and paper.  We’re in the age of electronic data 
flying back and forth in an instant.  I have to be comfortable that I’m in a rock-
solid relationship with an insurer that recognizes this too, because I’m betting 
my book on them.  Neither of us can fall behind the times logistically.  And I 
have to be lean and mean and nimble too.  They’re outsourcing some of their 
distribution to me and I’ve got to deliver (BPR-26); 
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 • Investing in one company’s systems takes a lot of thought.  First, you’ve got to 
be sure you are in it for the long haul with that company, because if everything 
falls apart that money is wasted.  As well you’ve got to think about how many 
companies you can do this with.  Money is scarce.  I’ve invested heavily in ING 
because they’re my main market.  With each of the lesser markets I’ve got I tend 
to invest less.  I hope this doesn’t backfire on me, you know, getting too many 
eggs into one basket because these days we tend to represent fewer companies, 
and tend to favour some more than others (BPR-41); 
• The whole issue of Belair pops up every now and then, but that’s OK.  It’s 
important for us to deal with brokers’ concerns head-on.  Most of them are fine 
with it, and understand that ING is committed to dealing with customers in the 
channel of the customer’s choice.  It is the customer that in the end makes the 
purchase decision.  The brokers should have nothing to fear because we are 
highly committed to their channel as well.  We will continue to outsource that 
part of the distribution chain to them due to the value they bring (RM-6);   
• I’ve noticed a willingness on the part of brokers to be accepting of new 
technologies and techniques that we bring to them.  It doesn’t come cheap for 
them, but it does show how committed they are to both their business and to us 
when they pony-up the cash (RM-10); 
• Concerns over the Belair Direct issue is often merely a symptom of a weakness 
in our communication link with a broker.  Once identified, we must get to the 
root of the problem, and uncover precisely what the underlying issues are.  
Belair is not going away and it will not evaporate.  Consumers choosing Belair 
will choose a Belair-like company.  But a significant portion of the marketplace 
enjoys relationships with their broker, and recognizes and appreciates the value 
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 that the broker provides.  Neither will this channel disappear.  We will continue 
to outsource distribution through the broker channel and to display our 
commitment to them we will continue to invest in research and development to 
improve our collective efficiencies (EX-1).               
 
 
8.3.9 Levels of Investment 
 
Proposition 19:  The nature and level of transaction-specific investments bears 
a positive relationship with levels of commitment.       
ING Canada’s decision to participate in the principal/broker insurance distribution 
channel is not unlike any manufacturer’s decision to outsource a component of its 
operations.  Unless benefits accrue to all levels of the distribution chain, the principal 
may be better off reclaiming those outsourced aspects and manage the distribution 
internally. 
 
In ING Canada’s case, value has long been evident for a particular market segment as it 
pertains to the intermediary channel.  The vast majority of consumers within the 
Canadian insurance marketplace gravitate towards insurance brokers versus direct 
writers of insurance, as they perceive brokers will provide advice and serve as their 
advocate in the event of problems or claims.  With this recognized and understood by 
the insurers and brokers, each tends to invest in those relationships in different ways and 
at different levels.  The reasons expressed by the respondents are varied, but themes are 
evident. 
 
Some respondents mentioned the matter of proximity, and how close the two parties 
physically existed to one another.  Some indicated that those who were closer at hand 
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 thus facilitating an increased amount of face-to-face visits tended to be the recipient of 
an increased measure of investment in both time and money. 
• We have a local office of an insurance company just down the street.  We meet 
regularly with them because they’re nearby and we get to hear about some of 
the new initiatives they’ve got going.  Probably because we can spend more time 
with them that we get involved in more of their stuff than some of the others.  
That particular company may not be the best of the bunch, but it’s easier for us 
to do business with them and that helps everyone, even our customers (BPR-42); 
• There are some company reps that I never see.  I guess they figure that either 
we’re too far away, or we‘re not important enough for them to visit.  Maybe it’s 
a bit of both (BPR-46); 
• For my own part, I would like to treat all my brokers equally, give them equal 
time and so on.  But it’s hard to compete with a guy who is in their face much 
more than me because his office is in their town.  The relationships and the 
related investments improve because of the closer connections (RM-10); 
• Although distance can act as an impediment to relationships, it shouldn’t 
eliminate them altogether.  We must examine different ways to overcome 
distances, and to allocate our resources in time and money to those 
relationships based upon their own merit (EX-8). 
 
8.3.10 Adaptation to External Factors 
 
Proposition 20:  If external (market) costs including enforcement, bargaining 
and information costs are high, firms gravitate toward undertaking activities 
internally.  Alternatively the firms undertake these activities externally when 
those costs are comparatively lower.  
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 The interview participants were requested to expand on the notion of an ever-evolving 
industry, and address this topic in terms of either a threat (or opportunity) of the 
principal (the insurer) choosing to reduce its transaction costs by vertically integrating 
rather than utilizing brokers in the distribution channel (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  
They responded in the context of both environmental uncertainty and also simply as a 
control and cost reduction matter.  Clearly the ultimate choice in doing so vests with the 
insurer, but there are implications for both parties over time if the decision is taken to 
vertically integrate. 
 
In addition, the respondents were also asked to consider other changes within the 
external environment that necessitated changes both for them and for their partners and 
other business relationships.  Such matters included the current consolidation of each 
the insurance companies and brokerages, as well as technological advancements. 
• Sometimes I wonder where this industry is headed.  I see a push towards 
concentration, insurers investing in or taking ownership positions in brokerages, 
full ownership of brokerages, insurance companies owning blocks of brokerages 
like Equisure or Canada Brokerlink, and a shrinking number of brokerages in 
the market.  I start to wonder about the consumers’ alternatives, and how many 
are truly independent (BPU-2); 
• It would be the kiss of death for an insurance company to switch channels and 
move into the direct world.  If they did, they wouldn’t be welcomed back later by 
the broker community (BPR-28); 
• I don’t see a problem with everything that’s going on out there.  We’ve got to 
embrace change if it makes things better.  There are some dinosaurs out there 
that can’t see that the market is dictating the changes.  We don’t need as many 
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 brokerages around because consumers are finding better ways to access them, 
like the phone, fax and internet.  Years ago people dealt more face to face.  Not 
any more.  Insurance companies are consolidating because they’re looking for 
economies of scale.  In the end how many companies do we need, especially 
when they are almost doing the same thing? (BPR-41);   
• The forward-looking brokers appear to be onside with the changes that are 
happening.  They also count on us and we count on them to share things that we 
see out there, like new methods and new technologies that will make us all more 
effective.  This is a dynamic industry, and we all have to learn to adapt to the 
changes.  However, we don’t need change for the sake of change.  We’ve got to 
challenge new ideas and implement the good ones if they benefit everyone (RM-
5); 
• No one knows what tomorrow will bring, but change is a good measure of all of 
the players.  How we react and adapt to the external environment says 
something about each of us.  Consolidation will eventually cease when it finds 
its appropriate level.  Technological change will do the same.  We strive to be a 
leader in the evolution, and our greatest allies, well, they don’t follow us blindly, 
but they do have the fortitude to accept and adjust to the world around us (EX-
8).   
8.4 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the findings of the three case study interviews.  In each case, 
representative quotes were provided in order to illustrate the various perceptions of each 
of the groups and the participants.  Guided by “The Commitment Wheel”, the following 
chapter will provide an analysis of these findings and address the research proposition. 
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 9 Discussion 
 
Recalling that the primary research proposition of this thesis is: 
Does Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explain the varying degrees of 
calculative commitment levels in relationships between insurers and brokers in 
the Canadian property and casualty insurance sector? 
the research propositions developed earlier will be examined against the backdrop of the 
“Commitment Wheel” while using the “tool” of transaction cost economics to 
demonstrate its linkage and impact upon calculative commitment.  The key elements of 
the TCE tool include asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency.  To demonstrate the 
linkage, the following research objectives or sub-research questions identified from the 
literature review will guide the research: 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s asset specificity factor in commitment. 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s uncertainty factor in commitment. 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s frequency factor in commitment.  
 Are there other factors that impact or influence transaction costs and/or 
commitment? 
As noted, this research examined these questions and issues from the perspective of 
both insurers and brokers through exploratory case studies.    
 
The existing literature contains a knowledge gap which, if identified, would provide a 
stronger link, and could lead to refinements of transaction cost economics and a deeper 
understanding of the issues underlying commitment levels.  This chapter will begin by 
exploring the contribution to understanding offered through exploration of the 
literature’s sub-topics and development of the propositions.  This will be complemented 
by an examination of emergent findings from the research.  The chapter’s structure is: 
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 • Commitment – Constructs and Beliefs (Blending TCE Theory) 
• Commitment – Enablers and Disablers 
• Commitment – Affective and Calculative 
• The “Tools” of Transaction Costs Which Impact Commitment 
a. Asset Specificity (Idiosyncratic Investments) & Transaction Frequency 
b. Uncertainty (Behavioural and Environmental) 
• Summarizing Transaction Cost Economics’ Contribution to Commitment 
• Additional analysis of research interviews 
• Summary 
 
This chapter continues to use italics to indicate quotes and except where stated 
otherwise this material draws upon similar conclusions reached independently in the 
case studies. 
 
9.1 Commitment – Constructs and Beliefs (Blending TCE 
Theory) 
 
Recalling from Burgess and Turner (2000) that commitment can be a catalyst for 
change, it is also evident that a lack of commitment can impair a relationship’s ability to 
thrive.  However, measuring this phenomenon is highly subjective.  Transaction cost 
economics provides a structured approach and framework as a tool in assessing the 
dynamics of relationships in terms of commitment.  Guided by the “Commitment 
Wheel”, the evidence in this study suggests that transaction cost theory does assist in 
understanding commitment in insurer-broker dyads.  Thus this section of the discussion 
will examine this study’s data while focusing upon the foundations and beliefs that 
determine commitment levels.  In addition, it will be complemented by an examination 
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 of the relevant elements of transaction cost theory that aid in characterizing and 
explaining the notion of commitment.    
 
Participants on both sides and at all levels of the dyads agreed with the inherent value of 
strong commitment to the relationships whether on their own part or that of the counter-
party.  Although that may appear to be a self-evident truth, most respondents relayed 
examples of broken relationships where the principal cause of the breakdown was either 
a perceived or real lack of commitment.  As per Proposition 1, the responses suggested 
that individuals are influenced by their personal definition of commitment and also how 
they perceive their counterparty appears to embrace it.     
 
The TCE tool of “uncertainty” is helpful in assessing counterparty commitment when 
examining contracts.  The “Commitment Wheel” depicts a close relationship between 
uncertainty and matters of fairness, dependence, etc.  Uncertainty can be mitigated 
when the parties acknowledge in writing their mutual obligations.  The discussion 
surrounding agreements, contracts, and exchanges of pledges provided insights into the 
recognized value of the documents as being important but not the crux of the 
relationship.  The parties tended to view these as frameworks for the working 
relationships on a go-forward basis.  Most did not perceive the contracts as either an 
enabler or disabler towards their future journey together.  They did respect the 
documents as a highly-effective and balanced acknowledgement of what is expected of 
each side during the term of the agreement, but little more than that.  The majority felt 
that exchanging pledges simply served as a mechanism to resolve disputes in advance, 
particularly as it related to sales volumes and compensation levels.  None suggested a 
sense of being increasingly bound or perceived the counter-party to be more bound 
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 because of the temporal nature of agreements.  However, each participant did indicate 
the necessity of contracts as a reference document and also due to the fact that parties 
within firms tend to change and these can serve as a notice to future players as to that 
which was previously agreed.  As suggested in Proposition 3, calculative commitment 
results from deliberate evaluation on a cognitive level of the need for the relationship, 
and agreements provide value by bringing clarity to the relationship as it relates to 
duties, obligations and responsibilities.    
 
Communication between the parties varies indirectly with transaction cost theory’s 
element of behavioural uncertainty.  Although respondents discussed the relevance of 
communication in relationships with varying degrees of importance, they each were 
inclined to suggest that it was the effectiveness and frequency of communication that 
would make it more enhancing.  This does point to the fact of how busy people actually 
are, and the delicate balance of wanting to be in-touch, yet not having their time wasted.  
Each valued the ability to have an open enough relationship with their counter-party 
such that they can immediately contact them by the most suitable means available when 
a matter is urgent.  Moreover, they valued an appropriate flow of two-way information 
that would serve to enhance their abilities to obtain their mutual objectives.  As was 
posited in Proposition 5, this was the repeated theme and it was continuously indicated 
that these would improve commitment levels on both sides.  Otherwise, the 
communication was perceived as simply being clutter and noise and may result in the 
opposite to the intended effect. 
 
Also within the realm of TCE’s classification of behavioural uncertainty and in response 
to the topic of reputation for fairness and the management of conflicts, the participants 
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 were requested to provide answers in terms of both how they wished to be perceived 
and how they viewed their counter-party.  Overall, there was consensus on the 
importance of preserving their own reputations and upon the assessment of others by 
their reputation, thus leading to reduced levels of uncertainty on all sides.  There was 
consistency in the interviews regarding the need to resolve disputes amicably and as 
rapidly as possible, all the while maintaining confidentiality.  There were several 
indications of the doubt that can result because of the actions of the counter-party even 
when their dealings with another party lands in the public domain.  Each respondent 
valued their reputation for fairness as one of their most sensitive possessions, and 
prescribed early intervention if this is unfairly compromised in their view.  They 
concurred with Proposition 6 that the aforementioned topic has a direct influence on 
levels of commitment by each side and that a mature approach to disputes and issues is 
in order, thus leading to a reduction in uncertainty in the relationship. 
 
Due to the dynamics of the insurance distribution channel, the allocation of both 
financial (e.g. investments) and non-financial (e.g. time, effort, etc.) resources tend to 
move with fluidity across the different aspects of the business.  Commitment is tested in 
the calculative form when resources are allocated, and in particular those that are 
described in the transaction cost framework as idiosyncratic investments.  This includes 
resources within the operations of both the principals and the agents.  Respondents were 
attuned to this, and indicated that the impact of resource allocation and the 
corresponding levels of investment is important for several reasons.  Naturally, each felt 
that they apportioned their limited resources where it would yield the most effective 
result.  In the majority of cases this would involve the partner to whom they are most 
committed and deemed worthy of investing in.  But beyond this at a more subtle level, 
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 they suggested that there is a measure of symbolism with respect to their resource 
allocation.  In a sense it is a gesture of goodwill that they wish to be acknowledged by 
the other party.  Moreover, this symbolic gesture works the other way.  Specifically they 
feel secure in the knowledge that their partner is investing in their mutual relationship 
too.  Thus, their responses support Proposition 4 suggesting that the manner in which 
resources are allocated provide an indication as to a party’s level of calculative 
commitment.   
 
The topic of outsourcing tended to be somewhat emotional for some brokers, 
particularly as it was intentionally placed in the context of ING Insurance (intermediary 
channel) versus ING Canada’s direct-to-customer division referred to as Belair Direct.  
Some brokers suggested that ING Canada was in a sense competing with the broker 
community by reaching out directly and transacting with consumers.  Although most 
did understand the fact that if ING Canada did not own this segment of the market, 
another direct-writer certainly would.  In applying the TCE framework to the subject, a 
measure of uncertainty is evident for the brokers.  The “Commitment Wheel” suggests a 
linkage between outsourcing and uncertainty.  Behavioural uncertainty is apparent  on 
the part of the principal because of the increasing attention it gives to the direct channel.  
This is also resulting in environmental uncertainty due to the changing landscape of the 
distribution system.  Ultimately, brokers are questioning the commitment of the 
principals to the existing system.  Some overtones in the discussions remarked on the 
notion that the expertise and local knowledge rests within the brokerage community, 
and this aspect of service delivery should be outsourced to them in the best interest of 
the clients.  Their concern revolves around the possibility of ING Canada (or any 
principal for that matter) restructuring the channel and delivery and eliminating the need 
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 for a broker in the chain.  There appears a real impact and concern on commitment 
levels because of the duality of ING Canada’s role in this regard.  Whereas ING 
Canada’s relationship managers and executives responded with a keen awareness of this 
topic, they felt that this was an issue that would not be going away and required 
sensitivity and vigilance.  Proposition 18 suggests that the evaluation of transaction 
costs is an integral ingredient in the decision process as to whether to outsource or not, 
and the final decision will impact commitment levels of relationship partners.  But this 
particular broker segment is generally rather close to ING and does not operate at a 
distance as some players may, and the latter segment would likely demonstrate a 
reduced commitment level because of Belair Direct.      
 
Related to the outsourcing issue is the matter of governance structures.  The 
“Commitment Wheel” depicts issues involving governance structures lying adjacent to 
the TCE ‘tool’ of asset specifity.  This is strongly linked to the calculative form of 
commitment.  ING Canada has been an active player in the development of creative 
governance structures in order to capture market opportunities.  The Canadian 
marketplace has been witness to a consolidation on the part of both insurance 
companies and brokers for a variety of reasons.  This has been driven in part because of 
the customer’s ability to purchase insurance by telephone, fax, over the internet, etc. 
thus reducing the need for face-to-face encounters and the need to have a broker on 
every street corner.  In addition, the endless pursuit of cost efficiencies and economies 
of scale are relevant for both brokers and insurers alike and this has added fuel to the 
consolidation fire.  When examined through the lens of transaction cost theory, this 
supports Proposition 13 which states that firms on both sides will gravitate towards a 
hierarchical, market, or hybrid form of governance structure based upon the choice and 
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 selection of their partners, available monitoring techniques, and the design of incentives 
(i.e. aspects of calculative commitment).  Increasing regulatory and compliance 
requirements and reporting have also added greater burdens on both parties and caused 
them to seek relief in the form of mergers and acquisitions.   
 
Although the reasons for the changing market landscape are many and varied, the 
implications have a direct bearing on commitment levels.  Brokers have expressed 
concern because of the possibility of losing an insurer relationship because of that 
company being purchased by another insurer to which the broker does not have a 
contract or had a previously poor experience.  The broker may not meet the criteria of 
the new company.  This makes the broker rather vulnerable and uncertain about their 
future.  Brokers have also engaged in the process of concentration whereby they reduce 
the number of insurance companies they represent in order to gain efficiencies, reduce 
their transaction costs, and gain favour with the remaining insurers they have selected. 
 
The insurance company respondents have also expressed their concern for this 
evolution.  On the one hand, they did express a need to be empathetic to the brokers’ 
position while on the other hand they discussed their own needs in this regard in order 
to gain a competitive advantage.  Major players like ING Canada have been examining 
ways to gain a stronger foothold in the downstream distribution chain.  To this end they 
have been purchasing brokerage operations, both in whole and in part, and participating 
in lending activity to brokers to help them facilitate the acquisition of other brokerages.  
Their belief is that because of their size they can achieve economies of scale in the 
distribution stream and further reduce transaction costs in the intermediary channel.   
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 The respondents suggested that some industry participants look upon all of these 
changes with suspicion, particularly those that are highly resistant to change.  The belief 
in those cases is that insurers and brokers should remain guarded and at a distance from 
one another.  They believe that there should be little, if any sharing of information and 
the brokers should protect themselves by representing a large number of companies.  
The respondents in the study, by-and-large disagree with these sentiments as they feel 
that the changes mentioned are positive and demonstrate stronger commitment between 
those that each elect to partner with.   
 
For those interviewees that have moved further along the concentration path thus 
tightening their mutual relationship, there are suggestions that a greater sense of 
openness and sharing has emerged.  Supporting Proposition 8, they each indicated that 
there is a greater sense of and need for trust as there is a greater reliance on the counter-
party to fulfill their obligations and responsibilities to the relationship.  In addition, 
there is a heightened level of the TCE framework’s idiosyncratic investments that are 
made that pertain to the unique relationship.  Less safeguarding of assets is deemed 
necessary, and a stronger partnership can evolve.  Notwithstanding this, there does 
remain a natural set of risks that come with this arrangement.  Pursuant to Proposition 
11, the opposite is also true of the aforementioned circumstances when a concentration 
as a strategy is deliberately rejected, most notably that there is generally more 
safeguarding of assets and less openness in their communication.  As suggested by the 
TCE tool of uncertainty, commitment is tenuous in these cases.  
 
During the interviews, participants were requested to consider the impact of forces that 
exist outside of their firms yet within the industry that may have either an influence or 
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 impact upon their future.  Whereas the broker group tended in large part to gravitate 
towards addressing the matter in terms of the insurance company and its ability to 
vertically integrate operations while eliminating the need for brokers in the distribution 
channel.  The ING Canada relationship managers responded in a similar fashion, 
suggesting the evolution was part of a natural progression but did not paint a doom and 
gloom picture.  Their feeling was that brokers too must adapt to the external forces that 
surround them (as many are doing) in this uncertain environment and that there does not 
have to be a complete elimination of the broker channel.  The customer will ultimately 
determine the value that the broker delivers and the marketplace must be prepared to 
meet those demands.   
 
It appears from the responses that the more progressive broker principals and the 
relationship managers of ING Canada agreed that changes are inevitable, but how the 
change is adapted to and managed is what will drive success for an organization.  
Adaptation to each of the external factors is also judged by competitors, partners, and 
customers alike.  The changes can be viewed as either positive or negative depending 
upon one’s perspective, but the way in which these are managed can influence 
commitment levels, as each party is observing the choices made by the counter-party.  
Decisions made regarding future directions may send signals to important contacts and 
key relationships thus having an affect on their perceptions about the other’s intentions 
and both their affective and calculative commitment to the counterparty. 
 
The matter of performance evaluation was recognized by respondents as being an 
important gauge of commitment for several reasons.  Naturally, measuring the counter-
party’s performance against predetermined targets is essential to the management of any 
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 business.  This facilitates planning, budgeting, and resource allocation, etc.  It also aids 
in troubleshooting problems and preventing serious issues before they arise.  It can 
allow for early intervention even in periods where performance targets are being 
exceeded and extra resources are necessary to meet the demand.  Performance 
evaluation techniques do not need to have a negative connotation as this can lead to an 
increase in uncertainty, thus as per Proposition 12 this can result in a rise in transaction 
costs through a sense for a heightened need for evaluating the counterparty.    
 
As previously noted the decentralized nature of this distribution channel gives rise to the 
need for empowerment and trust.  But performance evaluation is required to ensure 
compliance with the responsibilities and obligations set forth in agreements and pledges.  
Issues may arise in the evaluation of performance, but participants concur that this is 
often the result of poor communication or the lack of clear objectives. 
 
Respondents indicated a greater sense of commitment on both parts when matters of 
performance evaluation are taken seriously and in a constructive light.  They suggested 
that there needs to be a willingness to work together in order to achieve joint success.  
There is a requirement for them to communicate openly, frankly and with candour.  If 
performance has been suffering, the evaluation is not the time for blame or retreat.  
They agree that this becomes the opportunity to consider root causes and then seek 
options for remedial action.  The TCE framework tool suggests an increase in 
transaction frequency and performance is a strong indication of commitment to the dyad 
partner. Ultimately, this appears to have a significant influence on commitment levels 
on both sides because of the perception of the counter-party’s actions. 
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 9.2 Commitment – Enablers and Disablers 
 
Whereas the foregoing section of the discussion utilized the “Commitment Wheel” to 
apply the foundations of commitment and transaction cost theory to the Canadian 
insurer-broker relationship, this section will now expand the topic further by applying 
this study’s data in examining specific aspects of commitment that are highly relevant to 
this research.  These particular enablers and disablers of commitment include:  (a) the 
perception of asymmetry within the relationship; (b) opportunism; (c) trust and; (d) 
dependence.  Although each will be examined individually, there will be some overlap 
due to their inter-relationships. 
 
The matter of asymmetry in this channel is important because of the dynamics of the 
constant shifting of power.  It is necessary to recognize that a company such as ING 
Canada is huge when compared to a typical insurance brokerage operation.  A large 
insurance company would typically have considerable self-contained expertise in all 
facets of business operations, including marketing, legal, accounting, etc.  By 
comparison, a brokerage operation would normally contain limited resources and 
expertise would be limited to matters surrounding insurance.  Naturally, there are 
benefits and drawbacks to the issue of size of operations.  Larger operations tend to 
have greater resources and power, yet smaller firms can be more nimble and quicker to 
react.  Decision-making and other processes are less bureaucratic in smaller firms. 
 
However, the difference in size and magnitude of the two types of organization appears 
to lead to misperceptions about both the intentions and level of commitment of the dyad 
partner.  In addition, Proposition 10 indicates that the concept of asymmetry can be 
viewed simply as a mindset, as the size is rather situational and this can have an affect 
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 on commitment levels.  For example, each requires the other in order to thrive and each 
can switch or replace the other if the relationship deteriorates.  So when size is 
considered, a broker can operate while representing one insurance company but an 
insurance company cannot survive with only one broker in its distribution chain.  In the 
case of ING Canada over two thousand brokers are involved in the Province of Ontario 
alone.  Most brokers maintain membership in an industry association entitled the 
Insurance Brokers Association, a group which safeguards the interests of its members.  
In addition, brokers also form councils that ensure their interests are considered and this 
has can result in reducing their uncertainty about the channel. 
 
Due to the contexts mentioned above, the asymmetry and the power therein will shift 
from side to side.  Respondents suggested that the relationship is a game of give-and-
take, and they subconsciously observe the input of the counter-party to the relationship 
as a measure of commitment.  This not only includes resource allocation, but they also 
gauge how they feel they are treated when the power shifts.  As mentioned, 
misperceptions and miscalculations can lead to disagreements, ill feelings and poor 
communication, often resulting in a move from dysfunction to total breakdown. 
 
Closely linked to each of the key enablers and disablers of commitment is the issue of 
opportunism.  This too is explained by the use of the transaction cost tool of uncertainty.  
Respondents understood that opportunistic behaviour can affect the psychological 
aspects of their relationships and ultimately upon both real and perceived levels of 
affective commitment.  It was suggested that if one side perceives that they are in an 
inferior position to the other, the counter-party could act opportunistically against them 
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 and take advantage unfairly.  And the reverse is also true.  The choices made by each 
side becomes a demonstration as to how committed each is to the relationship.   
 
In many cases, participants indicated that opportunistic behaviour has developed as a 
result of the asymmetry that exists and how it is managed.  If one party has a reputation 
for dealing unfairly the result is often that their counter-party is the recipient of 
opportunistic behaviour.  Depending upon the nature of the ongoing relationship, 
vigilance may be necessary in order to monitor the activities and behaviour of the 
counter-party.   
 
In the context of insurer-broker relationships, opportunism could result in different 
ways.  For example, the TCE tool of frequency suggests brokers acting opportunistically 
might purposely direct potential insurance policies toward a different insurer, thus 
altering premium flow in favour of another relationship.  Even threatening to do so can 
weaken the relationship as partners can become suspicious of the motivations of the 
other side.  On the other hand, insurance companies acting opportunistically might with-
hold services and support to a particular brokerage, or they may alter commission 
structures and adjust co-operative marketing resources and efforts in an attempt to 
disenfranchise the broker.   
 
Regardless of how it is undertaken, opportunistic behaviour is viewed by both sides of 
the relationship (as evidenced by the respondents) as despicable conduct.  It raises 
suspicions and forces energy to be expended in a wasteful way.  Thus, as posited via 
Proposition 7, this jeopardizes the health of relationships and the result can be a 
reduction in commitment levels. 
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The notion of trust serves as both an enabler and disabler of relationships in the property 
and casualty insurance distribution networks.  Respondents were clear that trust is an 
essential ingredient in the health of a good working relationship and without it 
deterioration is likely.  Being intangible, trust is hard to gauge but it must be present.  
Often a breakdown in trust is more noticeable than when trust is present, thus the 
“Commitment Wheel” depicts trust and other emotional matters adjacent to behavioural 
uncertainty due to their relatedness.   
 
The concept of trust appears tightly linked with other aspects of commitment and 
transaction cost theory.  For example, breakdowns in trust may emerge from a 
communications dysfunction, a contractual dispute, perceived opportunism, unfair 
resource allocation, etc.  The outcome could affect one’s reputation for fairness, conflict 
history and lead to a reduction in the levels of investment in the relationship.  
Ultimately, as suggested in Proposition 8, commitment levels suffer the risk of injury.    
 
Respondents were eager and passionate to discuss the topic of trust.  Whereas they did 
express confidence in the mutual trust levels they enjoyed within the ING Canada 
distribution chain, they each recited both good and bad examples from other 
relationships they either experienced or heard about.  In any event, each suggested that 
the nature of insurance distribution, i.e. de-centralized and requiring different skill sets 
requires absolute trust in the other party.  Without trust, considerable additional 
investment and resource allocation would have to be dedicated towards monitoring the 
counter-party.  This was felt to be a waste of capital and energy. 
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 Also closely linked to matters of commitment and transaction cost theory is the area of 
dependence.  It also can serve as an enabler to build commitment and alternatively that 
which can destroy it.  An amount of dependence will manifest is situations where there 
is asymmetry between two sides in a dyad.  One firm’s dependence on the counter-party 
is determined because of their need to achieve their objectives.  Naturally, this need 
varies proportionately with how asymmetrical the relationship is.   
 
Dependence can lead to weakness and danger depending upon the fairness and actions 
of the dominant party.  Risks can include opportunistic and exploitative behaviour by 
the stronger of the parties.  Commitment can be observed by the actions of each side 
when dependence appears to emerge.  Conduct may adjust as power shifts in favour of 
the dominant partner.  Respondents expressed their views in this regard because of the 
perceived asymmetry in the relationships, and both sides were cognizant of the issue.   
 
Dependence could emerge on the part of the insurer if a particular market is under-
penetrated by them.  As noted in transaction cost theory, the tool of frequency suggests 
that both the insurer and the key broker within that community will sense the heightened 
need for that broker to re-allocate more premium in favour of that insurer.  Perhaps a 
more appropriate method to remedy this would be to appoint additional brokers within 
that community in order to not weaken the insurer’s position.  Alternatively, if a small 
brokerage operation becomes highly concentrated with one insurance company, yet the 
premium income allocated towards this insurer is small when benchmarked against rival 
brokers.  This particular broker becomes vulnerable as they need the insurer to maintain 
a contract with them in order to stay in business.  It may have been more appropriate for 
them to hedge their bets and entertain representing a second insurer.  This would have to 
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 be weighed against the reduction in volume to the existing insurer.  As indicated in 
Proposition 9, dependence bears a positive relationship with calculative commitment. 
 
In the end, the behaviour of each party when this type of dependence occurs will send a 
signal as to how committed they are to the success and sustainability of the relationship.  
The negative amending of contractual terms and/or exploitation during these instances 
will give notice that the dominant party is simply taking advantage of the dominant 
party and is not truly committed to their mutual longer-term success.     
 
9.3 Commitment – Affective and Calculative 
 
Whereas the current literature on the topic sub-divides commitment into two distinct 
forms as being either affective or calculative, so too does this study examine the 
phenomenon of these sub-sets from the perspectives of both insurers and brokers.  To 
revisit the definitions, the affective form is evident in cases where an individual wishes 
to forge a linkage with another because of common values or some likeness or affinity.  
The matter of identifying with the other party is regarded as an emotional attachment to 
the relationship.  Conversely, calculative commitment results from the deliberate 
evaluation and assessment of the value and the need for the relationship.  The process of 
deliberation typically involves a weighing of the pros and cons, investments, costs, 
inputs and outputs (Morgan and Hunt 1994).  Calculative commitment takes into 
account transaction costs involved in the dyad (Williamson 1985) and considers 
whether alternatives should be sought.  This is particularly relevant to matters involving 
the transaction cost tool of idiosyncratic investments. 
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 Respondents unanimously agreed that in this distribution format both forms of 
commitment are necessary and evident.  Participants were probed as to their own beliefs 
about a dominant form, i.e. either affective or calculative.  The overwhelming response 
was that this is a moving target and is somewhat contextual.  The dynamics of the 
industry keep altering the circumstances that each party may find itself in and as the 
situation changes, so too does the players and the playing field. 
 
Compensation structures within property and casualty insurance distribution are, for the 
most part rather standardized.  As can be seen within the sample broker contract in the 
Appendix, higher volumes of production can earn a broker an increased percentage 
payout on their business, either retroactively or incrementally.  This is not unique and is 
a common and natural incentive in sales distribution networks.  But calculative 
commitment is present and emerges from other reward mechanisms that are made 
available.  Among these other rewards and benefits are idiosyncratic investments in 
training programs, subsidized marketing efforts and partnership arrangements.  
Brokerage respondents named these items when contemplating calculative commitment.  
Company respondents leaned more in favour of geographic coverage, time 
expenditures, etc. when considered from their perspective.  The overall tone of the 
discussions in all three case studies supports Proposition 2, specifically that when 
considering the two forms of commitment, calculative commitment results from 
deliberate evaluation on a cognitive level of the need for the relationship.  It can be 
explained and measured through the use of the “tools” of transaction cost economics (as 
will be explored further in the following section). 
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 When observing commitment from the perspective of the affective category, 
respondents appeared more reflective.  Most could not ascribe a reason why they felt 
comfortable in dealing and partnering with a particular person or firm, but indicated that 
having a good feeling was important to them.  Matters of trust arose, along with a sense 
of good-will and strong two-way communications.  Good products, excellence in 
distribution, and suitable compensation aside, respondents indicated that a demonstrated 
willingness on everyone’s part is necessary to ensure the success of the dyad.  For either 
side to be committed to the relationship, they had to feel comfortable that they could 
enjoy working with the other party, and vice-versa. 
   
9.4 The “Tools” of Transaction Costs Which Impact 
Commitment 
 
As was mentioned earlier, there are specific aspects or tools of transaction cost 
economics which have explanatory power for commitment.  Specifically, asset 
specificity and frequency reach deep into the topic of calculative commitment while 
components of environmental and behavioural uncertainty also lend something to the 
discussion.  Although much of the uncertainty category is biased in favour of affective 
commitment, it does provide reasons for motivations for changes in governance 
structures.  Each of these tools of transaction cost economics will now be explored 
further. 
 
9.4.1 The TCE “Tools” of Asset Specificity and Frequency 
 
Factors involving both asset specificity and the frequency of transactions have a 
heightened relevance in terms of establishing commitment levels between insurance 
companies and brokers.  It is apparent in this study that there is strong inter-relatedness 
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 between the two factors.  Put simply, a greater number of transactions with a principal 
will tend to follow an increased investment in specified assets and conversely a greater 
level of investment in specified assets will be made to facilitate an increase in 
transactions.  Respondents on both sides and at all levels of the dyads expressed this 
concept in one way or another.   
 
The sub-sets of asset specificity described in the literature review have implications in 
this unique channel.  These include temporal specificity, site specificity, dedicated 
assets, physical asset specificity, brand name capital, and human asset specificity.  
Although most of the academic literature tends to focus upon human asset specificity, 
each area was addressed during the participants’ interviews and will be discussed and 
analyzed in this chapter.   
 
The notion of temporal specificity was explained in the context of the changing 
dynamics of the industry.  It appears that commitment to a relationship may be the 
intention of a party, but if a significant shift occurs in the industry or within the 
relationship, the level of commitment becomes tested.  The terms and conditions have 
changed.  Parties will consider the history of the relationship and how the counter-
party’s behaviour had been as they are now venturing forth into a new set of 
circumstances.  This may have to be done on faith.  If experienced satisfactorily, 
commitment levels return to their former place.  Failing that, the aspects of the 
relationship require reconsideration. 
 
The same is true for site specificity, dedicated assets, and physical asset specificity.  
Whether it is assets or locations, parties on both sides agreed that they tend to commit 
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 based upon a pre-determined set of circumstances.  When these circumstances change, a 
re-examination is appropriate.  But as above the cost of dedicating certain assets to a 
particular relationship may be a costly investment and requires commitment and faith on 
the part of both parties.  Conversely, serious consideration must be applied as to the cost 
of switching out of the relationship if the assets are of little or no value elsewhere.  In 
the case of this research, respondents discussed their investments in joint technology 
and other systems which then have no value in other relationships.  They agreed that 
this forces parties to not be flippant when considering exiting the relationship.  They 
find themselves working harder to make the situation workable due to both the financial 
and non-financial costs of switching.  Thus, as per Proposition 15 and 19, increases in 
investments in assets that have a high degree of specificity are positively correlated with 
levels of investment. 
 
Although not unique to this channel, human asset specificity requires investments on the 
part of both the insurer and the broker in terms of training, product knowledge, and 
systems expertise.  Generally this form of dedication will cause a temporary impairment 
on productivity due to the necessity for time taken for training, a gradual ramp-up in 
pursuit of full competence, etc.  Whereas human asset specificity is less tangible 
because cash payments are not typically exchanged, respondents noted it is a significant 
consideration when both committing to a relationship and also in contemplating a 
switch.   
 
Brand name capital is also not unique to this channel, but there are particular aspects to 
the relationships between ING Canada and a certain class of brokers in their distribution 
chain, each of which are included in this study.  For most brokerage operations, the 
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 goodwill associated with their trade name is an important and valuable asset, just as it is 
with insurance companies.  But for this particular class of brokers, ING Canada extends 
it own name to them for purposes of marketing leverage by way of dual branding.  This 
closeness is intended to send an implicit message to consumers that each party is giving 
its endorsement to the other party, hence the co-branding.  Although it is in the early 
stages of this program for ING Canada, the intended benefits have started to emerge.  
However, in instances where deterioration in the relationship occurred, the dual 
branding has made public the implied terms of the arrangement, and this can cause 
concern amongst consumers and staff, not to mention the misinformation that can 
follow.  Participants in the study indicated that this potential outcome makes it 
incumbent upon parties venturing into this form of arrangement to ensure they are about 
to engage with the best partner.     
 
Transaction frequency as a measure of commitment in this context can be both objective 
and subjective.  Clearly it is quantifiable since the number of transactions can be 
measured in many different ways, including the number of customers, dollar volumes of 
insurance premium, renewal rates, etc.  Presumably a satisfied broker would direct a 
steady amount of new business toward a particular insurer, and this would likely 
increase proportionately to the broker’s level of satisfaction.   
 
However, in the current environment of consolidation and concentration, it is difficult to 
ascertain the root cause of an increase or decrease in premium allocation per broker.  
Although it could be due to satisfaction or dissatisfaction levels, it may also be caused 
by a reduction in insurance companies the broker represents, thus causing a redirection 
of the cancelled insurer’s block of premium in favour of the remaining insurers.  This in 
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 itself may indicate commitment to the remaining insurers, but the reasons for 
concentration are not always given.  For example, the choice may not have been the 
broker’s to surrender a particular contract with a company.  It may have been decided 
by that particular insurer due to business reasons or dissatisfaction with the broker.  
Ultimately, as the respondents suggested, frequency of transactions is an indication of 
commitment, but further analysis is required to ascertain this on a case-by-case basis.  
These scenarios validate Proposition 14 which states that higher frequency levels 
provide an incentive for firms to consider a hierarchical governance structure since it 
would likely be easier to recover costs in this way for larger transactions of a similar 
type and in a similar region.  Otherwise a market structure or hybrid form would be 
more suitable. 
 
9.4.2 The TCE “Tool” of Uncertainty (Behavioural & Environmental) 
 
Participants in the study suggested that both environmental and behavioural uncertainty 
is a significant contributing factor to changes in commitment levels.  A level of 
certainty is required in order to forecast and plan for the future of an operation.  Thus 
typical business managers endeavour to avoid the possibility of interruptions to this 
level of certainty.  In uncertain times dyad members seek to restore order and normalcy 
to their operation, regardless of whether they are principals (insurers) or agents 
(brokers). 
 
Much of the current literature, based upon early works by Klein (1989) examines 
environmental uncertainty from two particular perspectives, i.e. the complexity and the 
unpredictability of the external environment.  In this study, the complexity of the 
external environment was assumed and acknowledged, and participants tended to 
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 address the issue in terms of its unpredictability.  Much of this unpredictability stems 
from the dynamism of the industry, including consolidation of players, concentration 
strategies, and regulatory demands and changes.  The participants’ responses regarding 
environmental uncertainty and other external factors validate both Propositions 16 and 
20 since they both impact choices of governance structure.  Specifically, 
unpredictability encourages companies to develop hierarchical structures and also when 
enforcement costs are high firms tend to gravitate towards undertaking activities 
internally.   
 
Respondents on both sides and at all levels of the dyad discussed the importance of 
dealing with a credible partner that has a history for fairness and a demonstrated 
conduct of commitment.  Insurance companies concern themselves that they may be 
eliminated from a broker’s list of companies that it represents because of a move 
towards concentration.  In addition, the consolidation of brokerage operations puts 
insurers at risk of a diminished premium allocation from a shrinking number of players.  
On the other hand, insurance companies are continuing to merge and acquire 
competitors, leaving a smaller number of market opportunities for brokers to choose 
from.  Moreover, brokers find themselves at the mercy of insurers involved in internal 
rationalization in which they are analyzing the production volumes from various brokers 
and cancelling the contracts of those brokerage operations that are either too small or 
unprofitable to deal with.  These aspects on both sides of the dyad are forcing members 
to demonstrate commitment to their partners, and to determine precisely how committed 
their partners are. 
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 Behavioural uncertainty has not received the same level of attention in the academic 
literature, yet respondents in this study did recognize its relevance vis-à-vis 
commitment.  Much of the concern suggested by the respondents surrounded rapid and 
unannounced changes by the counter-party which may have an affect upon the 
relationship.  Little was discussed about irrational or erratic behaviour, but more of a 
concern about changes that demonstrate a weakness in communication levels.  Neither 
side appeared to have a high tolerance level for surprise announcements regarding 
changes that affect their mutual interests.  It was indicated that although it may be 
necessary to occasionally suffer these occurrences, a frequent number would suggest a 
lack of consideration and commitment by the party doing this.  Although, others within 
the channel may be affected in the same way by this behaviour, and it may not have 
been intended to harm a particular counter-party individually, it does draw into question 
that firm’s commitment to the industry as a whole.  Respondents suggested that this is 
equally as important as changes to the one-on-one relationship and suggests that 
Proposition 17 is accurate due to the challenges that arise with a partner’s change in 
behaviour.        
 
 
 
9.4.3 Summarizing the TCE Tools’ Contribution to Commitment 
 
Summarizing the preceding section, it is evident from the interviewees that transaction 
cost theory aids in explaining the varying levels of commitment and in particular 
calculative commitment that can exist between the principals and agents in a typical 
insurer-broker dyad.  Whereas elements from both transaction cost theory and 
commitment theory do construct and characterize the different aspects of the 
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 relationship at its various stages of existence, ultimately the chief gauges of 
commitment stem from key components (or tools) of transaction cost economics.  These 
include asset specificity, frequency, and behavioural and environmental uncertainty.   
 
The building blocks of commitment theory suggest that an assessment of a relationship 
will lead to a determination as to whether a dyad member is committed in an affective 
or calculative way, or a combination of the two.  The interviewees suggested that they 
were inclined toward a belief in their context of a blend of affective and calculative 
commitment.  Specifically, they measure the value of the relationship by comparing it 
against other potential partnerships in both financial and non-financial ways.  Due to the 
highly standardized and regulated nature of this industry, many aspects such as 
commission rates, company size, volume levels, etc. are quite similar or can be assessed 
rather quickly.  These aspects do not change significantly from period to period.  They 
are largely the elements that are examined in judging the level of calculative 
commitment.  Conversely, the respondents felt that affective commitment has relevance 
in understanding their relationships.  Each side discussed the importance of needing a 
sense of closeness and trust with their dyad partners, and the more they sensed this, the 
more committed they were. 
 
In interpreting the data from the interviews, it was also clear that the four key tools of 
transaction cost theory, i.e. asset specificity, frequency, behavioural and environmental 
uncertainty are each integral to understanding how calculative commitment is 
constructed.  In most cases, a change or an action is required to provide a direction to a 
change in commitment.  For example, asset specificity requires a deliberate investment 
or re-allocation of resources purposely in favour of a particular relationship.  In this 
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 context, frequency is apparent by measuring the number of customers and premium 
volumes.  The two forms of uncertainty typically require changes in actions or 
environments that have an affect upon the relationship.  When confronted with 
uncertain times and behaviours, dyad members tend to gravitate towards that which they 
are more familiar and comfortable with.  Although each side of the relationship may be 
affected by changes and actions differently, it is clear from the data that these aspects of 
transaction cost theory are integral in assessing commitment levels within insurer-
broker relationships.  In particular, the tools of TCE’s of asset specificity and frequency 
bear a significant impact upon the calculative form of commitment. 
 
9.5 Additional Analysis of Interview Data   
 
In endeavouring to maximize the complete utility of this research data, further analysis 
was undertaken.  In conducting this aspect of the study, each of the interviews were 
repeatedly combined and re-grouped into new categories including:  large versus small 
operations (regarding broker operations up to nine individuals versus ten and more 
individuals), gender-based, age-based, and length of service.  This is in addition to the 
natural groupings that occur such as rural versus urban brokers, ING Canada 
relationship managers, and executives.  
 
Particularly relevant in interpreting and comprehending the following findings, it should 
be noted that each of the groups of Canadian insurance executives, relationship 
managers, and insurance brokers are fairly homogenous groups within themselves.  This 
can be traced to a number of causes including: 
• Most chose a career path in their given field and moved up within the ranks. 
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 • The individuals have had to participate in similar education streams that are 
necessary within each area to develop their careers.  
• Relatively few people are hired from outside of the insurance sector.  Thus, most 
have been exposed to an extensive socialization process during the development 
of their individual careers. 
 
The additional analysis did not lead to any new or additional findings, although it might 
be argued that the absence of notable differences is itself an interesting finding.  The 
underlying method considerations for this aspect of the research were discussed earlier 
in the Methodology chapter and the analysis methods were identical to those used 
within the case studies.   
 
9.6 An Examination of the Standard Groupings 
                        
It could be argued that differences between broker and corporate responses could be 
expected to occur.  To some extent this is inherent in the differing nature of their 
responsibilities and functions.  Moreover, the structure of the relationship has an impact 
upon views and attitudes, especially considering that several dynamics can be at play 
simultaneously, e.g. principal and agent, partner, customer and supplier, etc.  This logic 
is supported in the literature (Ross, Anderson, and Weitz 1997). 
 
The research did uncover the differences in perspectives among the different groupings.  
The differences are subtle and rather nuanced, yet still demonstrate a pursuit of common 
goals.  Interestingly, the relationship managers appeared to bear similarities to each of 
the other groups (brokers and executives), which is likely due to their deliberate 
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 placement as the primary contact for the relationship.  The nature of their responses 
demonstrates an awareness and understanding for both sides of the dyad.   
 
Collectively, the brokers appeared to recognize the importance of the roles played by all 
parties to the relationship, yet their responses appeared more limited and narrow 
towards their self-interests.  This is understandable given the fact that they have made 
considerable investments in their own businesses unlike the other respondents who are 
essentially employees of the insurance company.   
 
By and large, the executive responses appeared conceptual and theoretical.  
Recognizing the intent and objectives of the relationships, these responses appeared to 
be fairly high-level and somewhat utopian, yet understanding that those aspirations 
could be achieved with an adequate measure of intent.        
 
The foregoing does not suggest, nor cannot it assert that these findings reflect true 
differences between the groups.  However, the argument can equally be made that these 
findings reflect different perspectives between the groups related to positioning. 
 
 
9.7 Analysis of Brokerages 
 
An examination of broker responses reinforces the notion that this is a fairly 
homogenous group with similar modes of operations and goals.  When separated into 
sub-groupings of those with up to nine persons involved in the operation and those with 
greater than nine, no discernable patterns or themes emerged relative to their beliefs or 
approaches to their relationships with their insurance companies.  Size may be a factor 
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 in issues such as human resources, but as far as commitment or transaction cost issues it 
did not appear to present any significant differences.   
 
The proximity to the principal did not present any emergent themes either, nor did urban 
versus rural brokerage operations.  Operations are present in almost every community in 
the country, and this study presented a blend of brokerages spread all over the Province 
of Ontario.  These are located in large cities and small towns and villages.  Some are 
within driving distance of ING Canada’s head office in Toronto, while others can be a 
two hour flight from Toronto.  The finding that no significant differences were noted 
across these sub-groupings may be due to the fact that there have been numerous 
improvements in communications and information flow (e.g. computers, internet, etc.) 
and telecommunications.  Moreover, transportation systems have improved as well.  
Thus, recognizing that distance typically presents challenges to relationships, the 
responses may have been different many years ago, but not today. 
 
9.8 Analysis of Gender, Age, and Length of Service 
 
No differences attributable to gender were found.  Both females and males expressed a 
fairly consistent distribution of opinions and responses to the interview questions.  This 
was considered to be normal, given the aforementioned homogeneous nature of each of 
the groups.  Within each group, there appeared to be an equal diversity of opinions 
regarding the components of transaction costs and commitment, ranging from 
enthusiastic to cynical.  No gender-bias was apparent in the analysis. 
 
The respondents’ level of employment in each of these groupings requires fairly 
extensive training and career paths.  It is not typically a transient-filled business and 
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 successful owners, managers and executives generally have been promoted through the 
ranks of the business.  Notwithstanding this dedication and experience, there are 
different ages and tenures of the respondents.  The median age of respondents was 
forty-seven, and the median experience level in years was eighteen.  Within the context 
of these research interviews, no additional findings could be attributed to either length 
of service, age, nor gender. 
 
9.9  Summary of the Discussion and Analysis 
 
At the conclusion of each interview, participants were asked to share any other thoughts 
or insights that they deemed important to the topic.  Interestingly, almost all respondents 
suggested that commitment in either form requires the will on both sides of the 
relationship to make it work.  They suggested that their relationships can withstand a 
measure of pressure, but not a sustained level of abuse.  Effective communication and 
maturity appear to be two essential ingredients of a healthy relationship.   
 
The ‘Commitment Wheel’ was introduced and activated as a theoretical model 
describing the influence and impact of transaction cost issues on commitment levels in 
insurer-broker dyads.   
Overall, the research analysis and findings have confirmed interviewees’ perspectives 
that transaction cost economic issues do in fact explain levels of and changes in 
commitment levels.  In each of the case studies, participants confirmed that this concept 
was relevant and had merit, and had the potential to predict subsequent actions and 
reactions by dyad parties during times when factors of the ‘Commitment Wheel’ were 
affected.   
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 This chapter has discussed the research findings against the research propositions, 
including several emergent findings.  The following chapter (Conclusions) will continue 
this discussion and also respond to the original research question. 
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 10 Conclusions 
 
10.1 Findings of the Research Proposition 
 
Returning to the primary research proposition: 
Does Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) explain the varying degrees of 
calculative commitment levels in relationships between insurers and brokers 
in the Canadian property and casualty insurance sector? 
with the following research objectives or sub-research questions identified from the 
literature review guiding the research: 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s asset specificity factor in commitment. 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s uncertainty factor in commitment. 
 To explore the tool of TCE’s frequency factor in commitment.  
 Are there other factors that impact or influence transaction costs and/or 
commitment? 
As noted, this research examined these questions and issues from the perspective of 
both insurers and brokers through exploratory case studies.    
 
This chapter will initially consider the contribution to knowledge that this thesis has 
made in further understanding changes in commitment levels as examined through the 
lens of transaction cost economics theory.  This will be followed by the presentation of 
additional findings which emerged during the research analysis.  The chapter is 
organized as follows: 
 
 
 
274 
 
 - Contribution to Knowledge – Commitment and Transaction Cost Economics 
 Insurance company and broker perspectives 
- Contribution to Knowledge – Emergent Findings 
 Affective and Calculative Commitment 
- Theoretical Implications of the Research Findings 
- Practitioner Implications of the Research Findings 
- Limitations of the Research 
- Future Research 
- Concluding Remarks 
 
10.2 Contribution to Knowledge – Commitment and TCE 
 
As examined in the Discussion chapter, the thesis has found that the key elements and 
factors of transaction cost theory contribute to an increased understanding of the 
dynamics of commitment in principal and agent dyads.  These findings could be 
considered sufficient, in and of themselves, to achieving a full comprehension of the 
issues.  However, the development and inclusion of the ‘Commitment Wheel’ has 
increased the explanatory powers and understanding of the perspectives and the 
bounded rationality of each of the three groups in the case studies.   
 
As noted in the summary of the Discussion chapter, the study concluded that the 
components of transaction cost theory:  frequency, asset specificity, plus behavioural 
and environmental uncertainty each have explanatory powers in the comprehension of 
commitment theory.  However, they do not always have an equal weighting in their 
contribution and can vary in differing situations.  In a given circumstance, one factor 
may be the catalyst for an increase or decrease in commitment, and the other factors 
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 may play a supporting or minor role.  For example, market (environmental) uncertainty 
may precipitate a broker’s decision to move psychologically (affectively committed) 
closer to a particular insurer and make idiosyncratic investments in that relationship 
(calculatively committed).  This will drive increased frequency, etc.  Alternatively, a 
situation could arise in which a broker already made unique asset investments in favour 
of a particular relationship and as a result has developed a heightened motivation to 
make that relationship work, even when difficulties manifest. 
 
10.2.1 Insurance Company and Broker Perspectives 
 
The findings in the study clearly demonstrate the different perspectives of the three 
groups.  Although they tended to agree in their responses of the research topics, it was 
evident that the three groups looked at business issues through different lenses.  
Brokerage owners were inclined to consider issues from a typical business owner’s 
point of view.  This is only natural as they continuously risk their own capital and tend 
to take a long-term view in business decisions.  They have a greater impact on their own 
success or failure with their business decisions than does a typical insurance company 
manager on the success of the insurer. 
 
Conversely, ING relationship managers tended to consider issues from a principal 
(versus agent) viewpoint and tended to speak in real terms at a micro level.  Their 
viewpoint reflected the context of the nearer-term.  This is likely due to several 
influences including the following:  annual objectives, frequent role or position changes, 
changing focuses and priorities at the insurance company, among others.   
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 The ING executives responded in an idealistic fashion and at a macro level.  They were 
inclined to speak of what the intent is in a given situation and if it was a perfect world as 
it pertains to each of the circumstances.  Their high-level responses are likely the result 
of their detachment from the day-to-day dealings within the actual relationships, yet it 
displays their knowledge of the strategic intent of this form of business relationships. 
 
10.2.2 Contribution to Knowledge – Emergent Findings 
 
In addition to research findings linked to transaction cost economics and commitment 
theories, some key findings have emerged from the analysis of the research data.  This 
section revisits the findings in the area of affective and calculative commitment.  
Although each of those two forms of commitment are influenced by one or a 
combination of more than one factor of transaction costs, and the calculative form is 
dominant in these dyads, it is surprising that the majority if not all of the relationships in 
this study have a strong affective commitment component as well, particularly on the 
part of the broker (agent).    
 
The literature reminds us that the calculative form of commitment involves an 
assessment of the value of the relationship.  This requires an examination of 
investments, costs, inputs and outputs (Morgan and Hunt 1994) whereas the affective 
form seeks to uncover affinity, common values, etc. as a reason for forging a business 
alliance.  This is more of an emotional attachment.   
 
The study concluded that based upon the unanimous response from the participants, 
transaction cost economics aids in confirming that although the calculative form is 
dominant, both forms of commitment are evident in their relationships.  Whereas it is 
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 suggested that it may be difficult to ascertain the degree to which the calculative form is 
dominant in each individual case, it appeared that affective commitment remains a 
necessary constituent in each case.  This is somewhat surprising when considered in 
light of the fact that the insurance industry is a financial service and is highly 
quantitative in nature and so too is calculative commitment.  It would seem plausible 
that industry members would naturally gravitate toward calculative commitment as the 
dominant form for the foundation of a business relationship.  Although affective 
commitment is almost always present in varying degrees, key aspects of the transaction 
cost economics framework, particularly asset specificity (systems, training, etc.) 
confirm the presence and dominance of calculative commitment. 
 
10.2.3 Theoretical Implications of the Research Findings 
 
The thesis’s primary theoretical contribution surrounds the differing utility and 
applicability of transaction cost economic theory factors.  Empirical evidence from the 
three case studies suggests that the four factors not only assist in explaining 
commitment levels and forms of commitment, but also provides a basis for a fuller 
understanding of how the factors impact and/or influence each other in the context of 
insurer-broker dyads.   
 
In addition, and as supported by the methodological literature on exploratory case study 
research (Flowler 2002; Yin 2003b), theoretical implications within exploratory 
research can also serve to identify areas where existing theory is weak or absent.  
 
While transaction cost economics theories generally maintain a close relationship with 
commitment theories, highly-focused examinations of this type are under-researched.  
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 The unique characteristics of this particular study revolve around the nature of the 
participants and specifically the asymmetry that exists and the power-shifting that does 
occur between the principal and agent (insurer and broker/broker industry).  In addition, 
unlike typical agents, these brokerage operations are not single-person entities but are 
corporately-organized legal entities with varying sizes of staff members and licensed 
professionals.  Moreover, the industry operates within a tightly-regulated framework, 
thus adding nuances, constraints, and complexities not found within other studies.   
 
Secondly, as the literature review noted, the bulk of the research within this topic area 
has generally been conducted in a survey approach.  This study adds a new dimension to 
the field by utilizing an interview approach, thus enabling respondents to expand upon 
their thoughts where they deemed appropriate in an open and honest fashion.  The 
richness of the data that has been collected has expanded the knowledge in this area 
considerably. 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this research has attempted to make a theoretical 
contribution to the subject of commitment.  As noted earlier, the research findings 
suggest that transaction cost factors do play a role in influencing or directly impacting 
either or both of the two forms (affective and calculative) of commitment.  While the 
topic has received fairly broad general coverage, it can be argued that refinements to 
both theories are warranted. 
 
In summary, this research has made several theoretical contributions, and as exploratory 
research has identified several theoretical areas where empirical evidence has suggested 
current theories are weak or absent. 
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10.2.4 Practitioner Implications of the Research Findings             
 
This section will briefly assess these research findings from a practitioner perspective, 
thus considering the contribution of the research at the functional or operational level.  
It seeks to respond to the Academic/Practitioner gap (Swamidass 1991).   
• Since dyad members expressed the relevance and importance of the affective 
form of commitment, conduct and fair treatment is essential.  Reputation has 
attained a heightened value as a corporate asset.   
• Consistency in conduct and behaviour is an important ingredient in successfully 
committed relationships.  Reductions in uncertainty will provide comfort to 
other dyad members. 
• Partners are seeking trusted relationship counter-parties and fair treatment. 
• Frequency of transactions should result from good communications and fair 
treatment. 
• Increased frequency often leads to increases in idiosyncratic investments in 
order to reduce costs on a per transaction basis and improve economies of scale. 
• Partners will be willing to invest more heavily with partners with which they 
enjoy the relationship.  This increases switching costs which in turn increases 
commitment to an existing relationship. 
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 10.3 Limitations of the Research 
 
This section summarizes certain limitations of these research findings. 
 
Primarily, this examination was an exploratory case study, reflecting the fact that this 
body of knowledge was not well-developed.  As with any exploratory research, the 
study’s proposition generated new questions and hypotheses – which can only be 
addressed through further research (Yin 2003a).  Acknowledging the explicit focus on 
linking transaction cost economics theory and commitment theory, and noting the open-
ended fourth sub-topic which actively sought out other contributing factors, the 
possibility remains that the thesis failed to identify all relevant or critical factors in 
integrating transaction costs and commitment within the Canadian property and casualty 
insurance distribution environment. 
 
In addition, this research has examined the influences, impacts, limitations, and 
constraints of transaction cost economics from the principal and agent (insurer and 
broker) perspectives.  As previously indicated, other stakeholder groups, customers, 
regulators, etc. would hold different and potentially conflicting viewpoints.  Of 
particular note, for this study the researcher specifically decided not to incorporate the 
perspectives of others in the value chain.  This was based on the considerable 
differences between the respective roles and different motivations and lenses through 
which these relationships would be viewed.   
 
There are limitations inherent in the research methods.  While there were no discernable 
grounds for believing any of the following to be true, and although such possibilities 
were actively considered during the course of the study, the possibility remains that: 
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 • Research findings were primarily based on interviews with sixty-five industry 
members, including eight insurance executives, eleven relationship managers, 
and forty-six insurance brokerage owners and senior managers.  These 
participants may not be reflective of their individual class and strata as a whole. 
• Interviews were conducted during a period of time of change in the industry 
including a measure of market uncertainty, consolidation, concentration, and 
rationalization. 
• A sub-group of respondents may have been intentionally blocking or actively 
resisting the force of change.  As such, some participants may not have been 
completely honest or forthcoming. 
 
Because the dissertation uses a case study approach, the generalization of findings is 
theoretical rather than statistical (Yin 2003b).  As with any research of one geographical 
area and one unique industry, generalizations to the rest of the commercial world should 
be made with extreme caution.  For example, industries that do not require inter-
personal relationships with partners would be less inclined to consider the influence of 
the affective form of commitment and would deem it to be irrelevant. 
10.4 Future Research 
 
This dissertation, as an exploratory case study, has generated an expanded foundation of 
knowledge and opens up several avenues for future research on both the Transaction 
Cost Economics and Commitment theories.  A few suggestions follow. 
 
10.4.1  Transaction Costs 
 
It would be interesting and informative to conduct a longitudinal study of a group of 
brokerages and measure changes in volumes and frequencies of transactions per 
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 insurance company.  This would simultaneously measure changes in investments in 
specified assets in favour of each insurer, while continuously monitoring the 
environment and individual behaviours for uncertainty in behaviour.  This could be 
conducted with an action research approach, thus adding or removing a stimulus and 
gauging the result. 
 
At the macro level, a similar study could be undertaken whereby the industry is 
examined in the aggregate.  Investments in technology, specific assets, changes in 
volume by company, etc. would be investigated to determine how the market behaves 
relative to the transaction cost factors. 
 
10.4.2 Commitment 
 
Further research is warranted in the area of affective commitment as it pertains to dyad 
members in this industry.  Both a survey and an interview approach would uncover 
underlying issues in the affective form of commitment while looking exclusively at 
matters of trust, opportunism, fairness, etc.  This would provide considerable theoretical 
as well as practitioner value.   
 
An understanding of other related parties in the chain is of value as well.  For example, 
within a brokerage operation do the staff members share the level of commitment as do 
the owners and managers with respect to a particular insurance company?  Conversely, 
do the insurance company employees share the views of their internal executives and 
relationship managers as it relates to particular brokerages?  Or are they all working at 
cross-purposes?   
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 10.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Among other matters, this thesis concluded that the insurance industry is a product of 
the human condition.  Interpersonal relationships are as important as the products or 
services themselves.  It is a rapidly changing industry, and a thorough understanding of 
human and market behaviour is necessary.  Ultimately, and chief among this study’s 
findings is clear evidence that the tools of transaction cost economics, in particular the 
factors of frequency and asset specificity assist in explaining varying levels of the 
calculative form of commitment. 
 
In closing, it is hoped that this dissertation will be of value in assisting others in their 
understanding of how commitment is formed and in recognizing the importance of 
considering its relationship to the four transaction cost factors.   
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 12.1 Appendix ‘A’ - Master Listing of Interviewees/Respondents 
 
 
 
Brokerage Principal List 
 
Assigned 
Code 
Position or Title Gender 
BPU-1 Owner Male  
BPU-2 Partner Male 
BPU-3 Senior Partner Male 
BPU-4 Senior Manager Male 
BPU-5 Owner Female 
BPU-6 Senior Manager Male 
BPU-7 Senior Partner Male 
BPU-8 Partner Female 
BPU-9 Senior Manager Male 
BPU-10 Owner Male 
BPU-11 Senior Manager Male 
BPU-12 Owner Female 
BPU-13 Partner Male 
BPU-14 Partner Female 
BPU-15 Owner Male 
BPU-16 Senior Partner Male 
BPU-17 Senior Manager Male 
BPU-18 Partner Male 
BPU-19 Partner Male 
BPU-20 Partner Male 
BPU-21 Senior Manager Female 
BPU-22 Partner Male 
BPU-23 Senior Manager Male 
BPU-24 Partner Female 
BPR-25 Owner Female 
BPR-26 Partner Male 
BPR-27 Partner Female 
BPR-28 Senior Partner Female 
BPR-29 Partner Male 
BPR-30 Senior Partner Male 
BPR-31 Partner Male 
BPR-32 Owner Female 
BPR-33 Owner Female 
BPR-34 Partner Male 
BPR-35 Partner Female 
BPR-36 Partner Male 
BPR-37 Senior Manager Male 
BPR-38 Senior Partner Female 
BPR-39 Partner Male 
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   Assigned 
Code 
Position or Title Gender 
BPR-40 Senior Partner Female 
BPR-41 Owner Male 
BPR-42 Partner Male 
BPR-43 Senior Manager Female 
BPR-44 Partner Male 
BPR-45 Partner Male 
BPR-46 Owner Male 
46 Interviews 10 Owners: 20 Partners; 9 Senior 
Managers; 7 Senior Partners 
31 Males & 
15 Females 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BPU-1 to BPU-24 = Urban brokerage participants  
BPR-25 to BPR-46 = Rural brokerage participants  
 
 
 
 ING Canada Relationship Manager List 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Assigned 
Code 
Position or Title Gender 
RM-1 Regional Branch Manager Male  
RM-2 Regional Vice President Male 
RM-3 Regional Branch Manager Male 
RM-4 Business Development Manager Female 
RM-5 Regional Vice President Male 
RM-6 Regional Branch Manager Male 
RM-7 Regional Branch Manager Male 
RM-8 Business Development Manager Male 
RM-9 Regional Branch Manager Female 
RM-10 Business Development Manager Male 
RM-11 Regional Vice President Female 
11 Interviews 5 Regional Branch Managers;            
3 Regional Vice Presidents;   
3 Business Development Managers.      
8 Males & 
3 Females 
RM-1 to RM-11 = ING Canada Relationship Managers  
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 ING Canada Executive & Senior Management List 
 
 
 Assigned 
Code 
Position or Title Gender 
EX-1 Executive Male  
EX-2 Executive Male 
EX-3 Senior Management Male 
EX-4 Senior Management Female 
EX-5 Executive Male 
EX-6 Senior Management Female 
EX-7 Executive Female 
EX-8 Executive Male 
8 Interviews 5  Executives; 3 Senior Management 
 
5 Males & 
3 Females 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 EX-1 to EX-8 = ING Canada Executives & Senior Management 
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 12.2 Appendix ‘B’ - Interview Request Documents 
 
The following is a sample of a standard letter which was sent via email after an initial 
telephone contact with a potential interviewee.  If necessary, five to seven days later, the 
researcher would follow-up with the individual to ascertain whether they would agree to 
be interviewed and to schedule an appointment.   
 
The cover letter –  
 
Further to our recent telephone discussion, this email is being sent to seek your 
participation in an interview to gather views and perceptions on commitment levels 
within insurance industry distribution channels, particularly in property and casualty 
insurance.  The research is examining the relationships that exist between brokers and 
the insurance companies they represent.  Attached, is a one-page description of this 
research.  
 
Rest assured that the interviews are anonymous and that attribution of your comments is 
not a component of this research design.  The interview will typically last about 45 
minutes, and I am happy to advise that participants have found these interviews to be 
interesting and stimulating.  They also mentioned that they have enjoyed the 
opportunity to reflect upon the direction of the insurance industry in this regard. 
 
As you know, in addition to being a PhD student at the University of Bradford, I am 
also an employee of ING Canada in the Wealth Management area working out of the 
Toronto office.  
 
I would deeply appreciate your consent in agreeing to be interviewed, and value your 
input in this study. 
 
Thank you very much for considering this request.  I look forward to speaking with you 
again soon. 
 
Paul Griffin 
(416) 440-7088 extension # 43113 
 
paul.griffin@ingcanada.com 
 
(See attached: Description of the Study and Interview Request Letter) 
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 The attached Description of the Study and Interview Request Letter 
 
(Date) 
 
Re: Study topic:  Commitment levels within insurer-broker relationships 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
As you know, I am a Director in the Wealth Management area of ING Canada located at 
the Head Office in Toronto.  In addition, I am a part-time Ph.D. student at the 
University of Bradford School of Management, UK.   
 
By way of this letter I am seeking your participation in a forty-five minute interview to 
capture your experiences relating to the changing nature of commitment levels within 
insurance distribution channels (the research area of my dissertation).  This study seeks 
to examine how industry members are reacting to these changes, as well as gather any 
further insights they may have. 
 
I am seeking to interview brokers, company executives and relationship managers.  I 
would deeply appreciate it if you would agree to contribute your perspective, 
knowledge, experience and understanding to my study.  By garnering a diverse array of 
opinions this study can make a meaningful contribution toward a better understanding 
of this issue.   
 
There has been an expression of interest in this study by the various stakeholders in the 
insurance distribution channel.  At the conclusion of the research, I will be preparing an 
executive summary of the study and would be pleased to provide a copy to you.   
 
Your involvement is important in helping us understand this topic.  As well, I believe 
that this study will contribute insights and knowledge that will benefit and aid in 
bettering the industry.  If you agree, I would be happy to meet with you at a location and 
time that you find suitable.    
 
Thank you and I look forward to speaking with you soon. 
 
Paul Griffin  
Director, Operations & Compliance 
ING Canada   
(416) 440-7088 extension # 43113 
paul.griffin@ingcanada.com 
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 12.3 Appendix ‘C’ – Interview Guide (Topics and Questions) 
 
Within the insurance industry and through the extension of the knowledge of transaction 
costs and commitment, the thesis will examine the development of relationships 
between principals and agents.  Case study research in the financial services industry 
will lead to the development of a conceptual framework assessing the potential 
contribution of transaction cost economics in addressing commitment levels in 
relationships. 
 
The original research proposal for the thesis contemplated the following: 
 
“The broker typically maintains more than one insurance market within its repertoire in 
order to service the needs of various market segments.  But why choose one insurance 
manufacturer over another?  What characteristics tend to draw a broker to an insurer, 
and vice versa?  What binds them in a sustainable relationship?  How do both parties 
tend to make it work?  When and why does it occasionally fail?  These questions, among 
many more, will be addressed within the research.” 
 
Specifically, pursuant to the proposal, the following topics were to be addressed: 
1) What are the unique elements and aspects of an insurer-broker relationship that 
lead to improvements or degeneration of commitment? 
- What are the general expectations of the parties in a traditional 
relationship? 
- How will changing some elements of key deliverables by either party be 
received? 
- Can a relationship thrive if expectations are unfulfilled, or if they are 
selectively not delivered? 
Building upon the foregoing elements of commitment, the research will develop 
a hypothesis of the potential value of examining the impact of transaction costs 
on the level of commitment, and on the relationship overall. 
2) What conditions and practices support the examination of transaction costs?  
- Understanding the potential value of transaction cost economics in terms 
of examining the environment, organization and structure, human 
behaviour, and asset-specific investments. 
- Contribution to effective governance. 
- Include an analysis of opportunity cost issues. 
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Finally, adding to the human element, the research will then explore: 
3) How do managers and staff of both parties perceive the value, usefulness and 
quality of the relationship? 
- Examine the knowledge, perceptions, experiences, and beliefs of integral 
members of both the insurer and the brokerage. 
- Analyze how they perceive the value of enhancements or reductions in 
the counterparty’s deliverables. 
 
SECTION 0 – INTRODUCTION (5-7 minutes) 
 
• Obtain permission to tape, record, or videotape 
• Purpose of the interview 
• Outline the scope – responses not limited to their current context, i.e. include 
any other experiences 
• Describe the four parts of the interview  
 
1) Introduction (5 to 7 minutes) 
2) Commitment between principals and agents (10 to 15 minutes) 
3) Transaction cost issues (10 to 15 minutes) 
4) Application of the aforementioned items and other considerations (10 to 15 
minutes) 
 
“Getting Acquainted” Topics: 
 
• How long have you been in the business? 
• How many employees work here (either at the brokerage, 
department, or branch)? 
• How long has the brokerage been operating (if applicable)? 
• How many (insurance companies or brokerages) are you 
contracted/deal with?  Does this suit you? 
• Do you enjoy the business? 
• Is there a particular aspect of this brokerage/insurer/industry that is 
unique? 
 
SECTION 1 – COMMITMENT (10 to 15 minutes) 
 
Section objective:  The initial phase of the research will develop a solid understanding 
of commitment as it pertains to relationships between insurance principals and agents. 
 
>> I would like to begin by discussing how committed brokers and insurers might be 
to their relationships. 
 
1. How would you define ‘commitment’ as it pertains to the insurer/broker 
relationship? 
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 2. How much importance do you place upon signs of commitment from the other 
party? 
3. Please discuss commitment as it pertains to the following (explanations and 
definitions provided as necessary): 
 Contractual terms, pledges 
 Communications 
 Conflict history & reputation for fairness 
 Resource allocation behaviour within the channel 
 Perceived asymmetry of commitment 
 Opportunism  
 Trust 
 Dependence 
 Affective and calculative commitment 
 
SECTION 2 – TRANSACTION COST ISSUES (10 to 15 minutes)   
 
Section objective:  Focusing on transaction costs, the research will explore the impact of 
transaction costs upon commitment levels, and assist in the development of the 
hypothesis and model creation.   
 
>> Next, I would like to discuss the role of a subject entitled “transaction cost 
economics.”  Generally speaking, we will examine how you determine the best ways 
of allocating your investments in your relationships, both financially and non-
financially. 
 
1. Do you invest (financially and non-financially) equally across each of your 
insurance principals? 
2. Is there a disproportionate investment allocation in favour of a particular 
principal, i.e. largest, smallest, most or least desirous, etc.? 
3. Please discuss transaction costs in the context of the following (explanations and 
definitions provided as necessary)………. 
 Asset specificity (‘idiosyncratic’; ‘non-specific’; or ‘mixed’ investments) 
 Behavioural uncertainty 
 Environmental uncertainty 
 Frequency of transactions 
 Logistics 
 Outsource decisions  
 Governance structures 
 Safeguarding assets 
 Adaptation to external factors  
 Performance evaluation (internally and by the counter-party) 
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SECTION 3 – APPLICATION OF THE FOREGOING TOPICS (10 to 15 
minutes) 
 
 
Section Objective:  Establishing the value and importance that each party places upon 
the elements of transaction costs, and the influences upon commitment levels. 
 
>> Finally, I would like to end the interview by asking you to elaborate on some of the 
specific aspects of your relationship with the insurer/broker.    
 
1. How do you measure or gauge the commitment level of your broker/insurer? 
2. To what degree do you find commitment levels changing in the industry? 
3. Do you resent when you feel you are investing more into the relationship 
than the other party? 
4. Do you find your own behaviour changing in terms of commitment when 
circumstances evolve? 
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 12.4 Appendix ‘D’ - Sample Interview Transcript Excerpt 
A sample/excerpt of the interpretivist method used in analysing this study’s interviews.  
The researcher is identified as ‘PG’ and the selected respondent is ‘BPU-22’.  
 
Speaker Line 
# 
Transcript Topic & 
Code 
PG 209 
210 
211 
212 
Moments ago we spoke about your personal definition 
of commitment as it relates to your agreements with 
the various insurance companies you represent.  
Could you make a statement about your personal 
philosophy? 
Personal 
definition 
BPU-22 213 
214 
I enter into these arrangements for the long term.  I 
hope that the other side is thinking the same way. 
1 & 1-3.1 
(0/1-1) 
PG 215 
216 
217 
How do you feel about any changes to investment 
levels they make when they invest in your 
relationship?  Do you tend to reciprocate?  Do you 
feel inclined to? 
Resource 
allocation 
BPU-22 218 
219 
220 
221 
222 
223 
224 
225 
When we see the insurance companies coming up with 
new technology, product innovations and so on, we 
know they are making an investment in the channel.  
When they speak to me personally and say they are 
willing to share the cost of advertising or whatever, 
I’m really satisfied that I have a partner in their 
product and I’m willing to allocate a little more in 
their direction. 
1-3.4  
(0/1-1)            
PG 226 
227 
228 
OK. Thanks.  Now, based on the definition I gave you 
earlier about idiosyncratic investments, do you feel 
like it’s a leap of faith to invest heavily in one partner? 
Asset 
Specificity 
BPU-22 229 
230 
231 
232 
233 
234 
235 
236 
237 
238  
Me and my partners are always on the look-out for 
opportunities to make our business better, more 
efficient, more profitable.  If an insurance company 
has a great I.T. system and it makes us better to get 
hooked up to it, we’ll consider it.  Even if it means 
pulling some staff out of the line-up for a while to 
learn the system, or the product, or even if we have to 
pay some cash to be a part of it.  If it makes sense, 
we’ll do it.  Of course there’s a risk to it if our 
relationship falls apart.  But you got to be careful. 
2-3.1 
(0/1-1) 
PG 239 
240 
241 
Do you feel especially good about any particular 
insurers right now, given the uncertainty of the 
marketplace?  Do you want to cosy up to them?  
Environ-
mental 
uncertainty 
BPU-22 242 
243 
244 
I try to get close to companies like ING that look like 
they are in it for the long term.  I don’t want to get 
shut out of the market. 
2-3.3 
(0/1-1)            
PG 245 
246 
247 
248 
Given the ease with which customers can deal directly 
with insurers, do you believe that by outsourcing its 
distribution to brokers that insurers will continue 
operating in this channel and if so, why? 
Logistics 
and 
outsourcing 
decisions 
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 BPU-22 249 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 
255 
256 
257 
258 
259   
ING is making it easier and simpler to do business 
with them with their I.T. systems, websites, in-house 
training programs, and whatever else.  Outsourcing 
their distribution to the broker community brings the 
best talent to the right place.  They do what they do 
best, like underwriting and claims, and we manage the 
customer relationships.  It doesn’t bother me one bit 
about Belair.  I don’t want customers that don’t want 
to develop a relationship with a local professional.  If 
the customer doesn’t recognize the value we bring, we 
don’t need him. 
2-3.5 & 
2-3.6 
(0/1-1)            
PG 260 
261 
262 
263 
264 
Alright.  Since you’re an independent business, do you 
feel that insurers have the right to monitor your 
performance?  Do you resent it, or do you feel that 
maybe it brings you closer together in your 
relationship? 
Performance 
evaluation 
BPU-22 265 
266 
267 
268 
269 
270 
271 
272 
273  
Every year the insurance companies ask us for an 
estimate of how much premium we are going to send 
their way.  We give them our best estimate, but then 
they change their prices or how they do things or 
whatever, and they get upset because we didn’t give 
them what we said we would.  Then they want to 
change the terms of how we do business together 
going forward.  They’ve got to learn to see things from 
our end. 
2-3.10 
(0/1-1)            
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 12.5 Appendix ‘E’ - Sample Broker Contract 
 
BETWEEN: 
 
 THE HALIFAX INSURANCE COMPANY  
 (the "Company") 
 
 
 - and - 
 
 
NAME OF BROKER:    
 (the "Broker") 
 
 
ADDRESS:    
 
    
 
    
 
 
BROKER’S CODE:    
 
 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT:    
  
 
 
 
In consideration of the mutual covenants hereinafter contained, the Company and the 
Broker agree as follows: 
1. BINDING AND PLACEMENT AUTHORITY 
1.1 Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, applicable law, and the Company's 
underwriting rules and Rate Manuals in effect from time to time, the Broker is authorized: 
(i) to bind the Company on risks in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Company’s Rate 
Manuals and execute insurance contracts for the lines of insurance the Company and Broker are 
legally permitted to write, and in so doing, the Broker will follow the Company's  (i) pricing 
schedule  (ii) underwriting rules, (iii) any other underwriting instructions and limitations, and (iv) 
Rate Manuals, any of which may be amended from time to time by the Company upon notice to 
the Broker, 
(ii) to collect, receive and give receipt for premiums received by the Broker on behalf of the 
Company.  The Broker will remit all premiums collected by it on behalf of the Company within 
the time periods set out in this Agreement, and 
(iii) to request that the Company cancel or not renew policies where such action is 
authorized and permitted by law. 
1.2 The Broker will notify the Company in a timely manner in accordance with the Rate Manuals after 
binding any risks. 
1.3 If the Broker and the Company are licensed to transact business in a province or territory which is 
outside of the principal province(s) in which the Broker operates on the Effective Date, then the 
Broker will obtain the prior written consent of the Company before binding any risk in such province 
or territory. 
1.4 Notwithstanding Section 7, Termination, the Company may, at its sole discretion and for any reason 
whatsoever, including, without limitation, a failure by the Broker to comply with the Company's 
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 underwriting rules or any provision of this Agreement, on written notice to the Broker, withdraw all or 
any portion of the authority granted to the Broker pursuant to Subsection 1.1 for such period of time 
as may be determined by the Company.  The Company may, on written notice to the Broker, 
reinstate such authority on terms satisfactory to the Company, including, without limitation, requiring 
that the Broker enter into a Rehabilitation Agreement on the terms provided in Section 6. 
1.5 In the event that the Broker purchases another brokerage or the customer list of another broker, or 
opens another office, or manages on behalf of a third party another insurance brokerage 
(collectively the "acquired business"), the Broker must seek the Company’s written approval prior to 
binding risks and executing insurance contracts on behalf of the Company in respect of the 
acquired business.  
1.6 This Agreement does not grant any exclusive rights to the Broker. 
1.7 In performing this Agreement, the Broker will comply with, and will ensure that its directors, officers, 
employees, agents and independent contractors will comply with applicable law.  The Broker will 
not solicit or service any business without being duly licensed to do so.  
 
2. OWNERSHIP OF BROKER CUSTOMER LISTS (EXPIRATIONS) 
2.1 Subject to Subsections 2.2 and 2.3, the use and control of expirations, including those on direct-
billed business, the records thereof, and the Brokers work product, are owned by the Broker.  The 
Company will not use its records of those expirations in any marketing method for the sale, service 
or renewal of any form of insurance coverage or other product which will abridge the Broker's rights 
of ownership, use and control, without prior authorization from the Broker, nor will the Company 
refer or communicate this expiration information to any other broker, company, or other interested 
party, without prior authorization from the Broker. 
2.2 In the event that the Broker fails to remit premiums to the Company within the time period set out in 
this Agreement or, if the Broker has not properly accounted for and paid all premiums to the 
Company for which the Broker is liable, then the use and control of such expirations, up to the 
amount of indebtedness, including all right, title and interest thereto, all records thereto and the right 
to sell such expirations will be vested in and owned by the Company. 
2.3  In the exercise of its right to collect any indebtedness due from the Broker through the use and 
control and sale of expirations, the Company will use reasonable business judgment in selling such 
expirations and will be accountable to the Broker for any sums received which, net of Company's 
related expenses, exceed the amount of indebtedness.  The Broker will remain liable for the excess 
of any indebtedness over any sums received by the Company.  The Company  may, in its sole 
discretion, forbear from exercising any rights arising from indebtedness due from the Broker, if the 
Broker furnishes collateral security acceptable to the Company in the amount of such indebtedness, 
to be held by the Company until the indebtedness is satisfied. The Broker covenants and agrees to 
give the Company all assistance within its power to produce the result most favourable to all 
concerned  including clients of the Broker. 
2.4 Nothing in this Section will effect the Company's obligation, if any, to renew policies containing 
renewal guarantees or which must be renewed pursuant to applicable law.  The Broker will be 
entitled to receive commissions on such policies at the  prevailing rate of commission then in effect, 
subject to applicable law, unless the insured has instructed the Company in writing that some other 
agent or broker is to replace the Broker as broker of record, and provided that the Company may 
set-off against any such commissions any amounts owing by the Broker to the Company. 
2.5 Subject to this Section, the Company will not use or permit the use of the records of the Broker's 
business with the Company to solicit individual policyholders for sale of other lines of insurance or 
other products or services, unless so authorized in writing by the Broker.  If authorization is granted, 
the Broker will be entitled to the applicable commission or fee, subject to any applicable law, on 
sales resulting from the use of the Broker's records. 
 
3. PREMIUM COLLECTION 
Direct-Billed Policies-Billed Policies-Billed Policies 
3.1 On direct-billed business placed by the Broker with the Company: 
(i) the Broker will collect and remit to the Company the initial premium, where applicable, 
together with the completed application/declaration within the time period set forth in the 
Company's underwriting rules and other instructions communicated from time to time,  
(ii) the Broker will not be responsible to the Company for dishonoured cheques written by 
applicants or policyholders when accepted in good faith by the Broker, 
(iii) the Company will assume  responsibility for billing and collecting all premium  when 
existing business of  the Broker is transferred to a direct-billed program of the Company, 
(iv) commission  will be paid to the Broker within fifteen (15) days after the end of the month 
in which the premiums are received and recorded by the Company.  Any business billed 
directly to policyholders by the Company and for which the Broker receives the premium 
payment will be promptly paid gross to the Company, properly identified as to the 
applicable policy and without deduction for commission, 
(v) the Company will clearly and prominently identify the Broker by name when transmitting 
policies, endorsements, premium notices, and other communications to policyholders.  
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 The Company will promptly provide the Broker with notification of all communications with 
a policyholder, and 
(vi) in the event of termination of this Agreement, provided the Broker is not then in breach of 
this Agreement, the Company will, at the Broker's request,  furnish a list of the Broker’s 
clients to the Broker. 
 
3.2 Broker Billing 
(i) The Broker is authorized to collect premium on business not billed to policyholders 
directly by the Company, and will remit net balances to the Company in accordance with 
the current Commission Schedule.  It is agreed that all premiums collected by the Broker 
on behalf of the Company are the property of the Company, and are held by the Broker 
as a fiduciary and in trust for the Company, that the Broker has no right, title or interest in 
premiums collected and that the Broker will make no deductions for expenditures from 
these premiums before remitting to the Company, except for commissions, as mutually 
agreed upon, which are to be deducted from such remittance and retained by the Broker. 
(ii) Premiums that have been determined by audits, retrospective adjustments, and interim 
reports will be fully earned. The Broker will use best efforts to collect such premiums, but 
will be relieved of responsibility for collection of such premiums provided the Company is 
notified in writing in accordance with the Rate Manuals that the premiums could not be 
collected.  If the Broker fails to so notify the Company, the Broker will be responsible for 
payment of such premiums to the Company.  No commission will be allowed on 
premiums collected directly by the Company under this provision. 
(iii) Failure of the Company, for any reason, to bill the Broker for any item will not relieve the 
Broker of responsibility to pay the amount due. 
(iv) The Broker and the Company will comply with the following accounting procedures on 
business, other than on direct-billed business: 
(a) itemized statements of money due will be prepared monthly by the Company, 
or, when mutually agreed, by the Broker, and sent to the Broker or Company, 
whichever is applicable, not later than the twentieth (20) day of the following 
month, 
(b) the balance shown on the statement due to the Company, or due to the Broker, 
will be payable not later than sixty (60) days after the end of the account month 
for which the statement is prepared, 
(c) the Broker is authorized to advance premiums on behalf of policyholders in 
which event the Broker accepts full responsibility for the collection of such 
premiums, and 
(d) the Company will have access at all reasonable times to the Broker's books 
and records for the purpose of determining any fact relating to money due the 
Company when the Broker is in premium payment default. 
The Company may modify these accounting procedures effective immediately upon notice to the 
Broker. 
 
4. COMMISSIONS 
4.1 Commissions and chargebacks will be governed by Commission Schedules incorporated into this 
Agreement as follows: 
(i) as full compensation for services, the Company will pay commissions to the Broker in 
accordance with the rates and conditions set forth in the Commission Schedule in effect 
at the relevant time. 
(ii) the Commission Schedule may be revised either by mutual agreement of the Broker and 
the Company at any time, or by the Company upon  ninety (90) days written notice of the 
proposed revisions and effective dates to the Broker, provided that the commission rate 
on a class or line of business will remain in effect without change for a period of at least 
twelve (12) months, without regard to the Effective Date of this Agreement, and provided 
that commission rates will be changed immediately if required by law. 
4.2 Where applicable, the Broker will refund to the Company commission paid to the Broker, at the 
same rate paid by the Company to the Broker. 
 
5. BROKERAGE SALE OR TRANSFER OF BUSINESS 
5.1 The Broker will give ninety (90) days prior written notice to the Company of any sale or transfer of 
all or any portion of the Broker's business, or of any change of control,  merger or consolidation, or 
of any sale or transfer of more than ten percent (10%) of the shares of any class in the capital of the 
Broker, or of any amalgamation of the Broker with another corporation.  Upon receipt of this notice, 
the Company may, in its sole discretion: 
(i) elect to do nothing, in which case this Agreement continues in effect and, if applicable, 
the Broker will be  responsible to make all necessary arrangements with the purchaser or 
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 transferee with respect to division of  commissions and any other arrangements, and will 
so notify the Company, or 
(ii) execute a new broker agreement with the purchaser of the business or the purchaser of 
the shares of the business, and/or, 
(iii) elect to terminate this Agreement immediately upon notice to the Broker. 
5.2 The Company’s rights pursuant to Subsection 5.1 are in addition to, and not in substitution for, the 
Company’s rights pursuant to any other agreement to which the Broker and the Company are 
parties including, without limitation, any shareholders’ agreement to which the Broker, the Company 
and the other shareholders of the Broker are parties (“Shareholders’ Agreement”).  In the event of a 
conflict between provisions of this Agreement, as amended from time to time, and the 
Shareholders’ Agreement, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Shareholders’ 
Agreement will prevail. 
 
6. REHABILITATION AGREEMENT 
6.1 If the Company, in its sole discretion, determines that the loss ratio or any other aspect of the 
Broker's business placed with the Company is not acceptable to the Company, the Company will 
offer to enter into a Rehabilitation Agreement with the Broker.  The proposed Rehabilitation 
Agreement will be in written form, have a minimum term of one (1) year, will specify the aspects of 
the Broker's business which are unacceptable to the Company, and will propose a course of action 
to be taken by the Broker and the Company to correct the unacceptable aspects of the Broker's 
business. 
6.2 The parties acknowledge and agree that, if the Company has offered a  Rehabilitation Agreement to 
the Broker, the Company is entitled, notwithstanding this Section 6, to terminate this Agreement 
with the Broker pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 7.2(ii) of this Agreement, if: 
(i) the Company and the Broker cannot reach agreement on the Rehabilitation Agreement 
within sixty (60) days of receipt by the Broker of the Company's proposed Rehabilitation 
Agreement, or 
(ii) the Broker fails to carry out or continue to carry out any action or procedure, or attain any 
objective required by the Rehabilitation Agreement entered into between the Company 
and the Broker. 
6.3 If, while a Rehabilitation Agreement is in place, any other aspects of the Broker's business which 
are not dealt with under such Rehabilitation Agreement become unacceptable to the Company, the 
Company may, in its sole discretion, offer to amend the  Rehabilitation Agreement, and Subsection 
6.2 will apply to such offer. 
 
7. TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT 
7.1 Either party may terminate this Agreement by giving ninety (90) days written notice to the other 
party. 
7.2 The Company may terminate this Agreement immediately on written notice to the Broker if: 
(i) the Broker has not made payment to the Company of any amount due to the Company 
within the time and in the manner required in Section 3, 
(ii) the Broker has failed to comply with any term or condition of this Agreement, 
(iii) the Broker is bankrupt, fails to meet current obligations as they fall due, or makes a 
proposal in bankruptcy, 
(iv) the Broker's license is canceled, suspended or not renewed, 
(v) the Broker, or if the Broker is a partnership or a corporation, any partner, shareholder, 
director or officer is charged with any crime or offence involving the misuse, 
misappropriation or conversion of funds, or moral turpitude, 
(vi) the Broker has knowingly misrepresented the description or circumstances of a risk or 
claim, 
(vii) the Broker has, in the opinion of the Company, ceased to carry on business,  
(viii) the Broker has, without prior notice to the Company, sold or transferred any or all of its 
business or more than ten percent (10%) of the shares of any class of capital, undergone 
a change of control, amalgamation, merger or consolidation of the Broker's business, in 
which event the Company may elect to treat this Agreement as terminated effective the 
date of the event notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, or 
(ix) the Broker engages in any conduct or practice which, in the sole discretion of the 
Company, reflects or is anticipated to reflect unfavourably upon, or may be detrimental to 
the Company. 
7.3 In the event this Agreement is terminated pursuant to Section 7.1, the Broker may elect, by giving 
written notice to the Company within thirty (30) days of either giving or receiving notice of 
termination, to assume responsibility to complete the collection of, payment to and accounting to 
the Company for all premiums, commissions, and other amounts owing to the Company in respect 
of policies written through the Broker and due on the date of termination or arising thereafter. 
7.4 In the event of termination of this Agreement by either party, policies written through the Broker and 
in force on the effective date of termination will be allowed by the Company to remain in force until 
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 their expiry dates, unless canceled by the policyholder or canceled by the Company for non-
payment of premium or by reason of the risk no longer complying with the Company's established 
underwriting rules and instructions, and the commission agreement provided herein will continue to 
apply until all policies expire or are terminated.  The terms of this assumption will be in accordance 
with the Insurance Bureau of Canada Agreement, to which the Company is a signatory. The 
Company will prepare and deliver to the Broker a list of the risks to be assumed. 
7.5 With respect only to the servicing of policies remaining in force after the termination of this 
Agreement, the Broker will continue to be the duly authorized representative of the Company, 
subject to all of the provisions of this Agreement, except that the Broker will not, without prior 
approval of the Company, bind any new risks or increase or extend the Company's liability 
thereunder, or alter the terms of any policy. 
7.6 Termination of this Agreement will result in the immediate revocation of the Broker’s appointment as 
broker for the Company and the immediate revocation of all binding authority, the right to collect 
premiums and receive commissions thereon except as may be otherwise provided herein and 
except for commissions earned, accrued and unpaid at the effective date of termination.  All other 
rights and obligations of the parties hereto will survive the termination of this Agreement. 
 
8. RETURN OF MATERIALS 
8.1 All applications, policies, documents, manuals, equipment or other materials supplied to the Broker 
by the Company will remain the property of the Company and will be returned to the Company on 
termination of this Agreement upon request. 
 
9. ADVERTISING 
9.1 The Broker will not publish or distribute any advertisements, circulars or other materials referring to 
the Company or containing the Company's name, trademarks or trade names, without first securing 
written approval from the Company. 
 
10. CLAIMS 
10.1 The Broker will promptly notify the Company of any incidents, events or occurrences, which may 
result in a claim or loss. When requested by the Company, the Broker agrees to cooperate fully with 
the Company to facilitate the investigations, adjustment and settlement of any claim, including, 
when required by the Company, acting as the Company's agent in the settlement of claims. 
10.2 The Broker has no authority to and will admit no liability on the part of the Company in any manner 
except in accordance with specific claim settlement authority extended to the Broker in writing. 
 
11. GOVERNING LAW 
11.1 The laws of the province or territory of the Broker’s principal place of business governs this 
Agreement. 
 
12. CONFIDENTIALITY 
12.1 The  Broker will and will cause all of its directors, officers, employees and representatives, during 
the term of this Agreement and for two (2) years after its termination, to protect, not to use except 
for the purposes of this Agreement, and keep confidential all information concerning the Company's 
business and its practices and products. 
12.2 The Broker will and will cause all of its directors, officers, employees and representatives to protect, 
not to use except for the purposes of this Agreement, and keep confidential all information 
concerning any claim or potential claim during the term of this Agreement and until such time 
thereafter as any claim or potential claim is resolved to the satisfaction of the Company. 
12.3 All Company Rate Manuals, marketing materials, forms and other information supplied to the 
Broker by the Company, including the underwriting rules, are proprietary and will not be disclosed to 
any third party without the Company's prior written consent. 
12.4 The Company will, during the term of this Agreement and for two (2) years after its termination, 
protects and keep confidential all information concerning the Broker's business and its practices. 
 
13. NOTICES 
13.1 Any notice or other communication required to be given under this Agreement must be in writing 
given by facsimile, personal delivery, ordinary mail or by prepaid certified or registered mail to the 
current address of record of the respective party. 
 
14. ASSIGNABILITY 
14.1 The Broker may not assign this Agreement nor any of its right, title or interest in this Agreement, 
including any rights to receive any monies or proceeds, which include insurance accounts 
receivable, without the prior written consent of the Company.  The Company may assign its rights 
and obligations hereunder in accordance with any applicable legislation. 
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 15. SEVERABILITY 
15.1 Each of the provisions contained in this Agreement is distinct and severable and a declaration of 
invalidity or unenforceability of any provision by a court of competent jurisdiction will not affect the 
validity or enforceability of any other provision of this Agreement. 
 
16. AMENDMENT 
16.1 Subject to the Company’s right to change, without limitation, Commission Schedules, underwriting 
rules, Rate Manuals, administrative procedures, as provided herein, this Agreement may be 
amended in writing at any time upon mutual agreement of the Broker and the Company.  This 
Agreement will be modified effective immediately if required by law. 
 
17. ARBITRATION 
17.1 If any matters of difference, or any dispute will arise between the parties as to the construction or 
effect of this Agreement, or any matter arising therefrom, or from the relationship between the 
parties, then every such dispute or difference will be referred to the arbitration of three persons, one 
to be appointed by each of the parties hereto and a third to be appointed by the first named 
arbitrators in writing before they enter upon the business of the reference.  The cost of the 
arbitration will be shared equally by the parties. 
The decision of a majority of the arbitrators will be final and binding upon the parties hereto.  It will 
be a condition precedent that unless and until matters in dispute have been submitted to arbitration, 
no action at law with respect to the matters in dispute will be brought by either party against the 
other. 
17.2 This arbitration clause will not be applicable to the provisions of Section 6, Rehabilitation 
Agreement nor to Section 7, Termination of Agreement. 
 
18. HOLD HARMLESS 
18.1 The Company will indemnify and hold the Broker harmless against all civil liability, including legal 
fees and costs of investigation and defense incidental thereto, arising as a direct result of: 
(i) company error or omission in the preparation, processing, handling or billing of direct-
billed business or any other business placed by the Broker with the Company, except to 
the extent that the Broker has caused or contributed to such error or omission, 
(ii) failure of any insured to receive notice of cancellation, non-renewal, or any other notice 
affecting coverage of direct-billed business, where such notices are sent directly to the 
insured by the Company, 
(iii) any action or inaction of the Broker based upon the Broker's use of forms supplied by the 
Company or following instructions or procedures established by the Company, except to 
the extent that the Broker has caused or contributed to any such action or inaction, 
(iv) damages sustained by any person or entity as a result of information furnished by the 
Broker to the Company unless the Broker furnished false information with malice or willful 
intent to injure or with negligent disregard for the truth or accuracy thereof, and 
(v) any Company act or omission in investigating, settling or paying claims. 
18.2 The Broker will maintain, at all times while this Agreement is in force, errors and omissions 
insurance with extended coverage for loss resulting from fraudulent acts to cover claims against the 
Broker and its directors, officers, employees and representatives in an amount equal to the greater 
of one million dollars ($1,000,000) or such amount as may be required by applicable law.  The 
policy will provide that the Company must be given thirty (30) days prior written notice by the insurer 
of termination, cancellation or non-renewal. 
18.3 The Broker agrees that all personnel, licensed producers and other employees (collectively 
‘personnel’) will be instructed concerning the terms and conditions of this Agreement.  All such 
personnel are and will be employees of the Broker and under no circumstances employees or 
agents of the Company.  The Broker is fully and solely responsible for the acts and omissions of 
such personnel, and is solely responsible for their supervision, direction, compensation and 
compliance with this Agreement and applicable laws. 
18.4 The Broker will indemnify and hold the Company and the Company's directors, officers, employees, 
agents and independent contractors harmless against losses, liabilities or costs arising out of or in 
connection with a breach of this Agreement by the Broker, or any claim for negligence against the 
Broker related to the performance or failure to perform duties under this Agreement. 
18.5 The Broker will promptly notify the Company when the Broker receives notice of any claim or the 
commencement of any action relating to this Agreement, and the Company will be entitled, but not 
obligated, to participate in such action, or to assume the defense of any such action at its expense.  
If the Company assumes the defense of any such action, it will not be liable to the Broker for any 
legal or other expenses subsequently incurred by the Broker in connection with such action without 
the Company's advance written approval of such expenses. 
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 19. WAIVER 
19.1 Unless otherwise expressly provided, the extent of any waiver granted for breach of this Agreement 
will be restricted to the specific breach concerned and will not extend to any further occurrence of 
such breach. 
 
20. RECORD RETENTION AND AUDIT 
20.1 The Broker will retain all documentation; forms and records relevant to this Agreement and will, 
upon demand  submit to the Company or make available for audit purposes all such documentation, 
forms and records.  The Broker will retain these for a period of seven years. 
20.2 Upon providing three (3) business days notice to the Broker, the Company has the right to inspect, 
examine, audit and verify, at the Broker’s office or elsewhere, any matter related to this Agreement 
and to take copies thereof.  The cost of any audit reasonably incurred arising from an event of 
termination specified in Section 7.2 will be the responsibility of the Broker, reimbursable to the 
Company upon demand. 
 
21. TERM OF AGREEMENT 
21.1 This Agreement replaces and supersedes all previous agreements, whether written or oral, 
between the Company and the Broker and will remain in full force and effect until suspended or 
terminated as provided herein. 
     
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this Agreement to commence on the 
Effective Date. 
 
THE HALIFAX INSURANCE COMPANY 
 BROKER 
Signature:    Signature:    
 
Name:     Name:     
 
Title:     Title:     
 
Date:     Date:     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
339 
 
 Part 2 (Contingent Profit Commission Agreement) 
 
 THE HALIFAX INSURANCE COMPANY  
 (the "Company") 
 
 - and - 
 
 
NAME OF BROKER:   
 (the "Broker") 
 
 
The Purpose of the Profit Sharing Agreement (the “Agreement”) is to foster the development of profitable portfolios 
of business by sharing those profits generated by such business through the mutual efforts of the Company and the 
Broker. 
 
Eligibility Requirement 
  
The Broker agrees to maintain a minimum continuing concentration of ____%, of the 
Broker's total eligible personal lines gross written premium, with the Company.  For 
purposes of calculating the Broker’s concentration percentage, eligible business 
includes all personal lines business that the Company normally writes.  Eligible 
business does not include personal lines business placed with specialty markets. If the 
Company determines that the minimum continuing concentration level has not been 
met, the Company may, in its sole discretion, compensate the Broker in accordance with 
the Company’s Lead Carrier Broker Profit Sharing Agreement or in accordance with the 
Company’s standard Broker Profit Sharing Agreement currently in force.  Eligibility is 
also conditional upon the Broker’s continuing relationship with the Company pursuant 
to the Company’s standard Broker Agreement.   
 
Lines of Business 
 
The calculation of the Broker's Profit Share includes all personal lines and commercial 
lines business written through the Company, except accident and sickness insurance, 
except as mutually agreed by written amendment to this Agreement.   
 
Definitions 
 
Losses means the gross incurred losses, allocated loss adjustment expenses, IBNR, 
unallocated loss adjustment expenses and stop loss calculation for all business placed by 
the Broker with the Company for the latest two calendar years.  Each Loss is subject to 
a maximum of $200,000 for any one accident or occurrence and $200,000 for the 
aggregate of all property losses caused by a single natural disaster.   
 
Commissions Earned means the commissions earned in the period, on all business placed by the Broker with the 
Company, exclusive of profit sharing payments, for the latest two calendar years. 
Administration Expenses means the total of all underwriting expenses and premium taxes incurred by the Company on 
all business placed by the Broker with the Company, but does not include expenses relating to commission payments, 
as determined by the Company. 
Exclusive Alliance Credit means the amount of Company expense savings attributable to technological and productivity 
efficiencies. 
Profit (Loss) means Gross Earned Premium minus Losses and Commissions Earned and Administrative Expenses plus 
Exclusive Alliance credit.   
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Calculation of Profit Share 
 
The amount of the Broker’s Profit Share will be determined on a yearly basis as 50% of the profit generated, as set out 
in Schedule 1 of this Agreement. The calculation of a Profit Share is based upon the average of the latest two (2) 
calendar years only. There are no carry-forwards or carry-backs of profit or loss to any other accounting period.   
 
Growth Bonus Factor 
 
The Growth Bonus Factor is based on the difference between the prior year’s gross written premium and the current 
year’s gross written premium.  The Profit Share is multiplied by the Growth Bonus Factor percentage in order to 
calculate the Growth Bonus amount. 
 
Percentage of Growth Growth Bonus Factor 
10% to 19.9% 15% 
20% to 29.9% 20% 
30% and over  25% 
  
 
Nine Month Option 
  
The Broker may elect by giving written notice to the Company prior to November 1 of any year of the Agreement, to 
guarantee the minimum amount of the Profit Share as calculated from this Agreement.  In this event, the Profit Share for 
the year will be the greater of the Profit Share calculated on September 30th or December 31st, minus an amount equal 
to fifteen percent (15%) of the Profit Share at September 30th. 
 
This election is only available to the Broker in any year if there is Profit Share payable to the Broker as of September 
30th of that year.   
 
Deductions 
 
The Company may apply any Profit Share otherwise payable under this Agreement to any outstanding balances and/or 
other monies which are due from the Broker and which have not been paid to the Company at the time any Profit Share 
is payable. 
 
In addition, for any month in the current Profit Share year in which there was an outstanding balance and/or other 
money overdue from the Broker to the Company (a delinquent month), the Company may reduce the Profit Share 
payment by a maximum of ten percent (10%) for each delinquent month occurrence.   
 
Other Conditions 
 
The Broker’s premium, losses and expenses written through Wellington Insurance Company personal lines facilities will 
be included in the Profit Share calculation and Schedule 1 will apply as if the business has been written through the 
Company. 
 
For a Broker contracted with the Company for less than one year, the calculation of a Profit Share is based upon the 
Broker’s experience for that year. 
 
The Company's records will be used for all calculations of Profit Share. 
 
From the Effective Date onward, this Agreement supersedes and replaces all previous agreements, whether written or 
oral, with respect to the sharing of profits between the Company and the Broker and will continue in force until 
terminated.  This Agreement may be terminated or modified by the Company in its sole discretion for subsequent years 
by giving written notice to the Broker prior to October 1st of the current year. 
 
Upon termination of the Broker Agreement between the Company and the Broker for any reason, this Agreement will 
cease as of January 1st of the calendar year in which the termination becomes effective. 
 
The final determination of any questions or disputes relating to calculations, conditions, or terms of this Agreement will 
be made by the President of the Company. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties have executed this Agreement to commence on the 
Effective Date.  
 
The Halifax Insurance Company 
 
BROKER NAME 
 
Signature:   Signature:   
 
Name:    Name:    
 
Title:    Title:    
 
Date:    Date:    
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The Halifax Insurance Company 
Schedule 1 
Broker Profit Sharing Agreement (Exclusive Alliance Program) 
 
Broker Name:   
Broker Numbers:   
For the period ending:   
 
 
This Year Last Year 2 Year Average 
Gross Written Premium $XXX $XXX $XXX 
Gross Earned Premium $XXX $XXX $XXX 
    
Losses 
(incl. IBNR & ULAE & ALAE & Stop Loss) 
$XXX $XXX $XXX 
    
Commissions Earned $XXX $XXX $XXX 
    
Administration Expenses $XXX $XXX $XXX 
Exclusive Alliance  Credit $(XXX) $(XXX) $(XXX) 
Expenses 
$XXX $XXX $XXX 
Profit (Loss) 
$XXX $XXX $XXX 
Profit Share Factor 
  50% 
Profit Share before 
Growth Bonus 
 $XXX  
Percentage of Growth 
  
Growth Bonus 
Factor 
  XX% 
Growth Bonus 
  $XXX 
Profit Share 
Payable   
  $XXX 
 
